9.20.98.

Library of the Theological Seminary,

PRINCETON, N. J.

Presented by The Sociological Institute of Princeton Seminary.

Division HM51

Section S93

Shelf.....

Number.....

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY

By J. H. W. STUCKENBERG.

Introduction to the Study of Philosophy.
With an Appendix and Index. 6th edition. Crown 8vo, cloth, net, $1.50.

The volume is intended to be an ***Introduction to the Study of Philosophy****, and everything has been adapted to this specific aim. It is not an encyclopædia, nor is it intended as an introduction to any particular philosophical system — or to the history of the various systems — but to the study of Philosophy itself.*

The author holds that philosophy is not taught, but thought; that thought is never appropriated except by mental elaboration, and that the best preparation for philosophy consists in clear, profound, and independent thinking.

Introduction to the Study of Sociology.
With complete Index. Crown 8vo, cloth, net, $1.50.

For sale by all booksellers, or sent by mail, postpaid, on receipt of price, by the publishers,

A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON,
51 East Tenth Street (near Broadway), New York.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

J. H. W. STUCKENBERG

Member of the Philosophical Society of Berlin

AUTHOR OF "INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY"
"THE LIFE OF IMMANUEL KANT," "TENDENCIES
IN GERMAN THOUGHT," ETC.

New York

A. C. ARMSTRONG AND SON

51 East 10th Street, near Broadway

1898

Copyright, 1897,
By J. H. W. Stuckenberg.

University Press:
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.

DEDICATED

TO

W. D. MILLER, M.D.

Professor in the University of Berlin.

PROMOTER OF SCIENCE.

FRIEND OF HUMANITY.

PREFACE.

THE title gives the exact aim of the volume. An elaborated system of Sociology is not attempted; but the purpose is to lay the basis for sociological study, to designate the problems involved, and to aid the beginner in the solution of these problems. This purpose has determined the character of the volume and furnishes the criterion by which its contents must be judged.

Special attention has been devoted to the interpretation of society, particularly to the idea found under the head of *Sociation;* to the division of Sociology; and to the removal of the confusion caused by burdening the subject with materials which are not sociological, but belong to metaphysics, to speculative philosophy, or to natural science.

Three classes of inquirers were prominently before my mind, and the book was prepared chiefly to meet their needs.

First, that large class of professional men and other persons of culture who have had no instruction in Sociology, but are desirous of obtaining an idea of its nature and materials, and of pursuing its study privately. Even if they cannot become specialists, they want such a conception of the subject as will enable them to judge of its sphere and principles, and to get a knowledge of its trend and literature. The practical value of the volume will consist in bringing society definitely before their minds, and in furnishing the means for fruitful sociological investigations.

Second, students who have no Sociology in their collegiate course, but realize that without it their education and their preparation for life are incomplete. This Introduction will, it is hoped, prevent the waste of time and the fruitless efforts which are almost unavoidable if the study is taken up without some help to its definition, its division, its relation to other subjects, its method, and its literature.

Third, teachers of social science who desire a compend as the basis of their instruction, or who, while lecturing on Sociology, want a manual in the hands of their students. Such a volume as is here offered ought to make more easy the introduction of this study into institutions where it is now omitted. I expect to make the book the basis of

my introductory lectures to sociological students, and have had this purpose in view in writing the volume.

Teachers and students who use the book are of course expected to exercise the same independence respecting its contents as I claim for myself. It wants to lead to inquiry, not to imitation; and its purpose will best be accomplished by promoting investigation, however much the conclusions may differ from those here presented. Sociology needs thinkers, not echoes.

The problem to be solved is stated at the beginning of each chapter. By thus presenting the theme definitely to the mind of the student, the discussion is likely to be clearer and more profitable.

The smaller print is intended to explain and amplify the larger which it follows. The fact that smaller type is used does not imply inferior importance. The *Reflections* are for review and aids to original research.

During a residence of fourteen years in Berlin I found in the Royal Library many works of value to the sociologist whose contents are missed by such as study only French and English writers. Since my return to America I have been greatly indebted to Harvard Library and the Boston Public Library for the use of their rich treasures. The

books mentioned in the volume will suffice to introduce the beginner to the principal works and also serve, through their references and bibliography, to open the way to the extensive sociological literature in various languages.

J. H. W. STUCKENBERG.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
January 1, 1898.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	The Genesis of the Idea of Society	1
II.	Definition and Scope of Sociology	44
	A. Definition	44
	B. Scope	53
III.	The Relation of Sociology to Other Social Disciplines	72
	The General Distinction between Sociology and the Specific Social Sciences	75
	Political Science	78
	Political Economy	84
	History	88
	Other Disciplines	93
	Is Sociology a Grouping of Other Disciplines, or a New Discipline? . . .	97
IV.	Division of Sociology	102
V.	The Principles of Society *per se*	115
	A. Society	116
	The Individual and Society	116
	Sociation	126
	B. The Principles	143
VI.	The Historical Evolution of the Principles of Society	161
VII.	Sociological Ethics, or the Progress of Society	201
	1. The Ethical Ideal	216
	2. The Ethical Actuality	220
	3. The Means for Realizing the Ideal of Progress	221
	Completeness of the Division of Sociology	233

CHAPTER PAGE
VIII. The Method in the Study of Sociology . . 238
Method for Independent Sociological Research 263
IX. Is Sociology a Science? 272
X. The Sociological Study of the Age 295
Plan for the Study of a Community . . 323

Index 331

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

The Genesis of the Idea of Society.

The Problem. — *It is our purpose to trace briefly the idea of society as developed in the individual and in humanity. Not the interpretation of society is our aim, that comes later; but a general conception of society. Even persons of culture rarely apprehend the social totality.*

Antiquity and the Middle Ages lacked the broad outlook and the intellectual conditions for comprehending the total social organism. The world was too little known, and national and religious life severely limited the conception of the nature and the relations of society. Greek philosophy and Christianity enlarged the social thought; but it was reserved for modern times to make humanity its scope. Geographical progress, facility of communication, travel, commerce and the comprehension of the world as a market, the growing intimacy in national relationship, and the general enlargement of thought, have given prominence to human society as extending beyond church and state, and brought the different races into close contact. The multi-

plication and power of associations also gave prominence to social thought and movement. Society became too important for thinkers longer to neglect its interpretation. With the enlarged conception of society Sociology was born.

The problem presented in this chapter is introductory; it leads to, but not into, Sociology. We distinguish between the genesis and the interpretation of society; but the genesis of society itself is the condition for developing the idea of society in the individual and humanity, and for constructing a complete social system.

In the history of human thought the conception of society in its most comprehensive sense has not received due attention. The conception is difficult and presupposes various preparatory stages; it also seems remote from our immediate interests and ordinary inquiries. It is significant that the idea of society is not more frequently grasped in our era of advanced thought and enlarged views, when altruism awakens enthusiasm and peculiar prominence is given to social studies.

The development required by the individual in order to comprehend society is an interesting study. It is a process similar to that through which humanity has passed in its social development. The evolution of mankind has frequently been compared with that of an individual through childhood, youth, and manhood, the genesis of thought in the individual being similar to that in the race. The analogy may sometimes be strained, but we are warranted in saying that as the individual unfolds, his processes bear a likeness to those through which the human family passed on its way to civilization.

Each man is the centre of his universe; from that centre he draws the circumference of his vision, his interests, and his activities. Not only does he start with

himself wherever his thought, feeling, and volition wander, but he never gets away from himself. How to get out of himself is no more a problem for him than how to step on his shoulders; the problem is how to enlarge himself to the comprehension of society and the universe, and how to relate himself consciously as he is actually but unconsciously related. He believes a falsehood if he imagines himself isolated; but how shall he grasp that social realism in which he is involved?

Absolute social dependence is no more characteristic of childhood than is the total unconsciousness of this dependence. The life is mainly vegetative, a period of potentiality and prophecy, not of achievement. The individual himself has not been differentiated, and so he cannot differentiate society from himself. In the true sense will, reason, character, are mere possibilities; the reality has yet to be achieved. The child's circumference is limited to immediate needs and their supply.

The horizon of youth is enlarged; a dim social consciousness arises, social attachments are formed; but an imagined independence, wilfulness, even license are more dominant traits than the recognition of the existing social relation and social dependence. The attention is engaged by the immediate surroundings, by passion and pleasure, by ambition undisciplined by experience, by bright hopes, large plans, and tentative efforts. Youth lacks the conditions for a broad outlook into humanity, except perhaps in the form of visions and aspirations. Unless enthusiasm inspires the heart with patriotic and humanitarian sentiments, the family, the school, a narrow social circle, a few playmates and bosom companions limit the sphere of the social interests. Life and thought are too circumscribed for an intelligent conception of the meaning of human society.

For the growth beyond a self-centred and self-contained life, we look to the years of maturity. Yet when manhood and womanhood are reached personal matters usually become so absorbing through the struggle for existence and for advancement as to shut out the consideration of society, except so far as in our immediate environment and as a necessity or pleasure. When business is entered, the intensity of competition and the daily cares of life preclude the study of society itself and any considerable interest in its general welfare. Through the press, through religious, political, and economic considerations, the world now and then comes into view and receives passing notice; but aside from private interests, the sphere of life is found in the concerns of the community, the state, the nation, and of the church and the other associations to which the individual belongs. There are indeed some with enlarged social views and with ardent aspirations for humanity; they are, however, exceptions, and mainly confined to religious and philanthropic efforts. Modern business methods afford little opportunity for making a specialty of the study of society.[1]

We naturally look to the educated, and to such as devote their lives to intellectual pursuits, for that comprehensive and intelligent consideration of society of which we speak. It is society itself as an object of interest and study, in order that it may be thoroughly understood, which we are contemplating. So many things are involved in it which must be mastered in order that social affairs may be comprehended, that a high

[1] An intelligent business man was asked what he meant by society, of which he was speaking. He answered: "All my life have I been talking about society, and it seemed perfectly clear to me what was meant; but now that you ask me I cannot tell what society is." His experience is so common as to be nearly universal.

degree of scholarship and abstract thinking are required for a successful investigation of the complexities of association.

With rare exceptions, however, the educated classes are devoted to a profession or calling which limits the attention to a particular class of objects, and does not lead directly to a contemplation of human society. The preacher, the teacher, the lawyer, the doctor, are, as a rule, too exclusive as specialists to take a deep and broad view of humanity; if they do make it an object of special inquiry, it is apt to be wholly from their professional standpoint. The few teachers and specialists in Sociology necessarily concentrate their studies on social affairs. There are others also who transcend the limits of their profession and study society as society and for the sake of society. Their interest is theoretical as well as practical; they seek to interpret society and to promote social progress. The number of those making a specialty of social studies is on the increase, yet even in scholarly circles the percentage is small; but the conviction that the future is theirs inspires them with enthusiasm.

The above becomes more evident when we emphasize the oft-overlooked distinction between *society* and *societies*. The latter may receive much attention while the former is neglected. Every thoughtful man considers the societies of which he is a conscious part; but the social organism to which all societies belong and which is the social totality has a very different meaning. Much that characterizes our age as social in distinction from what is individualistic means that societies rather than individuals are considered; but it by no means implies that the age itself has grasped the idea of society as a totality.

Each one contemplates the individual when he thinks of himself; so each one considers societies when he thinks of his own immediate associations; but the notion of society *per se* is more abstract. Further discussion, in later chapters, will add to its clearness. It is enough now to say that the notion does not refer to society here or there, of this kind or that kind, but to the essence of society itself, what constitutes it, and what is found in all societies after what is peculiar to them as particular societies has been eliminated. The difficulty of the idea helps us to understand why so few individuals progress to it, and why it is so rare in the literature of humanity.

Whoever has passed through the egoistic to the altruistic view and attained the idea of society itself, can appreciate the struggles through which men as they now are, and as they were in past ages, must pass before attaining the same. The forces which control individuals and humanity in their contemplations can be inferred from the account given of childhood, youth, and manhood. The determining factors are pressing needs, personal affairs, self-interest, what satisfies the appetite and gratifies the taste, what is adapted to the particular stage of culture reached, the natural and social environment, the profession or calling in life. The vast majority consider only what is forced on their attention or immediately concerns them; curiosity may lead them beyond this, but hardly for serious contemplation. Social movements are exciting great interest and societies are rising into prominence; but there are few who for its own sake study society in its deepest and largest sense.

In general terms we can indicate the process of such as grasp the idea of society.

It requires but little reflection for any one to recognize the society in which he moves as but a component part of

a larger social totality. The family to which he belongs is connected with other families; the organizations he joins touch, influence, and are influenced by, other organizations; the state of which he is a citizen sustains international relations; and economic organizations are striving to make the world itself their market. Thus far beyond the individual's immediate social environment unions and organizations are recognized; it is found that men are not isolated but exist in associations; and it becomes evident that individuals can be understood only when studied in their associated capacity.

Men as associated furnish the most general notion of society. How they are associated and what the results of the association, are subjects for further reflection. At first the individuals in the association are the most conspicuous, and many are so absorbed by the individuals as not to be able to do justice to society. This difficulty can in part be overcome by considering that society exists when the individual is born; that he is born into it and is constantly subject to its influence. Heretofore the tendency has been to pass from the individual to the study of society; but the time seems to be at hand when the individual will be studied in the society of which he is an integral part, and which so largely determines his character and career.

The individual who apprehends society, and himself as one of its factors, simply apprehends the human reality in which he moves and of which he is a part. His attention is naturally first arrested by what is nearest him and most striking. The family, the church, the state, social groups in which he lives, great voluntary organizations, particularly of an economic character, and popular movements which carry along large masses, are proofs of the reality and power of society. But aside

from striking social phenomena and organized bodies, there is a deeper and subtler meaning of society which is apt to escape notice. Men are united by invisible ties and controlled by unrecognized social forces; they move in a social mechanism and are subject to social influence even when alone. They breathe the social air, they imbibe the social spirit, they live in a social environment. This must be appreciated if the individual himself and his relations are to be understood. Later we shall see that the most enlarged view of society is attained only by one who recognizes himself as an integral part of mankind as a totality.

Since the process in the individual is typical of that in the race, the development described helps us to interpret the evolution of the conception of society in humanity which we now consider.

The social actuality is not to be confounded with the full consciousness of that actuality; in other words, the origin and growth of human association are different from reflection on them and from the interpretation of the association. We must remember that men are usually unconscious or but semi-conscious of what concerns them, that facts absorb the attention long before their explanation is thought of, that chronologically practice precedes theory and events history, and that thought must be matured before philosophy and science become possible. Social processes for countless ages were required before society became conscious of itself. Indeed, though we are growing into this consciousness, we cannot yet boast of its full attainment.

The evolution of society was the condition for reflection on this evolution. Some social theory is of course involved even in the earliest social forms, and some occult notion of the social relations is implied in all social

action. But blind impulse and unreflecting instinct precede full consciousness and rational purpose. Intellectual progress consists largely in developing into clear consciousness the actually existing but unconscious social elements; what is implicit is gradually made explicit. There is thus a twofold process of evolution, — the consciousness of men respecting what exists is evolved, and society itself is evolved so that new elements are introduced into consciousness.

It is evident that a long process of development was required before human society could become an object of special inquiry. How long no one can tell, for the records are wanting; and for the same reason it is impossible to give an accurate account of the actual social evolution. From the traces which have come to us from prehistoric times, from the references to uncultured peoples in ancient authors, and from barbarians of the present we infer that the state of nature which preceded civilization was far removed from the ideal condition which Rousseau imagined. The individual and nature stood face to face, without any human development, and without any products or treasures of culture. As nothing had been done, everything had to be done from the first beginning. Appetite and passion ruled; the course of life was determined by the necessity of wresting a livelihood from nature and warding off foes. Association was of the rudest kind, — often an aggregation of brute force rather than association, — with the exercise of such forces as are designated savage and barbarian. Institutions in the sense of definite and permanent social factors did not exist; the family, which in its present form is itself a growth, was still in a formative stage, and the nucleus of all organization and association. At no period can we imagine man as a solitary being; he

must have been a member of a family at least. Neither the natural nor the social conditions were such as to make large groups possible among primitive peoples. But as a family grew it developed into the gens and tribe, with some patriarch or chief at the head, to whom all were subject.[1]

Even within a sphere so limited and a life extremely mononotous various associations were possible, — as for hunting and fishing, for grazing and agricultural purposes, for games and war. It was association in an embryonic stage, and mainly within the limits of consanguinity. There must have been affection, maternal at least, or the family could not have been reared. Curiosity and wonder were excited by the objects of nature. That the fancy was active is proved by numerous symbols and superstitions. There was generalization, attributing to many objects what was beheld in one, but a generalization which was instinctive rather than reflective or discriminative. These and similar conclusions are reached by the researches of ethnology and from the study of barbarians of our own times.

It is not easy to conceive in the crude forms of the earliest hordes or associations the seed whence the

[1] Such a solidarity exists in certain lower stages of civilization that the notion of the community seems to be much more prominent than that of the individual. The individual is simply a member of his family; his interests are identified with it; he is responsible for it, as it is for him. As one of a mass, he does not stand out as a distinct individuality. Lazarus, "Zeitschrift fuer Voelkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft," vol. ii., p. 421, calls attention to the fact that a Tamul clan designates itself by the pronoun "We," — a striking evidence of their consciousness of unity. When the property became private instead of belonging to the family or community, the notion of individuality received more distinct recognition in the general consciousness, as well as in legal enactments.

The article of Lazarus referred to above is a valuable one on "The Relation of the Individual to Society." Articles by the same in vol. iii. are also important. The social student will find all the volumes helpful.

state as we know it has grown. The family, the gens, the tribe of early times, constituted the primitive state. Whether the tribe grew into the state, or whether a number of tribes, forced by enemies, formed a state, it might be impossible to distinguish sharply between a chief and a king, a tribe and the first state. Numbers of people, a definite territory, and an improved form of organization are involved in the idea of a state; but all could be produced by a gradual process of development from the family.

With the establishment of the state we connect the idea of a more settled social condition. Thus one of the most potent factors for social development was given. Before that time the wandering life, whether from choice or necessity, and the unsettled condition of authority, prevented the permanent accumulation of the means and products of culture. Then the rule of a patriarch, a chief, a priest, or medicine-man, whoever had authority, must have been through age or strength, — a rule arbitrary or determined by tradition and precedent, or by customs and traditions. The ruler of a state might be a despot; but the number of his subjects and the relation to outsiders imposed restraints. It became necessary to define the nature of the authority; laws had to be enacted, and the more settled condition made a cumulative process of development possible.

A higher development may absorb a lower form and at the same time make room for a greater variety of social groups. When the tribe or tribes became a state, many lower forms of association might continue and new societies be added. The family continued; so there was room for spontaneous gatherings and voluntary associations of various kinds. What belongs to humanity does not vanish in the process of evolution, but

changes its forms. Not respecting what is lowest do men differ; it is alike the common basis on which all stand; the differentiation takes place respecting what is higher, — such as intellect and character. Certain associations may be deemed natural, belonging to all stages of culture; others can arise only in an advanced stage. Civilization has much in common with savages and barbarians, but it likewise has much which is impossible for them. After the state was formed, there was as much necessity as before for sustaining life and propagating the species. Not so much in what it eliminates as in what it refines and creates, does the process of civilization consist.

With the firm establishment of the state, humanity enters on a new process of evolution, in which we are still involved. When laws were made and recorded, they became a factor of first importance in connection with the traditions and customs which had prevailed till that time. The laws were in fact a culmination and crystallization of what had been regarded as becoming, sacred, and obligatory. By attributing them to some divinity their authority, as well as their permanence and unchangeableness, was enhanced. As changes were demanded, they could be made by means of interpretation, by some fiction, or by actual additions. What existed naturally became the nucleus around which other laws were gathered.

Probably no remains of the past, certainly none of the earliest historic times, are more important than the national will as embodied in the law. Other registers were soon added to those containing the legal enactments. A record of the most important events of the state soon became necessary. It was not history as we understand it; that came much later. A bare fact

was recorded or a mere outline of events given; perhaps it was in the form of picture or symbol, some hieroglyphic in which fact and fancy are indistinguishable. The monarch and those associated with him were the usual subjects: diplomacy, generals, wars, and conquests, national glorification, religious ceremonies, names, dates, deeds, afterwards annals and chronicles.

Such meagre records culminated in history in a crude form long before society became an object of specific inquiry. Much of antiquity is compressed in the saying attributed to Caligula: "Kings are gods; the people, cattle." The records were confined to persons of special prominence and to deeds deemed by them significant. The people were no more thought worthy of historic remembrance than of pyramids for their remains. Glimpses of their lives are at times caught, but they are incidental rather than intentional. The conditions for appreciating the social organism were lacking.

In the record of what was regarded important we see also the limit of serious reflection. The prominence and importance of the state made it an object of special inquiry. In all antiquity we look to Greece for rational investigation into the nature of objects. In their political and ethical writings Plato and Aristotle discuss the state, the former from the ideal and visionary, the latter from the realistic, point of view. The omnipotence of the state may be inferred from the conduct of Socrates when he refuses to flee from an unjust sentence and cheerfully drinks the hemlock to vindicate the majesty of the law. Political science still strikes its roots in that era of Greek thought and statesmanship. The eminent Greek writers refer to social conditions; but no systematic treatment was attempted. The state was society in so dominant a sense as to exclude all social disciplines except politics.

The character of Greek thought, especially from the time of the Sophists and Socrates, was pre-eminently concerned with human affairs. This is evident from the art and literature, as well as from politics and philosophy. The revival of the study of Greek letters always means a revival of humanism. But the concerns of the thinkers were human nature in the abstract, individuals as involved in social relations or entangled in social meshes, and the state, in which the individual was largely absorbed. Society as distinct from the state had not come sufficiently forward to attract special attention. Other subjects were more attractive and more urgently required development; the world was too little known for a comprehensive view of society; the particularism which prevailed in the nations interfered with the study of other peoples; and the exclusiveness of the prevailing religions also limited inquiry. The Greek states were usually so divided as to make even the idea of nationality very contracted, while other peoples were treated as barbarians.

Hebraism was dominated by national and religious particularism, which is sometimes broken through by the universalism of some prophetic utterance. In the psalms and prophets germs of a large conception of humanity are found. The social thought of Hebraism was, however, devoted chiefly to Israel and the neighboring nations. The purity of the Hebrew theocracy demanded a sharp separation from the Gentiles, thus making a large social synthesis impossible.

We know not what social thought may have been buried with ancient Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, and other nations; what is known of them, however, leaves no doubt that they were far behind Greece in that respect. The speculative mysticism of India was

too much lost in the gods and the universe and eternity to attach its philosophemes to human society as such. Buddhism had the humane spirit for such reflections, but it was too intent on saving the individual into Nirvana to stop to consider his social relations for their own sake during the process of salvation. Neither religion nor individualism in China interfered with a study of the social realism; but the broad outlook beyond the state was wanting for an enlarged view, reverence for ancestors made traditionalism rather than progress into new ideas the law, and the precepts of morality applied to political welfare rather than to society in general. The entire Orient presented conditions for reflection on society which were far less favorable than those in Greece.

As we approach the time of Christ we find that the progress both of events and of thought broke through the prevalent national and religious particularism. The conquests of Alexander enlarged the views of men by bringing many and remote peoples into contact with one another. More impressive and more permanent, however, was the enlarged conception of humanity made by Rome as a world-power. At the same time Greek philosophers, particularly the Stoics, discoursed on humanity, on the brotherhood of man, and on sympathy for all, regardless of nationality. These sentiments were echoed by Roman moralists and statesmen, many of them followers of the Stoics. Then came Christianity with its doctrine of the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God, with the demand that the neighbor be loved as self, the gospel wiping out the ordinary social distinctions of heathendom, exalting humanity by its close alliance with divinity, giving new principles and greater unity to society, enforcing its social laws with

divine authority, and spreading its new social teachings throughout the Roman empire and even beyond.

The enlarged conception of mankind included such a wealth of special objects that their appropriation rather than society *per se* absorbed the studies of men. The advance in social study was, however, marked. The immediate environment, family, race, and nationality no longer constituted the limits of thought. Yet so far as deeper inquiry was concerned, the national and religious points of view long prevailed. The Middle Ages were by no means as dark as is usually supposed; they had intellectual giants not a few; but the objects of special interest were the church and the state, theology, ecclesiasticism, asceticism; many regarded this world as so exclusively a preparatory stage for heaven that for its own sake it was not deemed worthy of investigation. Not so much for itself was humanity considered, but as lost or as an object of redemption. Not society *per se* was studied, but three institutions received constant recognition: the family, the church, and the state.

It is only in modern times that we find the external and internal conditions for the study of society in the most comprehensive sense. The revival of learning, the invention of printing, and the discovery of America were forerunners of the new era. The fetters of a severe ecclesiasticism were broken; theology was not relegated to the past, but it was obliged to share its dominion with philosophy and science; politics and economics gained prominence, and put into the foreground the state and the industries; the introduction of the factory and steam, especially in connection with the development of the mighty resources of the New World, gave an unparalleled impulse to secularism; and the advance of thought developed what are known as the modern ideas

of human rights. These rights found explosive expression in the American and French revolutions, and then became the main current in the stream of human progress. The people came to the front as distinct from the court, the nobility, and the aristocracy. Public opinion was formed and became a power as against the state hovering over the people, as represented in a Louis XIV., who said: "I am the state." The society of the people attracted attention, and thus a new object of social interest was created. The very sufferings of the people in contrast with the few privileged ones made them objects of inquiry as well as of sympathy; and the efforts at relief led to various communistic and socialistic schemes, particularly in France. It was the earnest practical interest in society at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth which became the occasion for new theories of society.

This growing prominence of the people made an epoch in human thought and history. Modern history teems with crises for the transfer of authority from the one to the many. From two centuries of social ferment the social thought now so dominant has emerged. The common people, their place in the social organism, their relation to church and state, their claims on the select few deemed superior to them, their needs and rights, now became objects of absorbing study. The removal of artificial distinctions gave a new meaning to society, no longer confining it to courts and the nobility, but including all members of the community, the state, and even of humanity. The importance gained by society made social investigations a necessity. Justice to it could not be done by merely discussing the church and the state. It became manifest that these were largely dependent on popular movements and voluntary organi-

zations. Society gained more and more prominence as an object of thought and life, and that alone was sufficient to direct intelligent consideration to its interpretation.

It is in the progress of humanity itself that we see the conditions for making society a study, not merely societies. Certain currents of thought tended in the same direction and promoted the same end. A number of thinkers reflected on humanity, on history, on law in human events, on progress, all bearing on society.

While in the Middle Ages society in a general sense had not attained sufficient prominence to make it an object of special inquiry, and while thought was absorbed by other objects, it is a mistake to suppose that the religious view is in itself in the way of social investigation. The character of Greek thought was more favorable to such investigation than that of the Middle Ages, yet Greece has no Sociology. Human development is not a modern idea; in the Middle Ages evolution was, however, viewed chiefly as a divine process, from God, in God, through God, to God. Even from this point of view society might have been an object of specialization. The teleological conception of the times no more interferes with social study than does the fact that man acts teleologically, choosing an end and moving toward it. If God is believed to act on man, and if freedom of will is held, that need not prevent the study of society *per se*. Divine and voluntary human action enter the existing process of nature, conforming to established laws. The most absurd notion and the most insane view do not interrupt the course of nature; they come to naught, but they conform to the established order. Whatever choices man makes, so far as an effort to realize them is concerned the action must be

adapted to the working of existing laws. The fact is that the source of action, divine or human, does not interfere with the operation of law in humanity. It could interfere only if the problem were given us to solve: to determine all human action as caused by an unalterable law of nature. But that is not the problem; the exact cause of every human action is not within reach. Whether that action is caused by nature, whether free, or whether traced to a divine initiative, it is all the same so far as prevision is concerned. Hence it was not necessary to break the force of Christian thought, unless onesidedly supermundane, in order to recognize law in humanity. When the occasion for the scientific study of society was given, Christian thinkers, as well as others, could make a specialty of the subject.[1]

Much as the supernatural view dominated the thought of the Middle Ages, the natural was not wholly excluded. Frequent mention is made of nature, and by

[1] It is not our purpose to discuss determinism or freedom of the will; but the error that freedom would overturn nature and its laws ought to be exposed. Human freedom is not held as an omnipotent power; its limits are circumscribed. If the initiative is free, that does not mean that the results of the freedom must be what one chooses. A free choice would operate on nature exactly as would a necessitated will. The laws of nature are not in the slightest degree affected by the fact that they are used on the principles of determinism or of freedom. Hence the absurdity of Dr. A. Riehl's statement ("Introduction to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics," p. 231): "From the power to do apparently unimportant actions with absolute freedom, would proceed the power to reverse the course of nature in constantly widening circles. A single element of irrationality, an exceptional event that is uncaused, must in its results make all nature irrational, as a very little leaven may set a whole mass of organic matter in fermentation." A will free in the use of the laws of nature does not imply the slightest interference with the regularity of nature's laws. When Riehl adds: "Nature could not exist with a freedom not subject to law," the only answer is that freedom cannot act on nature at all except according to the laws of nature. It is a perversion to identify freedom in the use of nature's laws with lawlessness.

no means always as the antithesis or enemy of God. A number of thinkers treat nature as God's handmaid, as the agency through which He works, so that natural law is not excluded from human affairs, but regarded as the law of God. Tertullian and others held that in nature we have a witness and manifestation of God. Sometimes, as in the case of Duns Scotus, the natural and supernatural were not only held to be in perfect harmony, but the former was supposed to include the latter. Then, again, the two were sharply separated. Scholasticism had its rationalism and agnosticism, as well as a severe orthodoxy, and these affected the theories of social development.

It was with the expiration of feudalism that modern society was born, and at the same time new modes of scholarly investigation were adopted. Instead of solving the great problems of being by *a priori* decisions, the heavens and earth were now examined directly, in order that they might tell their own story, and Bacon formulated the laws which the leading scientists were already following.

Among the more influential impulses in modern times toward a philosophy of society we must look to students of law. From the law that prevailed in the state they passed to the consideration of law as governing humanity.[1] Vico (1668–1743) wondered why there should be a science of nature and not of history. His view that God rules in nature and in nations did not keep him from going to the study of man and his history for a knowledge of society and its evolution. As is usual in

[1] It has been claimed that the notion of the prevalence of law in nature had its origin in the idea of law prevailing in the state. In that case the idea of law in society preceded the idea of law in nature. This should be considered by those who seek to make natural law the norm for society.

such tentative efforts, there were many fantastic elements; but man as an earthly being and in an earthly environment comes into the foreground; he is studied in his surroundings and in his history, in order to understand his evolution and the progress of civilization.

Montesquieu (1689–1755) published his "Esprit des Lois" in 1748, a work combining the excellencies of philosophic thought with learned research. He does not develop the influence of climate and soil on man, but distinctly recognizes it; he rejects the interpretation of human affairs by means of dogmatic presuppositions, and goes to nations and their history for a knowledge of their laws, and searches for comprehensive principles under which to put the endless variety of social phenomena.

It would be an endless task to hunt and publish the numerous hints, often isolated and merely tentative suggestions, found in writers since the sixteenth century, which are preparatory to Sociology. Materialism, deism, and rationalism concentrated the attention on man as the determiner of his own destiny and subject to earthly influences. As nature, government, and history received especial prominence in the studies of scholars, we find man in his associated capacity, according to his environment, development, political and economic relations, brought more and more into prominence. The relation of the individual to society; social motives, whether interested or disinterested; social maxims and laws; the ethical principles of society; the economic basis of society and the nations, — these are among the subjects which meet us in the writers on law, on history, on ethics, and on philosophy. In France we have Bossuet, Voltaire, Quesnay, Turgot, Rousseau, of whom Turgot deserves especial attention for his views on human prog-

ress, some of which anticipated important features in Comte's Sociology; in Germany we have Leibnitz, whose universal genius quickened science, philosophy, and the human disciplines; and in England we have a long list of political, ethical, and philosophical thinkers, from Hobbes to Bentham, who discussed society, the social affections, and social progress. The student who enters into particulars must also consider the influence of men like Grotius, who sought to bring nations as well as individuals under the dominion of ethics, by the establishment of international law.

The writers named and many others, prove that the characteristic ideas of Sociology are not new, but the result of a long process of evolution, during which they became more distinct, were more fully developed, and so correlated as to approach a system. The definite advance made in social thinking during the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century consists in this: society itself is apprehended and made a specific object of thought; its study is treated as a separate discipline, just as politics or economics; consequently the social thoughts, formerly scattered, are now concentrated; they are developed, are augmented by the study of history, of ethnology, of institutions, of the actual societies of the present in their various stages of culture; and the result of the total inquiry is used to find the principles, the laws, and the system of society.

There is one writer whose thoughts on our theme deserve notice, yet they have heretofore been too much overlooked. In the eminence of Schiller as a poet it is forgotten that he was professor of history in Jena. His inaugural address, in 1789, was on the subject, "What is Universal History and Why is it Studied?" In his comprehensive grasp as here revealed, as well as in his

ethical and æsthetic views, we see the disciple of Kant. He argues in favor of principles as the rational product of details. Man's relation to nature is recognized as affecting his progress; among the advantages of the present is the fact that he has subdued nature so that it ministers to his highest interests, instead of being his lord. The discourse is, however, historical, and shows that we are the product of the entire past and debtors to all by-gone ages. "A long chain of events reaches from the present moment to the beginning of the human race, which events are interwoven as cause and effect." The historian of universal history seizes from the totality of past occurrences those which have most deeply affected the present. The individual must regard himself as connected with the unalterable laws of nature, with the entire past, and as a member of the whole human race. "All preceding ages, without knowing or intending it, have striven to usher in our *human* century. Ours are all the treasures which industry and genius, reason and experience, have at last brought home in the long ages of the world." As we are under such great obligations to the past, whose product we are, we ought to pay to future generations that debt which we cannot possibly pay to the past.

Far more important, however, is a work whose first part appeared in 1784, the fourth in 1791, while the fifth, which was to have completed the whole, was never finished. This is the work of the theologian, preacher, poet, philosopher, and historian Herder, entitled: "Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Humanity." For its own sake and on account of its influence it is worthy of much more attention than it can receive here. Herder may well be called "an apostle of humanity," and as such he is a representative of a strong trend at the close

of the eighteenth century. In that agitated era of social fermentation, of human rights, of liberty, equality, fraternity, of American Independence and French Revolution, of communism and socialism, there was a strong tendency on the part of scholars to comprehend the whole of humanity, man as extended over space and moving through time, within the sphere of scientific inquiry. Schiller declared that to the philosophic mind even the most important nation is but a fragment, and that in such a mind its affairs can arouse enthusiasm only if in them conditions for the progress of the entire race are seen.

Herder rises above his contemporaries in the effort to enlarge the conception of man so as to include the whole of mankind. He had a passion for humanity, using "humanity" both in the sense of the human family and of a humane spirit. Other books of the period also aimed at the interpretation of the entire race, but Herder's is the most important and was much the most influential. It was mainly due to the impulse given by Herder that the study of humanity has been developed independently in Germany. The philosopher Lotze bears witness to the influence of the work of Herder. In the preface, he claims for his "Microcosm" that it repeats, "with the changed views which our age has gained, the undertaking which had its brilliant beginning in Herder's Ideas on the History of Humanity."

Herder states, in the preface, that early in life the thought often came to him "whether, since everything in the world has its philosophy and science, that which most of all concerns us, the history of man in its general features, does not also have a philosophy and a science." This early problem of his mind he now attempts to solve. His recognition of God neither interferes with the uni-

versal prevalence of law, nor does it relieve him, through *a priori* presuppositions, of the most thorough empirical investigation. The beginning of the work is significant, and shows the comprehensiveness of his view. The first chapters of the first book are astronomical, the aim being to fix the place of the earth among the heavenly bodies. "The earth is a planet among planets; it is a planet of medium size; it passed through many revolutions before it became what it is now." These are the first subjects. Then the preparation of our globe for the various kinds of organizations is considered, man being viewed in his relation to the earth and plants and animals. His dependence is shown; his evolution depends on imitation and exercise; culture is developed by means of human necessities and the conflicts with nature; the most skilful become the leaders, a law that prevails among men and animal herds. The effect produced on man by his relation to the earth, to the animals, and to his fellowmen, is a common theme. Man would have to be different if other metals were as much diffused as iron is; put among animals, he becomes wild like his companions; he is a man among men, but like his fellows; "according to the hands in which he falls, so is he moulded." Our form and culture are the product of eternal laws, "which no arbitrariness of man can change." Amid the endless variety of life on earth a certain uniformity of structure, a cardinal (typical) form seems to prevail. The similarity in the anatomy of land animals is striking. The inner structure of the rude form of animals is very similar to that of man. We cannot penetrate the mysteries of nature; but the transitions from one form to another make it not improbable that in the creatures dwelling in water, in plants, and that even in inorganic substances, there is one and the same capacity for organ-

ization according to one definite plan. "We find that the nearer they approach man, all creatures have, so far as the main form is concerned, more or less likeness to him, and that nature, with that infinite variety which she loves, seems to have constructed all life on our earth according to one fundamental plasm of organization" (*nach einem Hauptplasma der Organization*).

The manifold powers in beings make it possible for them to pass through transitions and to assume many divergent forms. Plants that grow wild in nature can be made objects of culture. "The same is true of animals and men; for every race of men organizes itself, in its peculiar zone, according to the manner that is most natural." On mountains, on rocks, in heat and cold, the same plants vary greatly. Can it be different with men? The diversity of earth and air produces varieties (*Spielarten*) in plants as in animals and men. According to its locality, whether it be in the sea or in a marsh, in a cold or hot climate, so is the form and development of the plant; "does not all this prepare us to expect of the organic structure of men, so far as we are plants, the same variations?" So much stress does he lay on the influence of the plants and animals amid which man is placed that he regards the history of man's culture as largely zoölogical and geographical, and he expresses the wish that a general botanical geography may be written for the history of humanity. So variable is man that he becomes a different being with nearly every change of climate. Among animals variations are constantly occurring; and according to the analogy of nature, it would be a miracle if man himself did not change with the climates.

Many of the details which illustrate the above make it still more evident how familiar certain ideas were over a

century ago which we are apt to regard as a discovery of our own times. To the relation of man to the earth and climate, to plants and animals in general, Herder adds his relation to the ape. "Within and without, the orang-outang is similar to man. Its brain has the same form as ours; it has a broad chest, flat shoulders, a face resembling ours, a skull like our own; heart, lungs, liver, spleen, stomach, intestines, are like those in man. Tyson has mentioned forty-eight points in respect to which it resembles our race more than it does the different kinds of apes; the deeds related of it, even its follies and vices, make it similar to man."

So much space has been given to these fundamental views of the work that we cannot trace his ideas of the processes of man's development. This development is followed through all climes and all stages of culture. It is one and the same humanity, but its course is transformation, its history is a ceaseless metamorphosis. Nation after nation passes in review, each with its peculiarities, its degrees of culture, its institutions, its contributions to human progress. What is antiquated in one period may have been a blessing at another, so that adaptation to their times is the standard for judging objects. The fourth part brings the evolution to the close of the Middle Ages; the fifth was to have treated of modern times, with a discussion of the spirit of humanity as revealed in various social products, a consideration of the treasures of the human mind, and of man's work everywhere and on everything, and with an outlook into the future. But only a meagre outline of this fifth part is given, nothing is developed.

The conception of the work is grand, and for that time such a book is remarkable. Its originality the research it involves, its historic data, and its generaliza-

tions reveal the diligent investigator and philosophic thinker. Herder was too much of a poet not to give play to his imagination in determining man's place in the universe, and in making all science and philosophy and history minister to his welfare. Kant after reading the first part criticised the soaring imagination of the author, and hoped he would restrain his lively genius in the parts that were to follow. Kant gave a general idea of a plan for the same subject. He regards human development as a process of the unfolding of the powers of man under the guidance of his reason. The process takes place amid the conflicts of society, which are the condition for eventually attaining order. The greatest problem for the race, whose solution is forced on it by nature, is the attainment of a general civic society governed by laws. The history of humanity can be viewed as the accomplishment of a hidden plan of nature in order to realize a perfect political state as the only condition for the complete evolution of all the capacities of humanity. The philosophic attempt to construct a history of the world according to a plan of nature, which attempt aims at the perfect civil union of the human family, must be possible, he thought.

The movement which began in 1784 might be traced down to our own time through numerous German works of eminent authors. Especially do we see the results of this movement in the works on what is known as the "history of culture." We must, however, come to the man who is most intimately associated with the name and subject of Sociology, — Auguste Comte.

The prominence of Comte and Herbert Spencer in sociological inquiries entitles them to especial consideration in a history of the subject. But their works are too voluminous for adequate treatment in an introductory

volume; besides, they are better known than their forerunners, their books and expositions of them are easily accessible, and every student who wants to specialize on social subjects must go to their writings. Here we cannot hope to attempt more than call attention to some prominent features in the works of Comte, and make a few suggestions on the study of this author.

The beginner is not prepared to form an estimate of the place of Comte in philosophic thought; it is doubtful whether in our age students are prepared to do him justice. He must be judged by his times and in the light of the work of his contemporaries and predecessors. Thus viewed, there can be no question that ardent admirers have given him credit for what belongs equally or more to others. He sees in history a process and progress from the theological to the metaphysical, and finally to the positive stage of thought. In the first stage, the explanation of things is found in gods, in the second, in entities, forces, causes, which are imagined; in the third or final stage, the positive or scientific, men reject the theological and metaphysical explanations, and go directly to the phenomena. This might be called the empirical method, the deeper meaning and ultimate source of things being beyond our reach.

The succession of the metaphysical to the theological method, and then of the positive or scientific to both, has been regarded as a discovery of Comte and the revelation of an important historic law. It is, however, not a law of history. Sometimes one method is dominant, then another; but all may prevail at the same time. The theological and metaphysical methods do not exclude each other; throughout the Middle Ages, and also since, Christian theology is largely metaphysics, the doctrine of God and the soul being no less ontological than

theological. Instead of treating one method as wholly false and therefore to be rejected, it seems to be a more rational conception of history, in passing from one stage of evolution to another, to conserve in each succeeding one the truth of the old and developing it, while rejecting the error. If the first stage is wholly false, how can it lead to the second as a higher stage; and how can the second, if likewise wholly false, lead to the absolute truth of the third? May not the main error of the methods consist in their exclusiveness, each claiming to be absolute? Perhaps the positive method is as faulty as the others in claiming absoluteness and universality, and the truth will be promoted by limiting it to its proper sphere. If the stages have any merit, they ought to be reduced to two, since the conception of theology that a divine being works is metaphysical; but it has not been shown that each method has not some truth, that each has not its place, and that they are exclusive but not complemental. Wild speculation at the beginning of the century led to a reaction; after speculation professed to be able to do everything, the reaction declared it could do nothing. An extreme produced an extreme, and the phenomenalism which resulted is, by itself, as faulty as the metaphysical speculation had been.

The supposed law of progress from the theological through the metaphysical to the positive stage is, however, not a discovery of Comte. Turgot (1727–1781) gives it so explicitly that it is unmistakable. He says, that before the connection between physical effects was recognized, nothing was more natural than to ascribe them to intelligent and invisible beings resembling ourselves. Various events had their gods, and to them they were attributed. "When the philosophers recognized the absurdity of these fables, without, however, having

acquired the true view of natural history, they imagined that they were explaining the causes of phenomena by means of abstractions, such as substances and powers, which explained nothing, but with which they reasoned as if they were primary beings, new divinities substituted for the old ones. It was not until later, after observing the mechanical action of bodies on one another, that other hypotheses were drawn from mechanics, as mathematics was developed and experience verified." Here we have the supposed law, the succession of the stages, the theological, metaphysical, positive, the very conceptions given by Comte, though somewhat elaborated by him. In the fourth volume of his "Positive Philosophy" he refers to Turgot, but does not attribute the law to him. It is not likely that Comte was guilty of plagiarism; but that, with his much reading, he should unconsciously appropriate such a law is very probable. It is, however, evident that its first statement belongs not to Comte, but to the Minister of Finance of Louis XVI.[1]

In his "Biographical History of Philosophy" G. H. Lewes says: "The foundation of a comprehensive method is the great achievement of Comte, as it was of Bacon, and the influence he has exercised, and must continue to exercise, will be almost exclusively in that direction." This method Comte calls the positive, in distinction from the theological and metaphysical. Applied to Sociology,

[1] For the facts here given, for the original of the quotation from Turgot, and for a discussion of the whole matter, see "Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für die Entwickelung der Socialwissenschaft," von Dr. Heinrich Wäntig, Leipzig, 1894. He states (p. 350) that among the forerunners of Comte respecting the three stages of development, Twesten puts the Scotch philosophers and likewise St. Simon. The law of these stages is found, about the same time as in Comte, in Quetelet and Sophie Germain.

it simply means that the science of society is to be treated like physics, that the aim is to investigate it just as the other natural sciences, and to give it the same positiveness. Comte recognizes the peculiar complexity and difficulty of social phenomena. In his hierarchy of the sciences he puts Sociology last, the order being: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, social physics or Sociology. He thinks the perfection of the positive system would be attained if all phenomena could be represented as particular aspects of a single general fact, as gravitation, for instance. This mathematical unity he seeks everywhere, and he frequently becomes the slave of his own rigid system. The sciences are arranged according to their abstract and general character; what is most universal and also most simple is applicable to all that follows, and therefore comes first; then follow the more specific and more complex sciences, the culmination being reached in Sociology. The principle of Comte's classification gives a conception of the relation of the sciences, and of the natural order of their development from the simple and general to the complex and specific. His own discussion of these sciences aims at principles; in distinction from the specialist, he seeks their bonds of union, a philosophy of the sciences. It is not strange that, with such a general view as his, specialists surpassed him in knowledge in their specific departments. Much that he wrote has now only historic interest. Our main concern is with the scheme as a whole. The lack of psychology in the hierarchy has frequently been observed. He made it a part of biology, and even treated it from the standpoint of phrenology, though he did not go to the extreme of some of Dr. Gall's followers.

But the main difficulty in his hierarchy of the sciences

is that it has no foundation; it hangs in the air. Facts are to be observed, theories are to be drawn from them, and the laws in the sequence of events are to be discovered; but the basis for these operations, their interpretation and justification, are wanting. Introspection, the direct observation of intellectual processes, and the ordinary method of psychologists, are discouraged. It looks as if Comte had a notion that somehow the mind can get out of itself, and in this way study what is going on within. He has no critical theory of knowledge; to this, much of the confusion in his works may be attributed. At one time he wants to subject all human affairs to natural law; then he finds peculiarities in man which require especial emphasis. Now everything is to be strictly scientific; then he lays great stress on morals and religion, making humanity or its great heroes the object of faith and worship, and modelling the hierarchy of his church after that of Catholicism. The claims of the heart are not met by what he terms positive; and when he establishes institutions which are to satisfy the heart there is a direct conflict with the positive elements. Whatever the logic of his sensationalism may be, there are parts of his system which demonstrate practically that he recognized the need of faith, and that he gave the rein to imagination and poetry. But this is in spite of his positivism. He seems to have been helpless in the matter. But aside from this yielding to the impulses of his heart, taking his theoretical views, we regard him as a type of that school which uses, without criticism, the mental faculties, which substitutes supposed objective knowledge for what is really subjective, which subordinates reason to sensation, which claims for science what is mere opinion, which denounces theology and metaphysics, and then (unconsciously perhaps) puts its own

theology and metaphysic in their place. Things are eliminated, and phenomena alone are left; yet the phenomena are treated as if they were entities. We are expected to experiment with nature; but we cannot experiment with mere phenomena. This school, by means of this experiment, wants to get nature to tell us all it can, that we may learn its secrets; why not treat the mind in the same way, imagination, reason, aspiration, faith being regarded as but so many revelations of its character? But this is disparaged as a departure from reality! Sensation is the supreme test; yet a Kepler needed imagination to discover his laws, Newton may have found it as serviceable as Milton, and it is involved in every scientific theory. Reason seems to be feared as metaphysical. We find that even culture is depreciated; it is a departure from nature. The study of thought by thought is also a departure from reality. Many members of this school surpass Comte in sensational consistency. They want nature to dominate mind. Sense is exalted as if it could pick up science without an appeal to thought; faith is ridiculed, but only because it is not known that all our science depends on faith, — namely, on the belief that our faculties do not deceive us. It is easy to make the objective world the law of our minds so long as it is not known that what we call the objective world is simply our mental conception of it. Our views are ours because they are in our minds; all terms that we use, no matter what the objects to which they refer, are mental, and never can be anything else.

Comte occupies essentially the position of that dogmatism which Kant tried to annihilate. Kant rejected the theological method of research as completely as Comte; he regarded the noumena as beyond our scien-

tific apprehension, and thought that we are limited to phenomena; so that the old basis is taken away from metaphysics. What is lauded as Comte's method is as much Kant's; but Kant respected the reason he criticised, he left room for faith where science could not tread, and (because he recognized our limitation to phenomena) he refused to assert that man is to be interpreted just as the plant and the animal. Kant's scheme for the study of humanity as emphatically as Comte's rejects theological and metaphysical theories; but while it wants man to be studied as he is, strictly according to the scientific method, he does not profess to be able to determine that all of man can be made absolutely scientific in the technical sense, and that the science of society is to be reduced to a physical science. Kant was the stanchest advocate of the freedom of will; but that did not interfere with his insistence on law in human affairs.

By attributing to Comte excellencies without discrimination, students are misled; it is a recommendation of his faults with his real deserts. The neglect to which he was subject in France cannot be ascribed solely to the fact that he was in advance of his age; in respect to the criticism of the mind he was far behind the true disciples of Kant. Whatever extreme Catholics of France may have claimed respecting society, the Encyclopedists certainly had no theological prepossessions, the sensational French philosophy was not metaphysical, and in Protestant countries human affairs generally were investigated in the scientific spirit by eminent thinkers.

We do not dwell here on the strange views scattered throughout his works, palpable errors being mixed with profound truths. The latter part of his life looks like mental aberration. Lewes says: "Over his subsequent efforts to found a social doctrine, and to become the

founder of a new religion, let us draw the veil." Even his earlier works abound in vagaries.

While it is a duty to guard against Comte's errors, it is equally a duty to give him credit where due. This is great, though we cannot find it in his stages of human progress or in originality of method. But he developed the method of social inquiry and applied it more fully than his predecessors. Never before did a thinker so concentrate all his energies on the interpretation of society. The term "social science" was in common use. The invention of the term "Sociology," however, is to his credit, as well as the word "altruism."

Comte is by no means always a profound and consistent thinker, but he is suggestive and comprehensive, intent on working in new mines of thought, and his place is unique and prominent. He made Sociology a distinct object of human thought, tried to establish its place among the other disciplines and to correlate it to them, concentrated the light, from whatever quarter the rays might emanate, on its nature and method, and gave a strong impulse toward those social studies which have now become so absorbing. Whether many or any of his conclusions shall abide, his relation to Sociology is, and always will be, a peculiar one. Even though others share with him the credit of having given the start to this discipline, his place is one of special eminence. We can almost speak of the dominance he gave to the social point of view as epoch-making.

Nothing was completed by Comte, but Sociology was fairly started. Even down to the present we can hardly speak of more than tentative efforts to fix the subject, to determine its method, to collect the materials it includes, and to form them into a valid and consistent system. We cannot here follow the history of our subject any

further; nor is it necessary, since its data are within easy reach of the student. Eminent sociological specialists since Comte are still living; in some instances their works are not yet completed, and in all cases it is doubtful whether we have the perspective for a fair estimate of their labors.

The genesis of Comte's Sociology must not be confounded with the genesis of Sociology itself. That would be making Comte the norm for sociological thinking. The same rule applies to Spencer and later sociologists. Just as the history of society does not construct the system of society, so the history of Sociology does not give the final Sociology. But this history gives valuable hints for future methods, conclusions to be tested, materials to be sifted, germs to be developed. There have been numerous sociological architects. They have reared no enduring structure; it is doubtful even how far they have laid an abiding foundation and drawn a plan available for future builders. We can hardly claim that more than a scaffolding has been erected; and even on this scaffolding the workers cannot agree to stand together and labor co-operatively on the same structure.

The evolution of the idea of society and then of Sociology, in the individual mind and in humanity, is an interesting and important theme. In the process of this evolution three objects come definitely before the mind: the individual; the various societies, such as social groups, organizations, the church, the state; and society as inclusive of all societies. Those who miss the last, the idea of society *per se*, fail to complete the evolution and cannot construct a comprehensive social system.

The individual cannot be understood if considered by himself. He sustains social relations and in these must be studied. Neither can an association be understood if isolated; it must be studied in connection with all the other associations to which it is related and whose influence it experiences. This is merely saying that indi-

viduals and associations must be taken as they really are; fictitious separations give fictitious results. Societies ought to be considered in the totality of their interrelations and interactions. This means that societies must be apprehended as forming a totality, and that they must be studied in this totality.

Societies themselves may be organized selfishness, intent on their own concerns to the exclusion of other interests. Societies may therefore be a barrier in the way of the apprehension of society as a totality. Concentrated around narrow self-interest, formed for competition or antagonism, they fail to recognize the organism of which they are but a part, and so limit their vision as to miss the view of humanity. A society is called a *party* because it is but a part of the whole; yet it is in constant danger of usurping the place of the totality, of which it may be an insignificant fraction. Family affection and patriotism are often synonymes of narrowness. Is not the history of states a revelation of self-seeking, of diplomacy guided by selfish cunning, of Machiavellian principles in practice? Even international law is not the fruit of national generosity. But if a people limits its appreciation to its selfish interests, not even including other existing nations as objects of impartial study, how can it be expected to concern itself about humanity in all ages of the world?

The difficulty of the individual and of societies in attaining the largest social view will enable us to appreciate the long struggle necessary in humanity before the idea of society could be grasped and made a permanent possession of mankind. Until recently the conditions and interests were such that the idea of society could not be seized; because individuals and societies were everything, society *per se* was not thought of. But since the revival of humanism, the dissolution of feudalism, the discovery of a new continent and travels and commerce among all peoples, the increase of freedom in church and state, and the growth of voluntary associations, both thought and society would have to be checked not to evolve the notion of the social totality.

All history bears testimony to the limited social interests, and therefore also to the limit of social studies, in the past. The dominant ideas have been individualistic, or of the family, the tribe, the state and nation, religion, economic affairs; the dominance of the social idea as inclusive of all societies is beginning, but its complete and general victory still belongs to the future. The social

study of history is a study of the limitation to which social thought has been subject.

However much the Greek intellect rose above the orientalism which preceded it, its standpoint for contemplating humanity remained Greek. The Roman standpoint was juridical and political rather than social. The larger view of a few philosophers and moralists both in Greece and Rome led to no study of society itself. The Christian view of humanity was religious and was intended to be so. The Middle Ages, middle because a bridge or transition from ancient to modern times, have been studied too exclusively from the religious and political points of view to bring out their social thoughts. Not only the Christian doctrine, but likewise Greek philosophy, especially that of Plato and Aristotle, was used to transform the old views of man and nature, often with results confusing and contradictory. The only society for depraved man which was deemed worthy of special inquiry was the kingdom of God, which was interpreted to mean the church, and the state as intimately connected with the church. Nature was regarded as a manifestation of God, natural law as divine law; but at times the world was represented as antagonistic to God. Sometimes matter itself seemed to be the embodiment of evil, at others the world meant sinful men. Near the days of the apostles, we find in the First Epistle of Clement a chapter on the peace and harmony of the universe, the working of nature being regarded as but a manifestation of divine power and goodness; but in the Second Epistle one chapter teaches that this world is to be despised, and another that the present and future worlds are at enmity. There is, however, a universalism in mediæval Christianity which frees the individual from the ordinary limitations of family, occupation, nation, and race, and promotes the idea of the unity of humanity.

For the development of the ideas which have prepared the way for Sociology works on the philosophy of history are valuable. See especially R. Flint, "Philosophy of History," France and Germany; and a later volume, with the same title, on France alone, with a long general introduction. The impulse given to the study of history and literature from the social point of view is bringing to light many references to society heretofore overlooked.

The modern evolution which has made the idea of society possible, we might almost say inevitable, has also added to its difficulty. Originally the mass was far more distinct than the indi-

vidual; he was merged in the family, the horde, or the tribe, even property being common. Progress meant individualization; the individual became more himself, less an indistinguishable part of the aggregate. Property became private and the possessor of it an object of legal enactments. Modern culture with the results of thousands of years of differentiation, presents individual and social diversity in place of the primitive monotony. In the distinctness of the individuals, in the variety of their interests, in the endless diversity of societies, in the richness and distraction of modern life, it is difficult to apprehend the underlying unity. The social wealth of the present promises to inaugurate the new social era; but this very wealth requires a larger view than in the past for the comprehension of society.

The last three or four centuries are especially important for the development of the sociological idea, the evolution being cumulative until Sociology itself is clearly enunciated. A few more hints are given respecting some modern writers, together with references to sociological literature.

Of Grotius (1583–1645) the "Encyclopædia Britannica" says he held "that the law of nature is unalterable; God Himself cannot alter it, any more than He can alter a mathematical axiom. This law has its source in man as a social being; it would be valid even if there were no God, or if God did not interfere in the government of the world. These positions, though Grotius' religious temper did not allow him to rely unreservedly upon them, yet, even in the partial application they find in his book, entitle him to the honor of being held the founder of the modern science of the law of nature and of nations."

The views of Vico appeared in 1725, in a volume entitled "Principi d' una scienza nuova d' interno alla commune natura delle nazioni." For his views see "Vico," by R. Flint.

In Montesquieu's "Spirit of Laws," the beginning and books XIV.–XVIII. are most valuable. He regards laws as indicating the relations which arise from the nature of things. In this general sense all beings are subject to law. Man is formed for society. By means of civil laws legislators have sought to remind him of his duties to his fellow-men. These laws are to take into account not merely the people who are to be governed, but also the climate, the soil, the location and extent of the country. Montesquieu distinctly recognizes in man's relation to nature an essential element of social phenomena.

The original title of Schiller's inaugural address is: "Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studirt man Universalgeschichte?"

Kant's discussion of society is contained in a tractate entitled: "Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht."

To the numerous views in Herder's work, which we are apt to regard as of recent origin, belongs the fact that he goes back to the rudest forms of culture, and traces the development of humanity through Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages. Thus he examines the condition of the peoples near the north pole in America and Asia, and gives an account of the Africans, lamenting that more is not known of them, and describes the Indians of North and South America. The title in German is "Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit."

The English reader will find the views of Comte accessible through the translation and condensation of his "Cours de Philosophie Positive," six volumes, 1830–42, by Harriet Martineau, — in a volume entitled "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte." It omits repetitions and material of little concern. The use of this volume can be the more conscientiously recommended because Comte himself was so pleased with it that he gave it the stamp of his authority by having it translated into French. On the history of the idea of society, see the book on "Social Physics," the last in the volume.

In monographs, in works on philosophy, and in encyclopædias, the student will find numerous discussions of Comte's system. In Ward's "Dynamic Sociology" the first chapter is devoted to this subject. J. S. Mill's volume on "A. Comte and Positivism" discusses both the earlier and the later views of Comte. E. Caird's "The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte" is a condensed exposition and criticism, especially strong in testing the Positive Philosophy by the systems of German philosophers.

The author of this Introduction has found the work of Wäntig, already mentioned, the ablest critical account of Comte. Besides an exposition and critique of Comte, it contains a brief account of his predecessors and successors. Among the numerous French writers on Comte are Littré: "Aug. Comte et la Philosophie Positive," and Rig: "La Philosophie Positive par Aug. Comte, résumée."

All of Herbert Spencer's works bear on Sociology, not merely

those with that title. For the whole system of his Synthetic Philosophy, the first volume, "First Principles," is fundamental.

Wäntig's book contains a bibliography of Sociology. "What to Read," by the Fabian Society, London, contains a long list of books on social subjects, such as socialism, the history and condition of labor, and how to elevate the masses.

In "The Social Problem" the author of this Introduction gives numerous social works, particularly such as bear on the burning social questions.

Besides the works mentioned in the following chapters, a brief list of French, German, and English books is here added.

Barrier: "Principes de Sociologie."

Comte de Chabrun: "Mes Conclusions Sociologique."

Combes de Lastrade: "Éléments de Sociologie."

Dallemagne: "Principes de Sociologie."

De Greef: "Introduction à la Sociologie."

Latourneau: "La Sociologie." This has been translated into English

Schäffle: "Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers," 4 vols.

Professor L. Gumplowicz, who occupies an exclusively naturalistic standpoint, has four books on Sociology: "Der Rossenkampf," "Grundriss der Sociologie," "Sociologie und Politik," "Die Sociologische Staatsidee." The third contains a sketch of recent sociological literature in France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Austria, and America.

Simmel: "Ueber Sociale Differenzierung."

Mackenzie: "Introduction to Social Philosophy." A suggestive philosophical rather than scientific discussion.

Two reviews are devoted wholly to Sociology, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, edited by René Worms, Paris, and *The American Journal of Sociology*, by Albion W. Small, Chicago.

In numerous other journals, especially the political and economic ones, sociological subjects are frequently discussed. The same is true of works on the state, on political economy, on communism and socialism, on culture and history. Many of the German works in these departments are of especial value.

Sociology is becoming a favorite study in America. Besides the work of Ward on "Dynamic Sociology," there are two volumes by J. Bascom, "Sociology" and "Social Theory." The "Introduction to the Study of Society," by Small and Vincent, is for

beginners. "Introduction to Sociology," by Arthur Fairbanks, contains a valuable bibliography. A complete system is aimed at by Professor Giddings in "Principles of Sociology."

This list is only preliminary. At the close of the chapter on "Method" the student will find directions for the use of sociological literature with a view to further research without the aid of a teacher.

REFLECTIONS.

Genesis of the Idea of Society in Individuals. Difficulties. Development of the Idea in Humanity. Unconscious Basis of much Social Action. Social Conceptions in early Stages of Humanity. Early Social Life. Reasons for the late Development of Sociology. Social Notions of Ancient Oriental Nations. Why Greece and Rome were not prepared for the Science of Society. Preparation for Sociology in Judaism and Christianity. Ideas and Institutions of the Middle Ages favorable and unfavorable for Social Science. Social Development by means of Humanism and the Reformation. Changes in Modern Thought and Society favorable to Sociology. Enlarged Conception of the World. Political and Economic Internationalism. Preparatory Ideas of Vico, Montesquieu, Grotius, Schiller, Herder, Kant. Comte's Work. His Method. Hierarchy of the Sciences. The Three Stages of Development. The Positive Stage. Comte's Place in Sociology. Other Writers on Sociology. Sociological Literature. The Needs of Sociology. How can they be met? Review the entire Chapter, giving a Summary of its Contents.

CHAPTER II.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY.

The Problem. *What is Sociology? What the exact sphere of its investigations? The definition gives the subject in epitome, condensing to the utmost the materials involved. It outlines the subject-matter as the nucleus of all discussions. By defining Sociology we get a guide for sociological research. If the investigation is to be rational, it must have a definite end toward the attainment of which the energies are directed.*

The definition is the centre from which the circumference is drawn marking the limit of the inquiry. Sociology deals with human society; this gives the focus of thought and the scope of sociological research. Comparative Sociology is another subject. The discovery of Sociology is the condition for its comparison. After it has been constructed many questions may be relevant which would only be confusing so long as the sociological material is in a chaotic state. To the student of Sociology everything is valuable in proportion as it leads him into the essence of his subject-matter, human society.

A. Definition.

Properly speaking, the development of a subject is its definition, the entire system being merely an explanation of the theme itself. So, too, the contents of a

volume are but an exposition of its title. In the beginning, however, we can start with a general idea which fixes and limits a theme sufficiently to make the aim definite and the study rational. The definition itself is but a seed whose richness of content can only be discovered by the process of its unfolding. As a plant springs from a seed and culminates in fruit which is the same as the seed whence it sprang, but in richer measure; so with the unfolding of a subject: it begins with a definition, expands that definition, and in the end is still true to the definition, but contains it in a fuller and more developed form than at the start.

The term Sociology has often been denounced as a barbarism because composed of a Latin and a Greek word. This, however, has nothing to do with the sense and applicability of the term. It stands for a definite and most important department of thought, has gained general recognition, is well adapted to its purpose, and has secured a permanent place in literature. Sociology designates the science of society. It thus contains two ideas which require elucidation, namely, *society* and *science*. The latter can best be considered in a separate chapter, when the idea of society is more definitely before us. With the aim of learning all that is knowable respecting society ever kept in view, it may even be a hindrance to determine at the start, before the materials to be shaped are known, just what form the final results shall take; better leave that, it seems, to the development itself. Here at least we are solely concerned with the general sense in which society, the subject-matter of all our inquiries, is taken by Sociology. After tracing the genesis of the idea of society, we now concentrate our thought on that idea as the object of sociological investigation.

Society (*socio*, *socius*, *societas*) means association, some kind of combination or union; it involves the notion of partnership, of mutuality, of co-operation, of holding something in common. Inanimate objects are aggregated; but of living beings, at least of such as are of a high order, we speak as associated. Association involves vital, organic relations, a union of inner, psychical factors, not merely external contact. So essential is the psychical element in association that society is perfect in proportion to the culture attained. In human society, the object of our inquiry, the highest association is attainable.

Sometimes human beings are regarded as forming an aggregation as distinct from association, as when they move along the street or travel in the same train or boat without intercourse. The same locality and external contact are taken as means of aggregation, not of association. Strictly speaking, this is correct; but it is not the whole truth. A more complete view shows that the aggregation of human beings contains a potential association which is not possible for lower organisms. Social unity exists independent of our consciousness of it; I belong to society whether I am aware of it or not. Every deeper view reveals the fact that those who do not know one another, yet have a common humanity, have essentially the same faculties and tendencies, and share a multitude of things which pertain equally to all and give all human beings an ideal unity. These associative elements really exist, and every apprehension of the actuality recognizes them. Thus ideally and actually, though not always consciously, human beings are associated, as brutes and trees and stones cannot be. The man whose consciousness of the social reality is most complete, can claim

ties which associate him with every member of the human family.[1]

This gives the comprehensive view involved in Sociology. We want a discipline which includes the whole of humanity in its associated capacity. Comte speaks of society as "comprehending, in a scientific sense, the whole of the human species, and chiefly the whole of the white race." While some in their sociological inquiries may consider chiefly one race, others another, that does not now concern us, the essential point being that our discipline includes the whole human family.[2]

Humanity is thus apprehended as a society, as consisting of units which are somehow bound together by elements they have in common. Some things the units

[1] Under this most comprehensive view of society many others of a more specific nature are embraced, and it is the business of Sociology to bring out their distinctive marks. Some societies are so large and so scattered that the members cannot know one another, as in the case of churches and labor organizations; others are small and local, so that the members come in contact. The tie of humanity is common to all associations; but the specific bond of union and particular purpose of a society determine its peculiarity and distinctness. Thus we have human society (associated humanity) and human societies (the various associations in humanity). Especially important is it to distinguish between societies dependent on what they have in common and societies which actively share and promote certain objects. What human beings have in common may be a passive possession; but in the ordinary, more specific sense, societies involve a union of active energies. Between society as a community involving common possessions, and society as an active association of different wills, the German language makes a distinction, using for the former *Gemeinschaft*, for the latter *Gesellschaft*. ("Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft," by Ferdinand Tönnies.)

[2] I am tempted to define Sociology as the science of associated humanity, that is, of humanity so far as it is united, so far as it is associated. If Sociology does not include every form of human association, it will be incomplete, and another discipline will be required in order to embrace the social forms which Sociology ignores. While making Sociology the science of associated humanity, we of course do not need to place equal emphasis on all forms of society.

share, and these are the bonds of association. There are elements which men share with the brute creation, and a strong tendency has been manifested to involve in the discussions of Sociology the analogies to human society found in the inferior creation. This may be intended to elucidate the subject, and sometimes does, but often confuses it. Mere analogies must not be taken for identity. Whatever biology and anthropology may have to say about the origin of man and his relation to the animal creation, Sociology deals with human association; and can leave the question of man's relation to the rest of the organic world to other disciplines, or else consider that question after it has fully explained human society. If Sociology must first evolve man from the brute, it is in danger of never reaching that human association whose interpretation is its sole business.

The total and most comprehensive conception of Sociology involves humanity as it is, has been, and will be. This is the grand ideal; as we cannot isolate a part of humanity from the rest, so we cannot abstract the human family as existing at any particular time; but in order to think it in its completeness, must consider it in its organic connection with the past and the future. Thought does not stop here, but seeks to relate man to all living beings, to inorganic matter, and to the entire universe. But the scheme is too great for perfect realization. Not only are we obliged to confine ourselves to human society, but even that presents severe limits to our investigations. Humanity as it is to-day is so vast and complicated that only a part of it can be understood by the most diligent specialist; of the past but few records were made, and many of those are lost; respecting the future, our limitations are

painfully evident. With a full consciousness of our limitations, we aim at the interpretation of human society so far as knowable.

Nevertheless, the comprehensive idea of society as not limited by locality and time is essential, because the only true idea. What do we understand by a nation? Surely not a people as existing merely at this moment. By a nation we mean a people with a continuous existence, with a past, a present, and a future, a totality of association regardless of time. As an individual recognizes his connection with his ancestors, not merely with the family as it now exists, so it is with the consciousness of a people. The same is true respecting humanity; it is a qualitative totality, regardless of time.

The same process must be adopted respecting every social form; it can be completely thought only in connection with its historical origin and development, and, if truly alive, as an energy pushing onward into the future. If humanity is really a unity, no individual in it can be fully considered without being viewed in his relation to the totality. One who grasps this idea realizes that he is so related to humanity that no part of it can be foreign to him.

Society as including humanity as a totality embraces the largest possible number of individuals; but aside from this, the contents of this abstract idea are the emptiest possible. Humanity, so far as a society, involves only such elements as belong to every human being in his association with others. You cannot say that human society is enlightened, or refined, or Christian, for it may include savages or barbarians. A modern scientific or literary association is not only a human society, but contains many other elements than

such as belong to humanity at large; its contents are richer. While we need the idea of humanity in Sociology, we must not imagine that this general conception is the sole object of sociological inquiry. Usually the term "society" is taken in a more limited sense, applying to individuals more intimately associated than merely as members of the same human family. From the few loose bonds we proceed to the numerous and intimate ones. Thus besides the common ties of humanity, men are connected by local bonds; they constitute a distinct community with well-defined interests; their associative elements are educational, legal, political, national. But aside from these extensive associative bonds which are inevitable, not dependent on the choice or consciousness of the individuals, there are numerous other societies which can be put under the head of voluntary association or organization. Thus men combine for particular ends; they organize. These voluntary associations are constituted for intellectual, literary, æsthetic, ethical, religious, political, industrial, recreative purposes, and serve to bring the members into peculiarly intimate relations.

Sociology as dealing with human association *per se*, not limited to a particular kind of association, must take into account all the associative elements, whether they be the most general and most empty, or specific and rich in content. Sociology will be incomplete in proportion as its interpretations leave any principles of human association unexplained. This settles the attitude of our subject to the family and the state, which some want to exclude from the domain of human society. They claim that the family is not a society, but the social unit from which society is formed; and especially in Germany has there been dispute as to

whether the state is to be considered as a society or as an institution apart from society.[1]

The family differs from all other institutions, but it is unquestionably a form of human association. The fact that its grounds of association are peculiar does not destroy its character as a society; that only makes it a distinct kind of society. Indeed, as involving the most intimate bonds of union, the family constitutes society in the most perfect sense. Whether we study society historically or as a system of association, we are obliged to lay particular stress on the family.[2]

[1] So eminent a writer on political science as Robert von Mohl uses "society" in a very limited sense. ("Encyclopaedie der Staatswissenschaften," 27.) He excludes from it the family, the gens, the community, and the state. He includes in society only such unions as are formed by distinctions of birth (nobility), or by means of superior conditions (as aristocracy of talent or position), or by similarity of occupation, or through economic conditions (the wealthy, the middle, and the poorer classes), or through religion. But by thus limiting society it is evident that Sociology is not the science of human association, but of only a limited part of that association. What Von Mohl includes in society cannot be understood properly unless it is correlated to the forms of association which he excludes. It is much better to include all human association in Sociology; then special kinds of association, as peculiarly valuable, can be treated more fully than the rest.

[2] The family as the original social unit deserves special study. It is prominent as the generic social type. The Jews were viewed as a family, "the children of Israel." "The household of faith" designates Christians as a family. It is common in the Old Testament to designate all descendants of a common ancestor as children, thus for all generations retaining the conception of the family. The "human family" shows to what an extent the idea has been carried. Indeed, the family is not only the primitive association, but also typical of association in general. It stands for unity, for intimacy, for close relationship, for community of possessions, thoughts, feelings, and actions; and associations are perfect in proportion as they approach the family type. In some degree every society partakes of the nature of family ties. Affection and friendship have their origin in the family; there play and recreation have their full exercise; the family is the first school; it trains in moral and social affairs as well as the intellect; it has a common altar as well as a common

For similar reasons we reject the theory that the state is not included in society. It is not a society like the family, nor is it a voluntary organization; nevertheless it is a form of human association of peculiar importance.

The family and the state being peculiar and specially important forms of society, can receive separate treatment. This may be advantageous because they will thus secure more attention and better development. That, however, cannot take them out of Sociology. They can be understood only in their relation to humanity at large and as connected with all its other social forms.

The subject-matter of Sociology is thus made definite, — every kind of human association. We are chiefly concerned about the associative essences, their infinite manifestations interesting us only so far as revelations of the social substance.

The notion of society as inclusive of the whole of humanity is essential, since all human beings have elements in common and are somehow associated. Even if some men were isolated now from the rest of humanity, there are indissoluble ties which connect them with it, and they can never be abstracted from the family to which they belong, whose organic connection with the human family is indisputable. Leslie Stephen ("Science of Ethics," 126) says: "We may thus consider the race as forming what is called a social organism." Crabbe ("Synonymes") defines society, "when expressing the abstract notion of associating," as indicating "that which is common to mankind." When we speak of the nature and laws of society, we use "society" as inclusive of humanity. The unity involved in the expression "human family" is significant.

In "Principles of Sociology" (i. 436) Mr. Spencer limits the idea

hearth, and is the primitive church; it is an economic unit and the original industrial society, — a real co-operative association; in its order, its authority, its obedience, we have a type of the state. It is astonishing how a study of the family gives a revelation of society in epitome.

of society to later stages of human development, not including the associations of primitive man. Of society he says: "Withholding the name from an ever-changing cluster such as primitive men form, we apply it only where some constancy in the distribution of parts has resulted from settled life." This accounts for the fact that he treats society as consisting of certain institutions which he discusses. Thus, however, some of the most important social factors are missed. The associations of primitive man, however fleeting, were beginnings of social evolution, without which the later stages of social development cannot be understood. We shall also see the importance of other social groups than such as are organized or institutional.

REFLECTIONS.

Aim of Definition. Relation of the Definition to the Development of the Subject. Individualistic and Social Point of View. Contiguous Association (Space), Successive (Time). Effect of Association. Limit of Changes by means of Animal Association. Capacity for Social Progress through Human Association. What does Human Society as viewed by Sociology include? Reasons for not limiting Society to Organizations and Institutions. Why are the Family and the State included? Importance of the Family as a Social Type. Why defer the Discussion of the Scientific Character of Sociology?

B. The Scope of Sociology.

The above places before us human society as the subject-matter of our discipline. It is, however, as we have seen, difficult to grasp the idea of society. Much may be said about society, just as about the universe, humanity, philosophy, science, while the object itself remains obscure. The following considerations may make the idea more clear.

1. The most evident objects in every gathering are the individuals; and these are usually taken as the

ultimate units in social analysis.[1] The individual himself is indeed a compound of great complexity; and if we wanted to analyze him completely, we should not be able to stop until we reached the primitive elements of which he is composed. But the individual is treated as the ultimate factor because he acts as a unit. Even if considered as composed of billions of particles, still he is an organism, a complex system forming a unity and controlled by a single power.

2. We cannot consider the individuals as forming society by merely adding them together as so many units. They are living beings, and as such act on each other. Thus the members of a family do not merely live in the same place and at the same time, but they also influence one another. It is like hydrogen and oxygen, which not merely exist side by side, but coalesce and produce a new substance, water. In order therefore to apprehend society, we must regard the individual members as so many forces which act and react on one another. This interaction of forces is the essential idea in association and socialization. It is the purpose of our study to determine how men act on one another, what the social forces are, and what results they produce. Society thus appears as a system of endless energies ever active and ever promoting changes.

3. Difficult as it may be to form a clear conception of this constant interaction of the social forces, it is easy to apprehend the definite products resulting from the interaction. The products of association and socialization are the numerous social groups, such as families, communities, and associations of all kinds. As individuals form social groups, so these groups

[1] How far this is correct will be shown later.

may be united to form larger groups, as when labor associations unite to form one great combination of laborers. It is the province of Sociology to interpret social groups, to explain their relation to one another and the combinations they form, extending to states and nations and humanity itself.

4. In its largest sense Sociology as the science of society aims at the laws for all kinds of human association. Thus it ought to explain processes of socialization which are only casual or temporary, as when men associate in travel or meet in a company which remains together for a few hours and never meets again. But society may become perfect in proportion as the association is abiding, when it becomes an institution and takes an organized form, as the family, the church, the state, guilds, the various literary and labor organizations, and the like. This gives definite objects of sociological study, and on these permanent social forms especial stress has been placed by sociological writers.

5. In order fully to understand the results of the interaction of the social forces we shall have to do more than consider the social groups formed. All human products are involved in socialization, the private ones of the individual alone excluded. Yet the individual himself is a social product; he could not be what he is without society. Therefore inventions, ideas, and systems, of individuals, are in a measure social results. Among clearly defined social products we place language, literature, politics, economics, science, art, and history.

We do not use force here in its physical sense as that which causes or changes motion. It is employed to designate all the human energies, whether physical,

intellectual, or moral. The social forces therefore include all the powers that work in society.

The five points specified will aid the beginner to form a general conception of the scope of Sociology. Our subject is not limited to definite social organizations; often the social atmosphere in which we live and from which we draw the breath of life is more important.

In scientific study the individual object or fact is valued for the sake of the law it involves. The phenomena of nature are endless, but millions of them are mere repetitions. In order to gain the mastery over nature, we seek to discover the laws in which the phenomena are included. Likewise in Sociology it is this condensed knowledge at which we aim. The myriad social forms with endless repetitions confuse the mind. In this chaotic mass Sociology aims to introduce order by the discovery of principles, essences, laws, and system.

The subject-matter of Sociology is the scope of sociological inquiry. This subject-matter consists of the associative energies, what associates men, what creates society, and what results from the action of the associative forces. We want in Sociology whatever is essential for understanding human society and for putting the knowledge gained in a rational social system.

When the scope of Sociology has been determined, the investigation should be strictly limited to the sphere designated. Interminable confusion is occasioned by continually passing into neighboring or foreign regions, devoting to side-issues that attention which should be confined to sociological inquiry. This erratic wandering is due in part to the fact that Sociology has not been sharply severed from other dis-

ciplines, and therefore does not stand out distinctly as a separate science.

Society itself should be brought into bold relief and all discussion concentrated on its interpretation. If the whole cosmos is to be drawn into the investigation, where is the limit of sociological inquiry? If we must first evolve the universe from the atoms as its seeds, we are in danger of being involved in such perplexities as never to reach man; and the way from the star-dust to society is so long and bewildering that we are afraid of being lost in some nebulous region before we come to Sociology. These endless wanderings may be pardonable so long as the idea of society itself is in confusion and men do not know what they are investigating in the study of Sociology. Were the subject-matter itself fully outlined, then the relation of society to the universe might be attempted, but until that is done we must insist that in Sociology the attention be concentrated on society itself.

The limitation here urged is especially essential for an introductory volume. In it much must be omitted which demands discussion in a work on Sociology itself. Nor can the beginner be expected to take up subjects of great complexity which one who has spent his life in developing them as a specialist can discuss with ease. Still other considerations lead us to omit discussions which have become common in larger sociological works. Certain studies must be considered as preliminary to Sociology, and it is taken for granted that they have been pursued before the science of society is studied. Sociology cannot be expected to discuss problems which are fundamental for all scientific inquiry, and therefore not peculiar to Sociology. These problems should be left to the specific departments where

they belong, and can be most thoroughly investigated, just as the sociologist demands that what is peculiar to Sociology shall be treated as a sociological specialty. It is of course necessary to show the relation of Sociology to other disciplines; sometimes the sociologist may have to develop elements in these disciplines to get the proper sociological material and a firm sociological basis. But the science of society is never to wander into other departments so as to lose sight of its specialty, the explanation of human society.

The following are among the problems which the beginner has no right to expect Sociology to solve for him, nor need he postpone his sociological investigations till they have been solved.

1. The problem of materialism and spiritualism. This should be relegated to metaphysics, where it belongs. The problem remains a problem after the proposed solutions of the profoundest philosophers. Those sociologists who imagine that a few empirical platitudes suffice to give them a warrant for their materialistic or spiritualistic basis, should be left to their imagination. The usual outcome is a shallow dogmatism which dominates all the inquiries. Careful thinkers have learned to treat the ultimate problems with great reserve, taking what is distinct and peculiar as distinct and peculiar, without pretending to explain connections and causes which are inexplicable. Thus mental phenomena are readily distinguished from the physical ones. Their relation to the body, particularly the nerves, is not fully understood, and this is to be admitted. To treat mental processes as products of purely material processes is unwarranted and at best a mere hypothesis. Scientific students of the actual world take phenomena as they are, and leave to metaphysics the metaphysical questions involved.

2. Our subject is Sociology, not biology; and as biology has its distinct sphere, so has Sociology. Much that is biological can be used with advantage in sociological interpretation; but Sociology is not to be lost in biology. Biology teems with unsettled problems. Besides, human phenomena may be different from those of animals below man. There is danger of taking similarity or analogy for identity. It is a mistake to suppose that human association, of which we are conscious, can be better understood by constant reference to animal associations, of which we are not equally conscious. The perversion seems complete when early human associations are ignored, while those of inferior animals are emphasized. Then, there is danger of keeping human society on a low level by continually seeking for analogies in the brute creation. Human society can be understood only by the study of human society, just as nature must be interpreted by the study of nature. Analogies may furnish helpful data without giving sociological laws.[1]

3. The theory of evolution is among the most powerful factors in modern thought. The truth embodied in it has wrought a revolution in thinking, particularly

[1] Some analogies may be specially valuable, as in the case of ants and bees. Their remarkable organization, the peculiarities in structure and function, and their division of labor, are illustrative of various forms and processes of human association. We naturally expect some laws to be of such general application as to prevail in all departments of organic life. But association which depends on reflexive or instinctive action can never be made the type of societies in which reason and conscience, in their highest forms and with their multifarious products, are essential factors. The higher development can interpret the lower much better than the lower the higher; and human association is the condition for interpreting animal association far more completely than animal association is the condition for determining human association. In either case, however, there is danger of attributing to the lower animals what is peculiar to man.

in the domain of natural science. Its very comprehensiveness makes evolution fascinating, and it is not surprising that some of its enthusiastic disciples have been far less reserved in their claims than the modest Darwin. In applying it to Sociology, it must be treated as a theory, which it really is, not as scientific demonstration. Besides, it professes only to be a process, a method of working, a law of development; it does not propose to settle the question of the origin of things. Even if the exact nature of evolution in biological processes were determined, which is not the case, that would not give the law of its operation in human affairs.

The logic of science teaches us that we must go directly to human society if we want to learn the processes at work in it. The short cut of *a priori* assumptions may save labor, but it also prevents accuracy and scientific finality.

In the application of the theory to social affairs the exact sense of evolution should be determined. The variety of meanings in which the term is used has made it vague. Sometimes it is treated as if it explained the nature and process of the universe, whether inorganic or organic; special applications of it are also made to biology; it is even employed to promote materialism. Among scientists themselves there has been much dispute respecting the nature of evolution; and since the exact nature of the process is still in question, extreme caution is required in its use as a sociological law. Especially must we guard against making a single factor in evolution, as the struggle for existence, or the survival of the fittest, the sole element when others ought likewise to be considered. A superficial process in evolution should not be taken as a philoso-

phy of the whole; a similarity in the process in different departments need not be identity. It should be considered that evolution involves something that is evolved, and that on this, not merely on the environment, the result depends. No environment can evolve an oak from a mushroom.

Evolution accounts for much which was formerly attributed to design; but this is different from the problem whether it dispenses with design altogether, or is itself the product and manifestation of design. If at the end of a certain process of evolution, in man, we have mind which works teleologically, then the conditions for producing that mind must exist in the universe. No matter what process is adopted, we can get from an object only what is in it in some form. One of the ultimate of the fundamental questions not settled by evolution is this: Is there involved in the process mind in the beginning as well as at the end?[1]

[1] Haeckel, "Evolution of Man," i. 95: "The gist of Darwin's theory, properly so called, is this simple idea: *that the struggle for existence in Nature evolves new Species* without *Design, just as the Will of Man produces new Varieties in Cultivation with Design.*" Darwin discusses the subject in "The Origin of Species," chapters iii. and iv. On the present limitations of the theory of selection, Riehl ("The Principles of the Critical Philosophy," 322) says: "It is too easy to forget that the theory of selection does not attempt to explain the origin of life, but the descent of species, the existence of which presupposes life. And when the statement is added that up to date the principle of transition from the one-celled being to the organism composed of several cells has not yet been discovered, the limits of present biological investigation have been given; it is not, however, justifiable to treat these as limits for the future progress of the science." On p. 324 he says: "At most, natural science could only approve of teleology as a mode of thought which has reference to the *origin* of things. But inasmuch as it does not occupy itself with the final reasons of things, but rather with the relative beginnings and the development of phenomena, it leaves to metaphysics the question whether existence in general involves design, whether the world taken as a whole is to be thought of as teleological."

But the extensive sociological application of evolution as formulated by Darwin is evident. It is significant that Darwin was indebted to the reading of a work on human society for a clear conception of the theory, — namely, Malthus' "Principles of Population."

It is beyond question that in the struggle for existence great modifications take place in human society. The struggle itself promotes development and modifies individuals and their associations; the fittest survive and transmit their qualities to their descendants. It is not, however, the only law in social evolution, nor does it in men with reason and design work in the same way as in the lower animals. Darwin by no means claims to explain everything by natural selection, acknowledging "plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation."[1]

4. The part taken by psychology in Sociology requires consideration. Just what is meant by the statement that Sociology is a psychological discipline or is based on psychology, should be explained. It needs no proof that all science and all knowledge are mental, depend on the laws of the mind, and therefore are based on psychology. Our biological conceptions are no less dependent on psychological laws than our logic. All departments of thought are therefore equal in that they are mental products.

If by the statement that Sociology rests on psychology is meant that the mind is the one object of sociological inquiry, then we demur. In Sociology we consider the mind and the body, and even the natural environment so far as it affects society. Thus psycho-physics rather than psychology is the object of sociological inquiry. Still more objectionable is psychology as the object of

[1] Origin of Species, 106.

Sociology if mind is taken in the sense of intellect merely. We must include in mind the emotions and the will likewise. It may be well at times to emphasize the intellect, the emotions, or the will, as specially involved in certain sociological processes. Here thought and foresight may be especially concerned; there feeling with its impulses; yonder will with its activities. Analysis has prevailed in psychology to such an extent as to divide the mind into numerous faculties, each of which was then discussed as if it had a separate existence. The result was false abstractions; the connection of the faculties was lost sight of, as well as the unity of the mind. Chiefly through the influence of Herbart was the tendency promoted to overcome this false abstraction and treat the mind as a unit. It is the same mind that is involved, whatever faculty may be exercised. Intellect, feeling, and will are organically united and never can be absolutely severed from one another. There may be a question of dominance; there can be none of complete separation or of the isolated action of one without the other.

In another aspect the relation of psychology to Sociology is important. If a psychology has to be adapted to a theory of evolution, it is in danger of losing its independence; the results of the inquiry are apt to be a foregone conclusion. The mind ought to be examined thoroughly as it is, not what it must be if certain evolutionary hypotheses are true. Least of all is psychology to be prepared with a view to determine Sociology. The sociologist can leave to psychology its peculiar province, the mental phenomena and laws. Psychology starts with a prejudice if limited to mental changes as affected by the environment. The mind enslaved by its environment loses sight of its inherent energies.

The conviction that it is thus tethered robs it of its spontaneity and freedom of exercise. A Sociology based on a psychology which depends on the natural environment is in danger of limiting society to natural forces. Whether this tethering of the mind be due to materialism, to the view that mental processes are physical, or to some other monistic hypothesis, it is surely not wise for a beginner to adopt it as a dogma. From the mind the mind must be learned. The saying of Leibnitz should be remembered. When confronted by a shallow sensationalism with the old dictum, that nothing is in the mind which was not before in the senses, he added, "Except the mind itself."[1] That is, the mind itself must be taken into account, its energy, its laws, not merely what impressions it receives through the senses. The severe limitation of mind to its environment and sense-impressions has indeed been lauded as pre-eminently scientific. It has also been claimed that this dominance of the sensational element has gained victory on victory in recent times. This boast is likely to be short-lived. There has, for some decades, been an unusual emphasis on the environment, partly due to past neglect of this important feature, partly to the depreciation of philosophy and to the predominance of natural science. But a strong reaction has already set in. The mind has claims which cannot be permanently suppressed. It elaborates, analyzes, and synthesizes, according to its inherent laws, the impressions received from the surroundings. The mind itself is the immediate environment of thought. Generalizations, abstractions, the drawing of laws from phenomena, the formation of ideals, such as beauty, truth, goodness, and the construction of

[1] "*Nisi intellectus.*"

systems, all reveal mind as not tethered to the environment or to phenomena. Some may value mental products only if they are proved natural products and serve to adjust the mind to its environment; but there are others who study the mind itself in its mental products, for the purpose of understanding the mind, just as they study natural phenomena for the purpose of understanding nature.

Among the greatest and most perplexing of psychological problems is that of the freedom of the will. The beginner cannot be expected to delay his sociological investigations till the problem is solved. He can leave it safely to the discipline to which it belongs, without interfering seriously with his sociological studies.

5. Theological questions can be left to theology. The fact that they have been so largely drawn into Sociology has greatly interfered with the free and full development of this subject. Not on Sociology itself do the atheistic, agnostic, or theistic conceptions depend, but on its presuppositions. Those who come to Sociology with materialism, or with a certain theory of evolution, or with theism, naturally make their presuppositions the laws according to which social phenomena are shaped. If Sociology has thus far been tainted with materialism and agnosticism, it is due to the fact that its development has been left to materialists and agnostics. Religion and ethics should be considered as social elements or forces, without bias, exactly as all other phenomena.

In thus trying to fix its scope, the purpose is to give Sociology its own place, and separate it from entanglement with other subjects, to which it is now so liable. In the beginning of a new discipline chaos may be

inevitable; the discipline itself has yet to be found and correlated. The confusion becomes still greater when Sociology is so vague and comprehensive that men can make it the repository of all their hypotheses and theories of chance and fatalism, of matter and spirit, of biological and cosmical evolution. The profound and systematic thinker will at least make an effort to differentiate Sociology from the other disciplines, and to give to each its special scope and problems.

This is written for the sociological beginner, not for sociological specialists. He should be encouraged to inquire into the ultimate problems, but in their proper place. He is not to confound Sociology with natural science, with metaphysics, with general philosophy, or with theology. His study of Sociology is to be for the sake of mastering society, not for the sake of any theory of the universe, of design, of volition, or anything else than society. Perhaps after he has grasped society itself he can form a better conception of problems related to society but not directly involved in it.

It need not be emphasized that the above does not interfere with the recognition of laws in humanity and in the uniformity of their operations. How far these laws are within our reach is another matter, and has to be determined by the actual investigation. But every honest inquirer must refuse to postulate certain laws where their existence has not been established, and to transfer laws from a department where their prevalence is evident to departments where their operation is not proved and their application doubtful.

The study of Sociology presupposes much preparatory training. When it comes in a university course, it is preceded by a liberal education. In that case there is no need of repeating in sociological inquiry what has already been learned in the study of the

natural sciences, psychology, and philosophy. The very fact that Sociology is then taken up implies that to the other subjects sociological studies are now to be added, and that the attention is to be concentrated on human society. Sociology will be more strictly limited to its scope when its place in a collegiate or university course has been definitely fixed and its relation to other studies determined.

The sociologist no less than other specialists should have the benefits of the division of labor. Indeed he is specially in need of them, because his department is so new and undeveloped. Other investigators likely surpass him in their specialties, just as he is supposed to surpass them in his own. In the spirit of co-operation they should work for him, and he for them. So extensive have the different departments of thought become that specialization is necessary for the most successful work. With a thorough liberal education as his general basis, the specialist looks to investigators in other departments for facts, laws, and principles, which he needs but cannot himself make a specialty of. If some of his requirements are not met in this way, he may himself be obliged to make special investigations in the specialties of others. It has been said that since the day of A. von Humboldt no scientist has been able to master all departments of science; they have become too vast for that. Even when Humboldt gave his "Cosmos" to the world specialists were advanced beyond some of its teachings, just as specialists had passed beyond certain doctrines of Comte's "Positive Philosophy" before it was completed. There may now be generalizations on the basis of all the sciences, because the principles are taken from the investigations of different specialists; but no scholar can be a successful specialist in all the sciences.

Recognizing this division of labor, the sociologist is expected to devote himself to his specialty, just as others devote themselves to their particular departments. He may be a specialist in some other sphere before he becomes a sociologist, — in natural science, in psychology, ethics, economics, politics, law, philosophy, or theology, — in which case he will bring to Sociology the advantages, perhaps also disadvantages, of his former specialty. It may under such circumstances be impossible for him to resist the temptation to give his Sociology the peculiar coloring of his past specialization. This will be overcome when the various social studies lead up to, and become the basis of, Sociology.

At present, using his own studies as a basis, the sociological specialist must look to other scholars as co-operators. Not only does he regard specialists in natural science, particularly in biology, as co-laborers, but also such as work in the various humanistic studies. He gratefully accepts the rich contributions to his specialty by ethnologists, anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers, historians, economists, political writers, moralists, and theologians. While the sociologist sustains relations to specialists in all departments and looks to them for help, nothing in the human sciences is to be foreign to him. Whatever of humanity is accessible should be concentrated on his specialty for the development of Sociology.

Even in his own department he is obliged to specialize; all social affairs do not equally concern him. The significant is most valuable; what is principiant, typical, essential, interpretive, causative. Unless there is this specialization, he will find his sphere too large and the materials beyond his comprehension. Under great social characteristics the sociologist groups all that is social.

Perhaps Sociology requires time in order that it may be sufficiently differentiated from other disciplines to sharply outline its particular sphere and confine it to the same. The confusion in Sociology seems now similar to that which formerly prevailed in philosophy, to which at different times all deeper and systematic knowledge was assigned; the result at last being that the term stood for so much in general that it had no definite meaning.

The student who clearly apprehends the subject-matter of Sociology will discover that it requires the concentration of all his energies. So profound and so vast is the theme that he will be able to account for wandering into forbidden paths only on the supposition that the subject-matter has been missed and with it the scope of Sociology, or that through some mistaken notion sociological inquiries are used to promote pet theories lugged in from other specialties.

When sweeping generalizations threaten to make an indiscriminate mass of heterogeneous elements, it is time to insist that humanity be studied in man, not in the brute. Particularly are we limited to human consciousness for all that is purely subjective, such as ethical considerations. It is admitted to be extremely difficult for one human mind to interpret the motives of another. We cannot enter another mind, but judge it only by outward ex-

pressions, which may be defective. We judge other minds only through our own experiences. Whoever considers this fact will hesitate to treat animal conduct as the key to human ethics. Two men may do the same things which must be differently interpreted if their motives are taken into account. The action of animals may look like that of men and yet be totally different. Until we can put ourselves in place of monkeys, dogs, and horses, we are justified in questioning the ethical characteristics ascribed to them. It is astonishing that in data of ethics claiming to be scientific, facts loosely gathered and without scientific method are confidently interpreted according to preconceived notions.

The failure to separate Sociology sharply from other disciplines has led to such confusion as to interfere with its recognition and development. So clear a thinker as Lorenz von Stein declared that it had always been impossible for him to form a conception of Sociology, "since, according to the French and English confusion of words, nothing any longer exists which is not in some sense Sociology, electricity, and bacteria included." [1]

This tendency to wander about creation, to follow cosmical processes, to trace biological laws, to transmute physical into intellectual and moral forces, and to interpret man by the lower animals, would be more excusable if the legitimate materials of Sociology had been exhausted. So far, however, is this from being the case that hardly a beginning has been made to collect and systematize them. Not only are these materials so definite that they can easily be distinguished from others, but they are so important as to deserve the undivided energies of specialists. Hardly any other demand is more urgent than that the attention be concentrated on phenomena known to be sociological, in order that they may be thoroughly mastered.

Our very speech shows that the common consciousness does not limit society to organizations and institutions. When we speak of a question as a social problem, we mean that it is a question not of any particular organization, but of society at large. We say that society makes criminals, and mean society itself, not a particular kind of society. We take society as a totality when we declare society responsible for slums, for saloons, for gambling, and for other evils. By the social condition of a people we mean all that pertains to the people as forming a community, including their

[1] Quoted by Gumplowicz in "Sociologie und Politik."

organizations and institutions. When in England and on the Continent men emphasize the need of social politics, they mean that political action should be based on the actual situation of the people. That society is not limited to organizations and institutions, but is an organism which includes these and much more, is an achievement of modern thought and one of the strongest impulses to sociological inquiries.

The student naturally approaches society in the largest sense through the study of social groups. Every such group contains all the elements which are essential to society. The social groups, their relations to one another, and the grand social totality they form, are all within the scope of Sociology.

The direct social action of an individual is on the groups to which he belongs, the family, the neighborhood, the community, and the various organizations of which he is a member. The action is apt to be intensive in proportion to the smallness of the group.

Much of the social influence of the day consists in the actions of groups on one another. In religion we have the churches and numerous religious organizations; in politics, parties and factions; in the industries, combinations of capitalists and of laborers; likewise associations for literary, scientific, artistic, and other purposes. Whatever cause enlists the sympathies of men leads to organization, without which there is little hope of success even for the most commendable objects. Thus, besides individual action, we behold that of groups and combinations of groups in all departments of life.

This interaction of groups affords an interesting study and exerts a powerful effect on social development. Men are apt, as we say, to lose themselves in groups, to partake of their characteristics and prejudices, and to sacrifice individuality. They must belong to parties to accomplish their purposes, and therefore give themselves to the parties. Where the majority rules, independent inquiry and individual conviction may have little weight. When men move in herds, we have "voting cattle." Public opinion, however worthless, subjects citizens of republics to abject slavery. "One might as well be out of the world as out of fashion." Shrewd men who appreciate the power of groups and associate action seek so to use them as to gain control of parties and conventions. Hence bosses in politics, and the methods of political machinery even in religious conventions.

In the study of social activity it is important to distinguish between the influence of persons and of things. Men personally weak and even contemptible may be socially powerful on account of rank and position (monarchs, the nobility, politicians), or on account of wealth. Title, place, and money may have power where scholarship and character count for little. With vast multitudes display gains the victory over solid worth. It is consequently of great significance in social study to determine what forces control communities. Later we shall see that it is essentially the social forces which constitute the scope of sociological inquiry.

REFLECTIONS.

Exact Aim and Scope of Sociology. Society as composed of Individuals, Social Groups, and Humanity. Why include the Primitive Social Groups in Sociology? Organized and Unorganized Society. Analysis of a Social Group. Synthesis of Social Groups. Power of Social Groups. Social Groups and Individuality. Subject-Matter of Sociology. Why Sociologists have not confined to this their Discussions. Reasons for strictly confining the Scope of Sociology to its Subject-Matter. Relation of Sociology to the Metaphysical Questions of Materialism and Spiritualism. Relation to Biology; to Evolution; to Psychology; to Theology and Religion.

CHAPTER III.

THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO OTHER SOCIAL DISCIPLINES.

The Problem. *We now have the Definition and Scope of Sociology. On human society as the subject-matter of our study the inquiries are to be concentrated. But there were social studies long before Sociology was thought of, and there now exist specific social sciences which treat of particular phases of society. In order to determine the peculiarity of Sociology it is necessary to consider its relation to other social disciplines.*

Sociology has not only been declared unnecessary, but has also been regarded as an intruder. Is there unoccupied territory for it, or do other studies already possess the land? In order to answer this question we are obliged to examine the standpoints from which the specific social disciplines contemplate society. Most of all will it be necessary to inquire into the social character of the science of politics, of economics, and of history, the subjects most emphasized as sufficient for social study by those who think no peculiar sphere left for Sociology.

Could we perhaps by adding or grouping the various social sciences already established secure the advantages sought by Sociology? If not, and if Sociology is really a new science, what differentiates it from the specific social sciences?

The questions involved in this chapter have not received sufficient attention. Much of the confusion in Sociology is

due to the fact that they have not been definitely answered. In order to determine relations, that discrimination which discerns both likeness and difference is required, and then due importance is to be given to each. We relate Sociology to the social sciences for the purpose of differentiating it from them.

May not the social science be related to the social sciences as society is related to societies?

In viewing from a short distance a row of three white houses exactly alike, the middle one may be seen clearly, but not distinctly. You cannot tell just where it ends and they begin; it is not seen distinctly, because it cannot be sharply distinguished from the other two. It would be distinct as well as clear if the two houses were black while it remains white. An object is made distinct by separating it from that with which it is most closely allied.

There is special reason for distinguishing Sociology from the other human disciplines and determining its exact place among them. Questions have been raised whether it has a distinct place, whether its sphere is not already occupied, or whether all it has to say is not now discussed by other disciplines. Sociology must prove that it is not an intruder, but has a valid claim to existence.

Even if all that belongs properly to Sociology had heretofore been included in another subject or in several, that would be no conclusive objection to its separation and its development as a distinct discipline. By this means it will receive greater prominence, more attention will be concentrated on it, and it will be more fully developed. Mathematics and the natural sciences were long included in philosophy; but in the

process of evolution they became independent, and this was to their advantage. Sociology is surely important and extensive enough for separate treatment; only as a distinct department of thought can the evolution it deserves be expected.

But has any other discipline included Sociology, so that now we need but take it from that department of thought and give it a separate existence? There never has been another discipline which included the science of society. But that the need of making human association an object of especial inquiry was felt is evident from the fact that various disciplines made an attempt so to enlarge themselves as to include society. This is true of political economy and likewise of the science of politics. But it is evident that in this way a complete interpretation of society was impossible. In one case society is reduced to industrialism and material interests; in the other to a political institution. Sociology is needed in order that every interest of humanity may receive its proper place and due emphasis in the social system. Heretofore we have had social sciences, but no social science; that is, various disciplines have discussed specific social themes, but no one considered society *per se* and all the social forces in their organic connection. Analogies are seen in the natural sciences. Thus there was a time when groups of stars were observed, but there was no astronomy; when certain flowers and animals were classified, but there was neither botany nor zoölogy; and the minerals were used and the earth was studied long before mineralogy or geology was developed.

Essentially the same process of evolution has taken place in all the sciences: a few facts were observed, rude classifications were made, things really distinct were put together either because there

was a lack of differentiation in the objects themselves or a lack of discrimination, and only after a long time did the science itself become possible. Hasty generalization is one of the most fruitful sources of error. Growth in knowledge is largely a development of discrimination. As thought advances, differences are discovered where formerly none were observed. Knowledge is twofold: analysis and synthesis; a recognition of distinct features and of the unity underlying the differences. Natural science is at one time an undiscriminated totality; then it branches into physics, chemistry, biology, etc. Shall this analytical process be followed by a synthesis of all the sciences so as to give us a system of the cosmos? This is conceived by some as the aim of philosophy in our day. We have specific social sciences which involve most important social factors, such as political science and economics; but if society itself is to receive adequate treatment, it must be made a distinct object of inquiry.

REFLECTIONS.

Difference between Clearness and Distinctness. Distinctness — distinguishing between similar objects. Advantages of making Society an Especial Object of Inquiry. Aim of Analysis and Synthesis in Scientific Research. Importance of Discrimination.

The General Distinction between Sociology and the Specific Social Sciences.

Sociology as the science of society confines itself strictly to human association. It aims to show what is meant by association, how it is brought about, to what process of development it is subject, and what results it produces. Three questions respecting human society are supreme: What? Why? How? Since human association itself is our aim, it is evident that the stress is not to be placed on any particular kind of association. The subject is so large that we shall be

obliged to confine ourselves to the general principles of society and to their general application.

In thus aiming at what marks human association as characteristic, we also aim at what marks every particular form of human society. If personal forces are the constituent elements of association, then these forces must constitute every kind of society formed. The forces may differ in kind, in number, in intensity, and in degree of development; but no society can exist otherwise than by virtue of these forces. The personal forces exist only in individuals; therefore the idea of society includes that of individuals as possessors of the social forces. In a society for physical culture, for mental culture, for political ends, and for any purpose imaginable, the prime question pertains to the character of the personal forces involved. Just as being includes all being, but only in the most general sense as being, so association includes every society, but only in its most general sense.

Here then is the broad difference between social science itself and the specific social sciences: the former discusses whatever belongs to society as society and applies the general ideas obtained to the different associations; but each special social science confines itself to a particular phase of society. While Sociology deals with the great principles or essences of association, and shows how they apply to all society, the specific social sciences specialize certain forms of association and give an account of their specific characteristics. More details are therefore to be expected in the limited social sciences than in the general social science.

Let us suppose that Sociology gives a principiant account of the nature and working of the social forces;

that would be a general interpretation of society. Among them are found industrial forces; they are consigned to economics for special treatment; there are also political forces; they are consigned to political science; there are ethical forces, which are consigned to ethics; and so with all the other social forces. Sociology is therefore the general social science of which the special social sciences are differentiations; it is the genus of which they are the species, the trunk on which they are the branches. While each social science has its specific sphere (the operation of specific social forces), it is not within the province of any one of them to determine what association itself is and how the various forms of society are related to it; that is the mission of the more general science, Sociology.

After indicating the general relation of Sociology to the special social disciplines, we now proceed to consider the relation of some of the latter to our subject.

Minds disciplined in philosophy are not likely to find difficulty in distinguishing between what is general and what is particular, the very distinction here made. If æsthetics is the science of beauty, then it seeks to formulate the general laws of beauty; these laws apply to every beautiful object wherever found. Yet besides a work on these general laws, there may be others on specific departments of beauty, as on architecture, painting, sculpture, and literature. Were the sphere of æsthetics so small that all its objects could be treated by a single discipline, then specialization might not be necessary. But as subjects develop, a division into general and specific departments becomes necessary. Thus in botany and zoölogy we have the general principles of plants and animals, and, besides these, numerous works on special families and classes of plants and animals. We have a history of the world, and distinct from it the history of the various nations. So in Sociology we have an interpretation of association, and in the special social sciences discussions of the family, economic organizations, the church, the state.

REFLECTIONS.

Why not discuss in Sociology all Social Forms both in Principle and Detail? What pertains to the General Science of Society which is not found in the Special Social Sciences? What do the Special Social Sciences contain that is not found in the General Science? The Need of General and Specific Disciplines illustrated by Philosophy, Science, and History.

Political Science.

Various limited societies have tried to absorb society itself and put themselves in its place. In the gens or the tribe, as an enlarged family, it is the family which embodies the social idea. Perhaps the members knew no other association. In Judaism and the Middle Ages the theocracy, the Kingdom of God, or the church is viewed as the essence of society. We can understand why Aristotle defines man as a political animal, when we remember how the individual was thought to exist for the state.

A part is put for the whole. It is a common mistake to concentrate the attention on a dominant or specially prized feature and lose sight of the rest. Thus a fixed idea is made the sole idea.

We have seen that the development of society beyond the political sphere was the condition for a larger conception of society. For us the state is but an arc in the social circle. Such an exclusive prominence may, however, still be given to the state as to make it difficult for independent or voluntary associations to receive recognition, or to be deemed of sufficient importance to justify social science as distinct from politics. What is left for Sociology in such cases when the state absorbs the church, regulates the family, and deter-

mines the limits of associative action? By making the state everything, other societies become nothing. Governments have at times been disposed to suppress voluntary associations, for fear they might interfere with the prerogatives of the state, threaten its supremacy, or endanger its very existence. A governmental paternalism which aims so to control the affairs of the people that there may be no occasion for independent associative action, hinders the organization of voluntary societies. Thus associations distinct from the state require a certain degree of prominence and importance in order to receive recognition and to deserve special treatment. In the very condition of society a reason is found for those historians who have made history consist chiefly of the state, its monarchs and officials, its diplomacy and its wars.

While we thus understand the exclusive attention to the state as the most perfect organization, yet throughout history, and particularly in modern times, we find numerous open and secret associations which are not included in political science. This is the more evident now since the conception of society has been enlarged to include all kinds of association, not merely formal organizations. Even in its largest sense the state cannot embrace all societies as constituent parts of the body politic. From the political forces numerous other social energies must be differentiated. The action of some of these the state may sanction by its laws; the action of others may be left free, neither requiring nor receiving recognition.

Society existed before the state was formed; in what sense would that society be included in political science? Then, we have not one state but many states, and the inclusion of all requires a science of interna-

tional politics. But would such a comprehensive science include all non-political associations and the whole of humanity? Some organizations, as churches, Masonic and other lodges, industrial societies, extend beyond the limits of a state or even of all states, reaching out to individuals and tribes not in a state. How can these be made a part of political science?

The science of politics needs differentiation from Sociology and the other social sciences, in order that its own peculiar sphere may be made more distinct. The function of the state is among the most momentous problems of the times; but this function can be distinctly brought out only when contrasted with the other social forces. In Russia the government aims to make society; in the United States society makes the government; in Russia the progress of voluntary association is a menace to the government; in the United States independent organizations may ignore the very existence of the government. Neither theoretically nor practically is there agreement respecting the limits of the state and its relation to voluntary associations.

The science of politics confines itself to the state, explaining its structure and functions, marking the peculiarity of its organization as distinguished from other societies, treating of the relations of the citizens to one another and to the state, and of the government to the governed, the constitution and laws, and all that belongs to the domain of national life. Some have questioned, as intimated above, whether the state ought to be included in Sociology or treated separately as outside of society. It is unquestionably a form of association, and therefore within the scope of Sociology; but it is only one of many social forms, and therefore political science cannot take the place of the science of

society. The distinctive elements in the state, the peculiar authority it exercises, and the vast importance of the subject must receive full recognition. Its sphere is that of collective authority and coercion; the sphere of other societies is that of co-operation. Owing to the importance and extent of politics, it has become a special science. It is, however, a social science, which indicates its intimate relation to Sociology. The state of the people is society in a truer sense than when the state is treated as an abstraction, or as a power hovering over the people, to which unconditional submission is required. We can indeed distinguish between social and political, referring the latter to all that pertains to the state, and the former to society as distinct from the state; but reflection shows that political action is social action as organized in the form of collective authority. The state, whatever its particular form and whoever exercises the authority, is sovereignty. The functions and limits of the sovereignty are among the most important questions of the day.

The state is the authority of the collectivity, whether that authority be seated in one man as a despot, in a chosen few as noblemen or aristocrats, in the male citizens, or in all the inhabitants of a given age. Since the state is the authority of the collectivity, all within that collectivity are subject to the authority within the sphere of politics. Many other spheres of individual or social life may of course lie outside of the limits of the political sphere.

Political action is always personal, that is, it is the personal action of (or for) the collectivity so far as political. The making and adoption of the constitution, the election of the legislative and executive officers in a republic, and all acts of the state are personal. The personal factor appears no less in a monarchy than in a republic. Where the power is not concentrated in one person, but diffused throughout the collectivity, the conception of it is less easily

apprehended. Then the notion is one of great complexity, as in the case of seventy million inhabitants. Yet the purely political sphere can be grasped, likewise the purely political power of the collectivity. The essence of the matter consists in the fact that in the individuals of a nation we abstract the political social factor from all other social factors. It thus becomes evident what the relation of Sociology to political science must be. It regards the state as social, and as therefore a part of the general social organism, determines its place and functions in that organism (correlates the state to the other social factors), but does not take the state by itself and develop the science of politics. This work, and all particulars about the state, it leaves to political science.

When the brightness of the sun hides the stars by day, that does not prove their non-existence. When the state becomes so great in the estimation of thinkers as to absorb the attention, what wonder that other social forms dwindle into insignificance? Still, other forms may exist which are important. But they are ignored, and that explains why Sociology is absorbed by political science. Particularly among statesmen is there a tendency to do this. When, however, social groups and voluntary organizations become so powerful and prominent as in our day, a broader social discipline than that of political science is required. The strong tendency of social specialists to make their specialty the test of Sociology will be overcome in exact proportion as sociologists are developed and approach all social subjects from the broad basis of the science of society.

Sociology recognizes the great importance of the state, its uniqueness of character and functions, and its influence on all social forms and relations within its borders. Even if we specialize in the study of the state or some other social form, the living connection of all associations so as to constitute a great organism must be recognized.

The theory of the state deserves and receives marked attention in our day from scholars. Sociological studies will give still greater prominence to the subject. They must consider the social relation of the state to the societies within its domain and also to other states (international law and politics). Various movements of the day emphasize the significance of the state in social affairs, and it is not surprising that a new impulse has been given to the study of political science. Conservative scholars admit that the theory of

the state ought to be reinvestigated and further developed, and powerful socialistic, revolutionary, anarchistic, and nihilistic tendencies insist on the complete transformation or even destruction of the state. In various places the social crisis is predominantly political. Among the questions of special importance to the student are the following: What was the origin of the state? What is its nature; that is, what are the distinctive social forces whose interaction constitutes the state? What are its functions? How is it related to the other social forces at home and abroad? What is its best form? What is its history? For the comprehensive view of the sociologist international law, international politics, including arbitration, and the civilizing influence of states on humanity, have peculiar attractions. So far as the collectivity is really expressed in political action, the government furnishes an excellent test of the character and intelligence of the people.

On the science of politics the works of Bluntschli, Mohl, Woolsey, Woodrow Wilson, Burgess, and Sidgwick are recommended. "Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften," six large volumes and supplement, edited by Professors Conrad, Elster, Lexis, and Loening, assisted by hundreds of scholars from different countries, is the most valuable repository of materials on all departments of political science.

In the first half of this century German writers like Riehl found it necessary to show that all society is not absorbed by political society. Professor von Treitschke has advocated the absorption of Sociology by political science. On Sociology as an independent science valuable discussions are found in the work of Gumplowicz: "Sociologie und Politik." This volume also discusses the relation of Sociology to other sciences. Schmidt-Warneck, in "Die Sociologie," views Sociology chiefly in the light of politics.

It is an interesting and instructive fact that each class and profession is strongly inclined to make its particular view normative for society. The statesman emphasizes the state; the lawyer the law; the theologian the church; the economist political economy; the capitalist capital; the laborer labor; the aristocracy and nobility the circle they constitute. Hence the inability of each to put himself in the place of another or to take a comprehensive view. What an argument in favor of the sociological standpoint, which views society as a totality, and gives each particular class and its peculiar view the right place in the social organism!

REFLECTIONS.

Origin of the State. Rousseau's Social Contract. What does the State include? Different Forms of the State. State, Nation, Empire. Relation between Constitution, Laws, Politics. Distinction between State and Government. Legislative, Judiciary, Executive Functions, why separated and how united? The work of each. Reasons for recent Development of the Idea of the State. Relation of the State to other Societies. Source of Authority in the State. The Laissez-faire, the Paternal, the Social Democratic, and the Anarchical Theory of the State. Grounds of Modern Attacks on the State. Arbitration; International Law; Federation of Nations. Ranke: There must be international natures in order to transplant the culture of one land into another. Patriotism and International Justice. Value of the Sentiment: My Country, right or wrong. The Meaning of Social Politics.

Political Economy.

The effort to make *a* social science *the* social science has been especially strong in political economy. So long as social science did not exist, but its need was deeply felt, it was not strange that a social study deemed of supreme importance should be treated as the missing discipline. Particularly is this exaltation of economics natural at a time when material interests are absorbing. Then political economy is apt to be regarded as not only furnishing the basis of social being, but as also determining those interests which pertain to social well-being. At such times agricultural, industrial, and financial affairs are treated as the chief concerns of the state, as if, when they are attended to, all other things will take care of themselves. It is hardly an exaggeration to affirm that during the nineteenth century political economy has

been the gospel of the leading industrial nations, the determining factor in individual and social life. Men have made wealth their divinity and its pursuit their religion. Political economy is to our age what politics was to Greece and Rome, and theology to the Middle Ages. And when society passes from the dominant political and theological to the economic stage, what wonder that political economy is made the social science?

Carl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and the social democracy give such an exclusive pre-eminence to political economy as to absorb in it the state and the whole of society. It is not strange that laborers whose existence is an unceasing struggle for the necessaries of life regard their industrial redemption as involving their entire social salvation. It must also be remembered that many students come from political economy as their specialty to Sociology, so that their sociological theories are naturally affected by their economics.

Other factors have co-operated to reduce Aristotle's "political animal" to an industrial animal, and to transform the science of economics into the science of society. The marvellous progress of natural science has given prominence to material interests and wonderfully stimulated invention; this, together with the industrial development since the middle of the eighteenth century, has made ours the era of political economy.

One reason for creating social science is found in the necessity of showing that man is more than a beast of burden and has other than material interests. The new science will relegate political economy to its proper place. That is at the bottom, the foundation. Society, in order to live and accomplish life's purpose, must have bread. We cannot build without a foundation,

yet the foundation is not the house. But the importance of the foundation is heightened by increasing the value of the superstructure. Political economy is not degraded by putting it at the base instead of the top of society.

When political economy is treated as an abstract discipline, as merely the working of certain natural laws of utility for the production of wealth, it can hardly claim to be a social science. During the last half-century this abstract method has continually lost in pre-eminence. The historic and psychological methods have gained power, and thus the human and social factors have received greater prominence. The result is that now it is regarded as not only a social science, but also, as intimated, an effort has been made to treat it as the social science.

A true social analysis, which gives all the social forces in society, overcomes the tendency to absorb man in a single interest. It teaches us that there is truth, but not the whole truth, in the attempt of Aristotle to make man a political animal, of Marx to make him an industrial animal, of others to reduce him to a fighting, a tool-making, or sporting animal, and of Augustine to regard him as a spiritual being. That man is not one of these, but all, is not disproved by the fact that in some eras a particular social force has prevailed to the neglect or subordination of the rest. Man is a unit as well as multiplicity; some one force can receive an exclusive emphasis and one-sided development. Its very exercise strengthens it and increases its supremacy. But if whole ages are absorbed by an effort to recover the holy grave from the infidel, is that crusade to be deemed an interpretation of humanity itself, or only of a particular phase of humanity?

Sociology recognizes the economic as among the most powerful of the social forces. We can imagine Robinson Crusoe as economic in his isolation; but as men live in society we consider the social effects of economics. Man has too many other interests to be absorbed by political economy; but neither can Sociology take the place of economic science. It determines the place of economics in the great social system, but leaves to economics the development of the specific economic system.

Respecting economics, Sociology has important functions in our day. The historic fact that at a particular time political economy

is supreme does not fix its place in the social system any more than the dominance of political science and of ecclesiasticism at other times determined their eternal supremacy. The historic prevalence of a social force does not prove that it ought to prevail. Just now there is urgent need of determining the exact relation of economics to politics, to education, to religion, to ethics, and to social reform. The abstract isolation, and consequent one-sided development, of economics, help to explain the practical materialism of the age. A large part of the philosophy of our times is interpreted by the effort to make political economy the essence of Sociology. While Sociology refuses to make industrialism the apex instead of the base of the social pyramid, it does not favor the idealists and visionaries who depreciate material interests, as if there could be an apex without a base. However the body may be prized for the sake of the spirit, we know that in this world spirits without bodies are ghosts. It is difficult to maintain the golden mean of the Greeks between due emphasis on material interests and over-emphasis; but it is as important as difficult.

Political economy is of more than ordinary interest to sociological students. It must be studied in order to understand the life and history of nations, the labor movement and the social problem of the day, and the dominant political concerns of legislative bodies. But it should be studied in connection with all the other social sciences or as an integral part of Sociology. Since the middle of the nineteenth century its progress has been great, out of the selfish into the social elements, passing from egoism toward altruism, enlarging its sphere from the economy of a household and a nation to that of the world, and rising from the fate of natural law to the voluntary agency of the personality, thus relating the subject to ethical purpose, and showing that in economics we have an art as well as a science. This trend beyond Adam Smith and Ricardo and the entire old or orthodox economic school is evident in the thinkers among the economists of continental Europe, of England, and of America.

As a repository of the best thought of eminent thinkers on political economy see: "Handbuch der Politischen Oekonomie," edited by G. Schoenberg, third edition, three large volumes. An excellent discussion of the economic function of the state is given at the close of A. Wagner's "Grundlagen der Volkswirthschaft."

Many economists, particularly the Germans, discuss the relation of their discipline to other social subjects. J. S. Mill gives his

work the title, "Principles of Political Economy, with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy." In Keynes' "Scope and Method of Political Economy," the fourth chapter is "On the Relation of Political Economy to General Sociology." The recent works on economics by Marshall, Walker, Hadley, Ely, and many others are well known to students.

REFLECTIONS.

Exact Sphere of Political Economy. Its Doctrine of Utility, of Value, of Wealth. Growth of Economics from that of the Household, to that of a Nation, and now to that of the World. The Place of Political Economy in Business; in the State; in International Relations. The Orthodox and the Modern School. Are the Industries entirely controlled by Natural Law? Selfishness and Self-Interest and Altruism. Individualistic and Social Elements in Economics. Relation of Political Economy to Political Science. To Ethics. Fundamental Character of Economics for Society. Trend of Political Economy to become the Science of Society. Some want to relate Economics closely to Ethics; others introduce Ethical Elements into Political Economy; others claim that this is a Perversion of Economics: Will not the dispute be settled by giving Economic Science its proper place in Sociology and thus relating it to Ethics and all the Social Disciplines? Political Economy as a Science and an Art (A. Wagner). The Personal Element in Political Economy. Roscher: "Man is the beginning and the end of our Science."

History.

It has been claimed that history covers essentially the same ground which Sociology proposes to occupy. History, it is said, deals with all that is significant in society and has left its impress on the development of humanity, seeking to discover the social forces, following the process of social evolution, and describing the achievements of society, while the individual is considered only so far as he leaves a permanent effect on

human thought and life. History includes social action, the establishment and development of institutions, the course of politics, the theories of political economy prevalent at different times, and social phenomena in general. A specialty can be made of the organization and evolution of society among a particular people or in the world. But indispensable as history is for the student of Sociology, it cannot construct for him a social science. Some writers on Sociology have devoted so much attention to the description and history of society that the impression may be made that there is little else in the subject. The student will obtain the right point of view by discriminating between the aim of the historian and that of the sociologist. The former does not propose to construct, but to describe, systems. So long as no social science exists, the historian cannot determine the relation which events sustain to it. He does not invent mathematics or science or philosophy; only as they exist and exert an influence is it his province to give an account of them. But the sociologist does not merely describe society and seek the causes of its phenomena; he wants to construct a social system such as has as yet no historical existence. His work is that of a scientist or philosopher; from the material furnished by the historian and by observation he draws the principles of society and infers the social laws, a process entirely different from that whose end is historical inquiry. The historian may give an account of the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel; but it would be as reasonable to expect him to construct them as to become the founder of Sociology. As the science of society lies nowhere in history, we cannot look to the historian to discover it there.

That historic discipline which comes nearest covering the same ground as Sociology is what the Germans call *Culturgeschichte*, a history of culture or of civilization. This has been developed independently by German scholars and dates back farther than Sociology. It aims to give a history of social evolution, tracing the various stages of culture through which humanity passed until the present degree of civilization was attained. If by this method historic laws of development are discovered, much that certain sociologists have particularly emphasized will be accomplished. Why cannot this "culture-history," as some have claimed, take the place of Sociology?

The reason given above, that Sociology is not an historical discipline, furnishes the answer. The tendency to reduce it to that is, however, significant and reveals a dominant characteristic of our times. A large class of persons may be designated as mere observers and empiric investigators, in distinction from rational inquirers and philosophic thinkers. Facts are gathered and classified, and statistics accumulated till we know not what to do with them; this they regard as all that is required. Their work is essential, but only a beginning. Laws and principles and systems are not picked up from the surface of facts; they are intellectual constructions, a philosophy of the facts. The student must be a thinker in order to become a sociologist. Those who cannot distinguish between a history of culture and a system of culture, between a history and a science of society, are as rational as the empiric who takes a history of human conduct for a system of ethics. The sociologist is not merely intent on discovering what the social facts are; he also insists on knowing what they imply; he listens to what things

say, and from this he tries to learn what they mean. Underlying the superficial trend, now so common, is the false supposition that the history of an object is its exhaustive interpretation. Many do not study philosophy *per se*, but its history, and then imagine that they understand philosophy, a conceit which would vanish if they truly became philosophers. An intelligent study of the history of science, of theology, of law, and of other disciplines, implies a knowledge of these subjects. This is true of disciplines which have a long history; but Sociology is yet to be constructed, and therefore can be still less completely studied in its history than the older disciplines.

The difference between the genesis of a subject and its critical interpretation is important. Scarcely any discrimination is more essential than that between history and observation, on the one hand, and the philosophic effort which, on the other, constructs a rational system. This will become more evident in the discussion of Method. Fortunately, there are evidences that the day is waning when sensation was taken for thinking, and when men feared that by an intellectual mastery of things they were in danger of losing the grip of their reality. The rational element in philosophy, science, and in any system of thought adheres strictly to fact, but interprets the fact, relates it, goes to its source and results, and thus, by its explanation, brings out the true reality in place of what only seems to be the reality. It is the science of society which makes us truly the possessors of society, intellectually its masters. What has been said will not, therefore, be taken as an indication that we can evolve, speculatively, from our brains systems without facts. History receives its proper place, and this cannot be the means of depreciating its importance.

History deals with society, giving an account of social genesis and social transformations. It is concerned about continuous factors. The individual passes away; but certain forces in him may affect society and become a permanent factor in social progress. Historic characters are such as have thus helped to make history; that is, their personal force has become a social force. Human history is an account of men so far as associated and acting on one another. It is therefore evident how it comes that history, which treats of society, has been thought to take the place of Sociology. This of course is only possible on the part of men who take the genesis of a thing for its scientific interpretation. The same mistake is made by those who describe a process of evolution and then imagine that they have explained the nature of the universe.

For the sociologist history is of inestimable importance.

E. B. Tylor ("Researches into the Early History of Mankind") says: "The explanation of the state of things in which we live has often to be sought in the condition of rude and early tribes; and without a knowledge of this to guide us, we may miss the meaning even of familiar thoughts and practices. . . . It is indeed hardly too much to say that civilization, being a process of long and complex growth, can only be thoroughly understood when studied through its entire range; that the past is continually needed to explain the present, and the whole to explain the past."

On the history of culture as a totality or on particular phases of it numerous works have appeared. These include such works as Mr. Spencer classifies as "Descriptive Sociology." See also "Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom," by E. B. Tylor, — first chapter, "The Science of Culture;" second, "The Development of Culture;" third and fourth, "Survival of Culture." "A History of the Mental Growth of Mankind in Ancient Times," by John S. Hittell. "Social History of the Races of Mankind," by Featherman.

Ethnology has become a favorite theme with investigators, and numerous valuable works have appeared in the English, German, French, and other languages.

A philosophy of history, if ever realized, cannot take the place of Sociology. It aims at the rational interpretation of what has transpired, and thus furnishes valuable material for the science of society, which it, however, does not construct.

On historiography, "Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode," by Bernheim, is excellent.

Kidd's "Social Evolution" is so well known as hardly to require special mention.

REFLECTIONS.

Difference between History, Historiography, and Philosophy of History. The Genetic and the Rational Interpretation of an Object. The History of Society and the Philosophy of Society. Does History invent, construct, or only record? Value of History to the Sociologist as a Repository of Human Thought, Action, and Institutions. Psychology in History. Meaning of Culture and Civilization. Does Evolution always involve Progress? History as a mere Succession of Phenomena and as giving the Genesis of Things. Evolution as a Method of Procedure and as an Ontological Interpretation of the Universe. Difference between the Description of Society and a History of Society.

Other Disciplines.

In the above we have the principles according to which the relation of Sociology to other systems of thought must be decided; it is consequently not necessary to give details respecting the rest of the allied subjects. Some German scholars have attempted to develop a "Psychology of Nations," concentrating attention on what is called the mind of a people, its manifestations and products, just as the ordinary psychology is devoted to the interpretation of the individual mind. This effort to get the *Geist* or spirit of the peoples as it objectifies itself in myths, arts, religion, literature, government, institutions, is exceedingly interesting and of great value to the sociologist. Professors Lazarus and Steinthal, the chief promoters of this study, have brought to light many important social facts. By taking the spirit found in the different nations it may be pos-

sible to determine the dominant characteristics of the *Zeitgeist.* But the psychology of nations does not furnish the philosophy of society; it must rather be regarded as a department of the more general subject, and a preparation for it, than its substitute. Not the mind of a people is the subject-matter of the sociologist, but society or human association, thus making a difference in the centre of attention.[1]

In a department so extensive as Sociology, and embracing so many subjects, it is natural that some social phases should have received especial attention and development. There are persons with a dominant practical tendency who look on Sociology as concerned mainly with human welfare. For such its essence is found in social ethics, a subject which has been treated in works on general ethics. We shall, however, see that this is but one phase of Sociology, its practical culmination, it is true, but presupposing a knowledge of what society is, in order to learn what it ought to be. In social ethics we have a practical application of sociological theory to reform and to human progress; and so far as it gives the most general principles for such application, it is itself a department of social science.

Jurisprudence belongs properly to the science of the state. It gives the legal aspects of society, and its history enables us to interpret many social views and forms. The law usually expresses in a condensed and authoritative form the social theories dominant at a

[1] Many of the discussions in the journal published by the professors are valuable for the consideration of society at large. The need of a discipline larger than that which considers only a state or nation was recognized by Professor Lazarus; but he regarded the national life as particularly important and therefore worthy of special treatment. ("Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft," iii. 420, note.)

particular time, or at least those of the ruling classes which control the legal enactments. Yet the law expresses but one aspect of society, namely, the legislation required for social well-being. So closely is the subject related to political ethics, that it may be classified under that head.

Among the humanistic studies which are important both as social products and social forces, we place linguistics. Language is a deposit of the history of the race, being of humanity a record similar to that of nature as written in its rocks. Peoples put themselves into their language, body themselves forth in it, and, though dead, speak through it. The language into which a man is born is one of his greatest inheritances from the generations of the past. We call it his "mother tongue," but it is more than that; it is the mother of a man's intellect and of the products of that intellect. Another form of expression is art, and some peoples of the past are known to us only through the relics of their art which have descended to us. Literature we might include in language, and philosophy also, as the highest expression of the wisdom of the ages. In all these we behold social and not mere individual productions. Psychology as the interpretation of the individual mind, psycho-physics and anthropology, treating of mind and body in their relation and interaction, furnish indispensable material for our study; but they are not in danger of being confounded with Sociology.

This brief survey suffices to show how intimately all human disciplines are related to our subject. Anatomy, physiology, biology, and all the natural sciences, as we have seen, also have significance for it, since it must take into account a man's body and his natural environ-

ment. But in the study of humanity we lay especial stress on the distinctively human disciplines.

The psychology of nations, like the history of culture, is evidence that society, instead of the individual, is becoming the focus of thought. In language, in ethics, in laws, in all institutions, we are learning to discover and emphasize the social factors. We are born into social conditions by means of which we become the heirs of all past ages; and our inheritance from society imposes on us a debt of which we can repay to society hardly an appreciable fraction. Through any social deposit of the ages we can approach the subject of Sociology and discover its essentials. Montesquieu in discussing the Spirit of Laws continually touches fundamental principles of Sociology. In harmony with the general trend, ethics is passing rapidly from the individual to the social stage. Instead of the individualistic ethics of the past, the time may not be distant when social ethics will be the chief subject and individual ethics merely a subdivision. A true sociological ethics will, however, enhance the importance of the ethics of individuals.

Not only is there a tendency to make disciplines social which were heretofore treated as individualistic (psychology, ethics), but even so far as they remain individualistic more emphasis is placed on social influence. Thus in the psychology, ethics, and education of the individual mind more attention is given to the influence of the social environment. There is marked growth in the conception of organic connection in thought, relating more intimately the various disciplines and systems, and also between persons, so relating them as to overcome their isolation and form society.

Each particular social discipline takes a social force and reduces its working to a system. Thus the political and economic forces give us politics and economics; so we have associations which are the products of recreative, ethical, religious, and other forces. Each social discipline deals with some particular dominant social force, treating as subordinate any other forces connected with this dominant one. But Sociology takes society as a totality, making all the social forces its subject-matter, considering their interaction, their development, and their products.

REFLECTIONS.

What do we mean by the Spirit of a People? What a Psychology of Nations involves. What Factors determine

the National Spirit? Characteristics of different Nations. Psychology of different Organizations and Stages of Culture. Ethics, Jurisprudence, Language, Literature, Institutions, how far Individual, how far Social, Products.

Is Sociology a Grouping of other Disciplines, or a New Discipline?

Could we not by merely grouping the various human disciplines which have been developed construct Sociology? If those that exist meet all requirements, why not rather develop them than spend our effort in adding a new one? By grouping the various disciplines which pertain to humanity, we at best get only separate sciences of certain human factors, as economics and politics; but this leaves society itself without a science. No one of these makes the interpretation of human association as such its aim. Each discipline attends to its own special department; but it is not the business of any to show how all are related to one another and constitute a totality. We do not get a complete idea of the human body by merely describing each member separately; it must also be shown how the members are organically connected, form a totality, and act as a unit. However much the separate social disciplines may help us to construct a social science, they cannot do it themselves. Biology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, history, political economy, the science of politics, give data indispensable for Sociology; but not one of them has society itself as its subject-matter, neither do all together make the interpretation of society *per se* their aim.

Sociology is needed to make society the one object of inquiry. Sociology is that comprehensive general

science to which the other human disciplines are tributary, in which they culminate and find their completion. In nature no special science, as chemistry, or geology, can claim to be an interpretation of the material universe; but from all the natural sciences certain inferences can be drawn which are general in character and have an application to the universe as a totality. This is the work of philosophy, whose business it is to search for the ultimate principles. Philosophy is the apex of the intellectual pyramid; all objects belong to its basis, and it is itself the highest possible ascent of rational thought. Sociology is a construction of scientific and philosophic thinking on the basis of all other human disciplines. It rises above the rest. The special social disciplines culminate in it; and in Sociology their relation to one another becomes manifest. All their rays are concentrated in a focus, yet have a definite relation of position and intensity. If one ray claims to be the focus, it ignores the others and its own relation to them. This is the very thing which has happened with respect to the human disciplines. Thus, as stated above, in Greece politics took the place of Sociology; the individual and society were essentially absorbed by the state. In the Middle Ages the church and its theology were the culmination of human thought and association, and they determined the point of view from which all objects were observed. In more recent times economic science has not only been called the social science, but it has actually striven to comprehend society, as if it could interpret all social phenomena and meet all social demands. Recent history has had its era of individualism, which depreciated society and made the individual the focus of attention. Now we have a conflict between individualism and

socialism, because the proper sphere of each is not recognized. Opposed to government as despotism, or as an abstraction hovering over nations, we have anarchism. Human thought and life have suffered enough from these one-sided attempts to interpret humanity and determine its course. It is equal to the attempt to make chemistry the interpreter of the universe. Politics, theology, economics, are all important; but neither can absorb the rest without injury to itself and them. They and much besides belong to society, and in the science of society each finds its proper place and its right relation to the other special human sciences. We need the general, culminating, all-comprehending science, Sociology, in order that we may overcome the pernicious error of making now one special science, and then another, the totality, which it is not, and the interpreter of the whole, which it cannot be. Not from the first, the second, or the tenth step of the pyramid can the whole structure itself and the surrounding country be seen, but only from the apex. The service rendered by the special sciences to Sociology is great; but its service to them is not less. The arm is of great use to the body; but of what use is the arm without the body? We want to grasp the meaning of society in order to determine the relation of the organs to the total social organism and to one another.

The nature of Sociology is misunderstood by the writer who claims that "it depends more or less upon all other sciences, but it cannot be shown that any other science is in the least dependent upon it." Bernheim regards Sociology as an aid to history, *Hülfswissenschaft der Geschichte;* but it is much more.

The social sciences can of course exist without Sociology; they were in process of development before it was constructed; but for their perfection Sociology is necessary. They culminate in it, and by means of it receive their proper place in the social organism.

When political science or political economy seeks to become the social science, Sociology interferes and puts it where it belongs in the system of humanity. Not only is the tendency of the mind to unity thus satisfied, but the one-sidedness resulting from the abstract, isolated development of a subject is overcome. The various disciplines are likewise made more fruitful by being put into organic relation with one another. Political economy becomes a new discipline when related to all the higher interests of society; and there is a renewal of political science when it passes from the abstract to the social stage, defining its relation to other social disciplines, and making the social actuality the basis of political activity. When the science of the state takes its place in Sociology, finds itself an organ in the organism, patriotism will cease to be a synonyme of national selfishness and injustice.

Not by adding or grouping the various social sciences do we get Sociology. The family + economic and other voluntary organizations + institutions + the church + the state do not constitute social science. They are manifestations and forms of society, and it is the society revealed through them which we want to apprehend. Not as isolated do we seek to understand these various social forms, but as connected, as forming an organic whole. The science of society considers each social science and each social group from the standpoint of the totality. It does not lose the individual in society, but it views him in humanity as we view a drop in the sea; it views societies in their distinctness, yet as but so many currents in the same ocean. We can consider a drop as the essential thing (individualism); or we can trace one current after another (the special social sciences); or we can consider the drops and the currents as they form the ocean (the view of Sociology). Take the drop from the sea, still it is of the sea and retains its flavor; so if an individual is the last of his family and outside of the limits of church and state and all organization, still he is a product of society and a member of society. This view of the individual as related to the whole of humanity, and of each particular society as related to all other societies and as a manifestation of society *per se*, is given by no special social science, and by no other discipline than Sociology. The student can therefore study societies and yet miss the idea of society; he can study social sciences and have no conception of *the* social science. Sociology, as the social system, treats individuals, societies, social phenomena and institutions,

never for their own sake, however important that may be in itself, but solely for the sake of determining their organic connection as constituent parts of the social system.

If I ask a man what language is, and he begins to teach me French, I object and say that I want to know what language itself is, not a particular language. Then he takes up the ancient languages, and English, German, Russian, and others; still I object and demand what language is, not what the ancient and modern languages are. Language is in all the languages, yet no language is language *per se*. Language itself is the means of communicating ideas by sound or writing; each language communicates ideas in a particular way, but it is only one of many ways. At first it may seem as if the answer to the question, What is language? must be so empty as to be almost meaningless; yet the answer involves that rich and important field designated by linguistics or philology.

Sociology, the science of society, is similar to linguistics, the science of language. Every language involves the science of language, but also many concrete elements which cannot be considered in linguistics; so every social science involves the science of society, but also many concrete facts which Sociology must leave to the special social sciences.

REFLECTIONS.

Difference between the Collection and Classification of Facts, and Science. Between the Grouping of the Social Sciences (encyclopædia) and Sociology. What the Social Sciences do for Sociology, and what Sociology does for the Social Sciences. Different Point of View of Sociology and of the Social Sciences. Can any Special Social Discipline take the Place of Sociology? Can all the Social Disciplines? Illustration from Philology. Review of the whole Chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

DIVISION OF SOCIOLOGY.

The Problem. *Sociology, the science of society, is now distinctly before us. So vast, however, is its material that for profitable study classification is necessary. The classification must be on the principle that things which are alike are to be united and that they are to be separated from things which are different.*

Sociology is one, but a unity in diversity. We analyze it according to its diversity; but this analysis is for the sake of better interpreting the totality. The analysis in anatomy and physiology is for the study of the various parts as forming the undivided body. Social synthesis is always the ultimate aim of social analysis.

Numerous divisions of Sociology are possible, and each may have cogent reasons. The best is that which most naturally groups the diverse materials and presents the greatest advantages for systematic study. Each division is in itself a system, and the synthesis of the divisions constitutes the larger system, the science of society.

Society is to be interpreted. The problem now is how so to classify the objects of investigation as to make the interpretation most perfect.

Sociology is unity, yet multiplicity; it can be rightly apprehended only as one in many, and as many in one. Thus nature is a unit; yet for the purpose of the most thorough study we form various natural sciences, each

distinct, but all united. So in the same landscape we distinguish between mountain, valley, and stream.

A nugget of gold may be divided, yet each division will be gold and as such complete in itself. It will be a specimen by which gold everywhere may be judged. It may be added to other gold; but this quantitative increase adds nothing to its quality.

In sociological study we find both qualitative and quantitative differences. A fact may be repeated a million times, yet it need be mastered but once in order to understand all its repetitions. Thus a fact in nature is a type in which all like facts can be studied. The case is different, however, when quality is considered. A knowledge of gold does not teach me what silver is. Each quality must be studied by itself.

Quantitative differences play a prominent part in Sociology, as in the division of labor, in numbers which constitute an army, and in the amount of wealth. The division of our subject, however, depends on qualitative differences.

Mentally we may separate into different parts an object which in itself cannot be divided. In the study of man we can consider the body by itself and the mind by itself; but in the real man we cannot take the body from the mind or the mind from the body. The body can be dissected only after the life has been destroyed.

Evidently, then, divisions in the case of organic subjects are mental abstractions; parts organically united are mentally separated. The mind is considered apart from the body in order that it may be the more thoroughly studied according to its inherent nature. By thus isolating a subject for the more perfect concentration of attention it is sure of the fullest development.

We know that the chemical elements are scattered throughout the universe and enter into various combinations; yet we try to take each element by itself, to learn what it is and what can be done with it. So in psychology we isolate intellect, susceptibility, and will, and discuss each separately; but the real mind cannot be separated into three unconnected chambers, and in the actual mental processes we can never claim to have any faculty in absolute isolation.

Important as such isolation is for clearness and thoroughness, it may likewise be misleading. Mental divisions are sometimes taken for actual separation. The psychological isolation of the intellect and exclusive emphasis on it have made the impression that psychology treats of mind merely as intellect. One of the greatest perversions of modern times results from the isolation of the economic force, as is the case in political economy. This has actually resulted in treating economic laws as if they acted independently of ethical, religious, and social considerations. We have also seen how a false abstraction has led to a process in politics and economics which tended to make *a* social science *the* social science. The partial truth found by means of isolation must not be mistaken for the whole truth, which can be discovered only by studying an organ as part of the organism which it helps to form.

These considerations are essential in connection with the division of Sociology. The science of society deals with life in its most complex forms; all the social forces are organically related, they interact, and constitute a totality; and while we are obliged to isolate these forces for intellectual reasons, we must not forget that in society itself the social forces are indissolubly united.

Not for the sake of society, then, but for the sake of our conception of society are divisions made in Sociology. From the total unity we abstract a part, in order to concentrate our attention on it and fathom its meaning. Division is thus a form of mental specialization, just as from the human body we take a hand and make it an object of special investigation. Our inability to follow more than one process of thought at a time makes divisions a mental convenience and even necessity.

The division is an analysis of the subject. This analysis is not arbitrary; it will help us to understand a subject only in case there is some basis for it in the subject itself. The aim of the analysis is to bring out actual differences; it must present to the mind ideas which can be abstracted from the rest, and which offer special advantages to the mind by means of this separation. There is thus a reason for the division in the nature of things. The division ought also to be logical, no two divisions overlapping each other or covering the same ground, yet all together including the whole subject.

The division, like the definition, can deal only with the most general characteristics; it draws lines, but does not give all the contents between the lines. It is evident that a subject cannot be divided unless there is some knowledge of its contents; one must know what is involved in mathematics before he can divide it into its different departments. The same is true of Sociology; a general idea of its contents is the condition for a division of those contents. This, however, does not imply that all the details of a subject must be mastered in order that the division may be made. Since it is so general in character, the student can make it who has a general survey of the contents; indeed, it

is possible that the very definition may involve the division.

Some may be deterred from an effort at division because the subject is so vast and complicated, and embraces so large a variety of objects. But whatever the multiplicity involved, some classification, and therefore division, must be possible. The student cannot expect the best results by wandering hither and thither in Sociology, picking up what fragments he can, without systematic classification, or with a classification too partial to contain the whole subject. The vastness of the subject makes division the more necessary, so that the separate parts may be distinctly apprehended.

The division of Sociology into Statics and Dynamics has been common since Comte's day. The explanation of social phenomena by physical terms has not proved satisfactory. Bodies may be at rest in relation to the objects around them; but only by means of violent abstraction can we imagine society at rest or in a state of equilibrium through the forces affecting it. Dynamics, as the science of matter in motion, when applied to Sociology is used for the movement or evolution of society. If with Comte we use Static Sociology for society in a state of order, and Dynamic Sociology for society in a state of progress, we are apt to get a false notion of society, a notion which Comte himself, however, rejects. By distinguishing between society in a state of order and in progress it looks as if the two were irreconcilable. Does order mean stability as distinct from progress? May not progress or progressive movement be the highest order? Nor are we better reconciled to this division when we examine Mr. Spencer's book on "Social Statics," whose complete title is, "Social Statics, or the Conditions essential to Human

Happiness specified, and the First of them developed." Is, then, social movement not a condition of human happiness? Even if the division were adopted, another would have to be added to make it complete. In mechanics we have matter at rest or in motion, and an explanation of matter is necessary; so society must be explained before its order or progress can be intelligently considered. On account of its great complexity and difficulty this is far more necessary in the case of human society than in the case of matter. Some violence will be required to make the discussion of society at rest an interpretation of the nature of society, whether at rest or in motion, and this interpretation is what is now most needed in Sociology. Therefore we reject the division of Sociology into Statics and Dynamics, just as we reject Comte's view of Sociology as Social Physics. Aside from the theoretical reasons, the student will find the inadequacy of the division confirmed by the works which have adopted it.

As a preliminary to the above division Mr. Spencer has "Descriptive Sociology," whose purpose it is "to furnish materials for a Comparative Sociology, and for the subsequent determination of the ultimate laws to which social phenomena conform."

This affords fresh proof that a thorough, critical revision of the subject is required. Descriptive Sociology involves an absurdity. The term implies a description of Sociology, but what is meant and actually given is a description of society. How can there be a descriptive Sociology before Sociology itself is constructed? What Sociology is there to be described? If Sociology is the science of society, the general definition, then descriptive Sociology is a descriptive science of society. But it cannot be that, for its mission is simply "to furnish ma-

terials" for the construction of Sociology. As well call natural history a descriptive science of nature. Mr. Spencer, by making the collection of materials in order to form the science a description of the science itself, has increased the confusion in Sociology. Just as we distinguish between society and its science, so we distinguish between social and sociological; but this distinction is wiped out by making social description a description of sociological science.

So essential is the division for the clear apprehension and successful development of the subject that on it the progress of the student will largely depend. The old one must be rejected; but how get the new division required? Let the mind be fixed intently on the subject that is to be divided. This is the science of society or such a knowledge of society as can properly be designated a science. The supreme question to be answered is: What is society? Not what societies are is the question, but what society *per se* is. How can we speak intelligently of society in different localities and times unless we know what we mean by society? We want to avoid that confusion which is inevitable if the student is thrown into the midst of social descriptions and discussions, while all the time it is not clear what is meant by *social.*

Society *per se* must therefore be our first aim. We must find it before we attempt to discuss it. Society itself or the idea of society must be distinguished from the peculiar manifestations of society in a particular time or place. Our subject thus deals exclusively with society and its manifestations. The manifestations of society can be viewed in two aspects: we can inquire what society is here and there, now and then, and thus get an actual history of society; or we can ask: What

ought society to be? How far does the actuality correspond with the ideal? We thus have three divisions: what society is; what society becomes in the process of historical development; and what society ought to be. The same can be stated in this way: The Principles of Society; The Application of these Principles in the Process of Historical Development; and The Application of these Principles to the Future Progress of Society. This gives the principles and their application as the basis of the division. If the principles are complete and their application is correct, then all that pertains to society is included.

Sociology is therefore divided as follows: *I. The Principles of Society. II. The Historical Evolution of these Principles. III. Sociological Ethics, or the Conditions of Social Progress.*

Other divisions are possible; and if in the development of the subject a better one is proposed, every student will welcome it. But the above is the result of a natural analysis of the subject-matter, and gives a complete and clear conception of all involved in the vast subject of Sociology.

Our division is an analysis of the definition and gives three new definitions, each at the head of a distinct department. What society is (its Idea), what it becomes (its History), what it ought to be (Ethics), exhaust the discussion of society and give sharp outlines with definite contents.

This division has been made in spite of the conviction that it will meet with determined opposition. It is not based on any dogmatic decision as to what Sociology ought to be, but on the query: How can we obtain the most thorough knowledge of society for the construction of the most perfect social system? If any one of the divisions is omitted, the knowledge of society will be fragmentary.

Those who are afraid of ideas will object especially to the first division. They want the phenomena of society; but society itself

or society *per se* seems to them vague, incomprehensible, if not fictitious. Their objections will lose their validity so soon as the division itself is clearly apprehended.

In the following pages reference will frequently be made to society, the generic term, as distinguished from societies, and it is important for the student to fix in his mind the exact meaning of the term. When in "Principles of Sociology" (I. 435) Mr. Spencer heads a chapter, "What is a Society?" the form is concrete, but the meaning is abstract. By "a society" he does not mean a particular society, but any society, those qualities which must exist in order to constitute a society. He therefore means by "a society" society in the abstract, what pertains to all societies; this is the very sense in which we use society without further qualification, or society itself, or society *per se*. To define a tree is to indicate what we mean by tree; to define an animal gives what is common to all animals; to define a human being is to give a definition of every human being.

It may seem more scientific to emphasize the facts of society as the aim of Sociology, rather than society itself.[1] But it only seems so. Those who think that in facts they have something tangible and objective, while the idea of society is subjective, are mistaken. The facts they consider are mental possessions as much as the idea of society. They cannot step out of their minds into objective facts; but the facts are phenomena of their own minds, whatever their source may be.

The first division is fundamental, and therefore indispensable. What sense is there in speaking of the phenomena of society, if it cannot be determined what society is? If the idea of society cannot be grasped, how can any fact be pronounced a phenomenon of society? If we cannot fix the meaning of society, is not the science of society a misnomer? The terms "society" and "social" constantly occur in Sociology, and one of the main difficulties

[1] G. Ratzenhofer begins his work on "Wesen und Zweck der Politik" with this statement: "Sociology deals with facts; its sphere is the development of the social life of man in so far as known through tradition and investigation. In these facts it seeks the social laws, and only in so far allows speculative views as they are the rational inferences from the facts and the laws."

In "Social Theory, a Grouping of Social Facts and Principles," by John Bascom (p. 8) this definition is given: "Sociology is a knowledge of the facts of society, the order in which they follow one another, and their causes and reasons."

heretofore has been that they did not stand for clearly defined objects; and as they themselves were obscure, the entire subject, whose essence they express, was likewise obscure. By placing first what logically comes first we aim at an explanation which shall illumine the whole subject.

The objection to the first division might be valid if the idea of society were based on speculation or metaphysics. But it is nothing of the kind. We get that idea from society itself; the idea is the result of, or inference from, empirical investigation. We behold society in what are called social phenomena, and we simply attempt to describe what we behold. In thus seeking for such an idea as will make society definite, so that we can intelligently use the term, we do not imagine that we have a metaphysical substance or anything else that can be called ontological. Our intellectual conception of society has therefore nothing to do with a metaphysical entity.

This primary emphasis might not be necessary if Sociology were an old discipline in which the sense of society and social is universally known. But there is no consensus respecting the use of these terms. Just because the subject-matter of our discipline is so much in dispute, all intelligent progress will depend on its meaning. One reason why various sociological works are so unsatisfactory is the fact that after their study the student knows much about society, but cannot define society itself, the very object for which the whole research was made.

For the same reason we reject the notion that Sociology treats merely of domestic, ecclesiastical, industrial, political, and other institutions, or of customs, economics, civics, ethics, and religion. Sociology as the science of society includes these institutions; but they are creations of society, not society itself. Sociology is not an encyclopedia of these creations, nor does it absorb them. Each remains a discipline by itself; but Sociology apprehends them as involved in its principles, and determines their relation to one another and to society. A philosophy or science of civil law does not enumerate every law that was ever passed, neither does it take the place of jurisprudence; it aims at the principle and reason involved in law. So Sociology deals only with the essential elements of the various social sciences as involved in the science of society. It must confine its investigations to principles; these must be strictly sociological, that is, they must be an expression and inter-

pretation of essential elements in human association. We might call Sociology the science of the social essences so far as they constitute a totality; this leaves to each social science its specific department, and keeps the sociologist from the futile attempt to make his specialty the repository of everything human. As in logic we have the laws of thought, but not a statement of all thoughts, so in Sociology we have the laws of association, but not special sciences of the different associations.

Society as a totality is our aim; we want the interpretative essences of this totality. Many difficulties will vanish with the clear apprehension of this aim. We can illustrate the sociological point of view by comparing it with that of a special social science. Political economy seizes an economic principle as economic; Sociology seizes it as sociological; political economy views it in its abstract or isolated economical working; Sociology views it as not abstract or isolated, but as correlated to all other social factors; the political economist studies economies for the sake of economic science; the sociologist for the sake of social science; the economist sees in economics utility, thrift, wealth; the sociologist beholds society in economics; the economist wants to master a phase of society in economics; the sociologist wants to find in political economy conditions for constructing the social science.

The same rule applies to all the other social disciplines. The sociologist values them for the extraction of sociological essences. He does not rest in economics and political science, as the economic and political specialists; but he passes through them to the general social science.

In order to make clear the distinction between the first division and the second, the principles of society and the historic evolution of these principles, we again refer to the science of language.

In Professor W. D. Whitney's article on Philology in the Encyclopædia Britannica a distinction is made between language itself and the development of the different languages. The power of speech and the relation of speech to ideas is a different subject from that of the evolution of language, though we go to this evolution for our knowledge of the power of speech. In considering language *per se* Professor Whitney discusses the nature of language, the cause of language, the voice, imitation, brute speech and human speech, language and culture, and many similar subjects, revealing a large and important sphere of thought. Now

just as in philology there is an important realm for language *per se*, so in Sociology there is for society *per se;* but language is only one of the social factors and far less rich in content than society itself. This will enable the beginner to see that our first division is not only rich, but also of primary importance. Just as in philology we discuss language itself, and then proceed to discuss the evolution of language, so we adopt the same procedure in Sociology respecting society.

It would not be necessary to place this primary emphasis on society if the conception were simple; but it is extremely complicated and therefore requires thorough investigation.

Another lesson is taught by the science of language. After language itself has been explained, philology considers the evolution of language. This is an application of the principles discovered, showing the relation of the different families of language to the power of speech. Thus F. Müller (see "Brockhaus' *Konversations-Lexikon*," article *Sprachwissenschaft*) classifies all the languages into eighteen groups. These groups are investigated according to their relation to one another; but the complete development of any group is not the province of the science of language. Just so in the science of society we distinguish between the evolution of society as a part of Sociology, and the history and particular form of societies, which latter are left to other disciplines.

Incidentally another parallel between philology and Sociology may be noted. The article just referred to says that formerly philology was placed among the natural sciences (by Schleicher and Max Müller), but that this is properly abandoned now by all linguists.

The distinction between social and sociological, mentioned above, is important. Social is the more comprehensive term; all that is sociological being social, but not all that is social being sociological. Sociology is the social science; but a special social science is not sociological. We designate as social whatever pertains to society; but as sociological only that which pertains to the science of society. Whoever investigates social phenomena is a social student; he becomes a sociologist only when he relates all the social phenomena so as to form the social system or the science of society. Sociological always implies that the point of view is that of society as an organism; that every social phenomenon is viewed in its relation to society as a totality; and that

each social factor is appreciated as an integral part in the social system.

A man may study French and not be a philologist; he may likewise study social subjects and not be a sociologist.

Charity taken by itself; isolated social reforms; movements in society considered as severed from their connection with society as a totality, are not sociological. This term should be used in the comprehensive, organic, and scientific sense involved in Sociology, whence it is derived.

REFLECTIONS.

Mental Reasons for Division. Its Basis in the Nature of Things. Its Logical Requirements. Division and Analysis. Relation of Division of Contents to the Details of those Contents. Common Neglect of Principles on which Divisions depend. The Definition and the Division. Description of Society and Descriptive Sociology. Distinction between Social and Sociological. How get the Division of our Subject? What is Society *per se* or in itself? Distinction between the Idea of Society and Social Phenomena. The Sociological View of the Social Sciences. What must be — involving Necessity and Universality; what is — the Actuality; what ought to be — expressive of Value, Worth, Object of Aspiration, Appeal to the Will. Our Division in physiological and medical terms: Social Structure and Functions; Development of Structure and Exercise of Functions; Social Therapeutics.

CHAPTER V.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETY *PER SE.*

The Problem. *After tracing the genesis of the conception of society we determined the comprehensive sense in which society is the subject-matter of Sociology. How shall we treat this subject-matter? The answer of the first division, discussed in this chapter, is: determine the principles of society.*

This requires a deeper study of society, to which all that has preceded is but of a preparatory character. Is the usual interpretation of society as an association of individuals correct and final? Society is a union; but is it really individuals that are united? Can we even conceive of individuals, consisting of body and soul, as permanently united so as to form society? One man in England, another in Australia, a third in the United States, belong to the Society of Friends. They have never seen, or heard of, one another. Does the fact that they belong to the same society mean that they are united as individuals, the totality of their personalities being absorbed, or only that certain qualities or energies in them attach them to the same society and constitute them its members?

The real problem is the differentiation of the individual from society; such an analysis of him as will discriminate the individual as social and as extra-social (not necessarily anti-social). Each one can solve the problem by determining his relation to the associations he enters. Let him answer the question, What of me belongs to myself as an

individual, and what of me belongs to the societies of which I am a member?

Sociology deals with principles. By principles of society we mean all that must be in order that society may be. Our first division considers what is involved in society per se; *that is, in society itself, in the very idea of society, as distinct from the historic evolution of societies and social ethics.*

The problem of this Chapter therefore is: such a mastery of society itself as will make its idea definite, and give us a basis of social evolution and of what society ought to be.

What would require elaborate discussion in Sociology proper can, of course, be given only in outline in this Introduction.

A. Society.

What has thus far been said is preparatory to the discussion of the subject-matter of Sociology. It is hardly more than the substitution of one word for another to say that human society is human association. The very thing we want to know is what associates, and what takes place in the process of association.

The Individual and Society.

Every effort to interpret society as composed of individuals has proved a signal failure. Yet that is the universal conception of society.[1] If personalities them-

[1] Worcester defines it: "A union of many in one general interest. A number of persons united together by mutual consent, in order to deliberate, determine, and act jointly for some common purpose." Standard Dictionary: "The collective body of persons composing a community. . . . Any

selves are taken as constituting society, then an association is supposed to be expressed by the persons belonging to it. This is the root of many errors and of interminable confusion.

Strictly speaking, *individuals are aggregated, never associated.* We can speak, as is usually done, of men and women as associated, but it must not be taken literally; the expression requires explanation.

Individuals consist of body and soul. In this sense individuals may assemble and form a congregation or aggregation. But how individuals as a union of body and soul can associate or coalesce does not appear. The presence of individuals is necessary for certain kinds of society; but the aggregation of individuals as the condition of association must be distinguished from the association itself.

Twenty persons in a town agree to organize a literary society. Then it is decided to organize another society to study the archæology of the region, and only the same persons join. By naming the persons separately no hint is given that a literary society exists. The fact that there is a literary society does not show that there is an archæological association. The same persons may form a dozen other societies, showing that no one society absorbs the individuals. Perhaps no organizations are formed; in that case certain interests of the individuals that might be made social remain individual.

Consider the literary society more closely. Is it a

body of persons connected by acquaintance, friendship, or neighborhood." This is a fair sample of what is common in all dictionaries and in all languages. Thus the attention is concentrated on individuals as the constituent factors of society. The Bible Society, the Sunday School Society, and other organizations are given as illustrations that society is composed of persons organized or associated for a common end.

society of the twenty men? Even in literature each has his favorite authors and holds numerous views which the others do not share and he does not mention. Besides, he has many other interests and peculiarities which lie wholly outside of the sphere of the society. Manifestly, then, it is a mistake to say that, in a literal sense, the members constitute the literary society; the truth is that what the members have in common, what they express and share, and what becomes an object of united pursuit (the purpose of the organization), constitute the association; the purely private affairs of the individual are not associative factors. Perhaps a small fraction of the personality enters the literary society.

In some kinds of association the distinction between the associative and non-associative factors is marked. Men form industrial organizations for the purpose of promoting certain interests which they have in common. But the industries are pursued for the sake of personal advantages; hence the same men may cooperate to secure a tariff or other legislation, or to get cheaper transportation, while each competes with the others to sell the most goods and reap the largest profits. So far is the organization from absorbing the individual in this case that he may antagonize all the other members in every sphere except where their interests harmonize. Indeed, industrial combinations are, as a rule, valued by each for the sake of the private benefit to be derived from them. Disintegration takes place so soon as members find that they can accomplish their own purposes better by withdrawal.

The same differentiation applies essentially to every possible association. In no instance is it composed of individuals 1+1+1+1 and so on indefinitely, but only

of so much of each individual as actually enters the society. What unites the members of a labor organization who never see one another? Their common interest as laborers; as private individuals, in religion, in politics, and in many other spheres, their views may diverge and be wholly foreign to the labor organization. The members form the organization; but the organization does not absorb the members.

The individual, therefore, is more than what goes out into any society he joins; indeed, he is something besides all the societies to which he belongs. The thought which is not communicated, the feeling which is not expressed to another, the purpose which no one shares, the invention which dies with the inventor, are individual and private, but not social.

The individual always acts as a unit, no matter whether in private or social affairs, whether alone or in society. This, however, does not imply that when he acts as a unit he includes in one act all he is and all his interests. The one line along which a particular act moves must not be mistaken for the circle of a man's thoughts, interests, and purposes.

Our analysis of the individual which differentiates between him as private and as social, is confirmed by the consciousness of each person. To the statement that he is a member of society a plus must be added: he is something besides. The entire individuality cannot go out into society; his selfhood makes this impossible. A great difference exists in individuals, some yielding more of themselves to society than others. But all have a large sphere of action which remains private. Men can be socialized; that is, certain elements in them which are still private may be made social.

This differentiation we emphasize because both essential and fundamental for a correct apprehension of society. Men may keep to themselves some things because they are egoistic, selfish; others they refuse to share because solely private affairs. The altruist who shares most may distinguish more sharply between private and social affairs than the egoist. His right to his own is made more clear by the fact that he gives to society all it can claim. The distinction between what is private and social in the same person becomes manifest when we observe how money, land, business, pleasures, can be treated as purely individual, or can be socialized by sharing them with others.

Our analysis does not take the individual out of society, but determines his exact relation to it. Society does not absorb the individual, but only so much of him as is social. *Sociology, therefore, does not include the individual as an individual, but considers him solely so far as he is a social factor.* For the psychology and ethics of the individual a distinct sphere is thus left by Sociology, just as was the case before this discipline was thought of.

Hydrogen and oxygen coalesce and form water; individuals never can thus coalesce and form society. A drop of water falls into a stream, forms part of it, is absorbed by it, and is nothing else than what it is in the stream; but no human individual is thus absorbed by, or lost in society. The hand is part of the bodily organism and cannot live when its organic connection with the rest of the body is severed; but an individual may be cast on a lonely island and live. As an individual he may exist for years though there be not another human being to draw out his social powers. We cannot therefore agree with Mr. L. Stephen when ("Science of Ethics," 110) he says: "It is as true that man is dependent on his fellows as that a limb is dependent upon the body." Without society (the family of which he is a member) he could not have been born, and in this sense he is as dependent as is the limb upon the body. But a man who withdraws from the actual social organism may live, while it is impossible for the limb to live when severed from the body.

We must likewise distinguish between humanity and human society. Human society is coextensive, but not synonymous, with humanity. In mankind we include every individual and all of him; but in human society we include every individual only so far as he has associative elements. What is not associated with others is not a social factor. Therefore Sociology does not indiscriminately discuss humanity, but only so far as associated and therefore a society.

Lamartine somewhere says, that "history is neither more nor less than biography on a large scale." Another undiscriminating generalization, and therefore only in part true. Biography may be called the history of an individual; but never can biography, however enlarged, be the synonyme of history in the usual sense. Biography treats of the individual; human history, of society. The former considers what is personal, no matter what its social relation; but to history an individual belongs only so far as he sustains relations to his fellow-men. In history we have a record of what has entered into the social organism as an influential and abiding factor. There is biography which is not history, because there are individual elements which are not tributary to the currents of history. There is an individual culture which is not social culture; the individual may have personal excellences which do not enter the social organism and therefore do not promote the elevation of society.

Since there are individual elements which are not social, it is clear that the individual is not absorbed by society. In the one hundred individuals of an organization there remains much that does not enter the organization. But is there not also something in the organization which is not found in the one hundred individuals as isolated? If there is, then that constitutes the social element; that is, if we can discover what distinguishes the one hundred associated persons from what they are when isolated, it will give us the associative element and the essence of society.

What, then, have we in the society formed by one hundred men which did not exist in the one hundred before the organization?

We call the new product society, something that did not exist in the isolated individuals. The new factor is association; the individuals, we say, leave their isolation, unite for some purpose; something which each was interested in before, but merely as an individual, is now made the common interest of all, so that

they share the same aim with one another, communicate their sentiments, plan and work together. The supreme idea of the organization may have been in each mind before; but now it becomes a bond of union between them; what was formerly a private possession now becomes common property. The central thought of the individuals receives prominence by the very fact that it is made the nucleus of an organization. Let us suppose that the one hundred unite to ward off an enemy. Each while he remained alone might want the enemy defeated; the union of each with the other ninety-nine is the new element. Now a common purpose unites them; it leads to action and reaction on one another — to interaction — to planning for protection, to offence and defence, may lead to war, and perhaps it is the first step in forming an army and a state.

This makes it evident that in the society there is something distinct from the sum of the one hundred individuals, just as in the sum of the individuals there is something which is not in the society. You do not see the society when you see the individuals; all you see is the aggregation of the individuals; society is not an entity. Some would say that society is a relation of individuals. But this is not true; it is only a relation of certain elements in individuals, not of the individualities as total personalities. Besides, the notion of a relation of individuals is too general, too vague, too empty, so shadowy that we cannot grasp it. To make it definite we must show *what* the relation consists of, giving its substance. Society is a reality; it is an actual, working force, and must be apprehended as such. This force is personal; that is, it consists of so much of the personality as is given to society. The one hundred persons really act on one another; this is the new force not exerted in their isolation. The new relation constituted when the society is formed is one of interaction. The force is definite and in the best sense real. Each learns from the others what their motive is, how they expect to realize it; there is an exchange of ideas, schemes are proposed and discussed, plans are laid and executed. The intellect, heart, and will are involved, likewise the body, property, and the use of various natural means for the purpose of the association. So far as the members agree, they encourage one another and co-operate; so far as they differ in opinion, they may learn from one another, inciting to discussion and development, perhaps also to conflict.

Society, then, is not a vague relation, nor is it a relation of individuals, but of certain elements which individuals possess, of personal energies which act on one another. Society as an organism of individuals is inconceivable; but as an organism of personal forces which become social, which act and react between individuals, and make what is the private possession of one the common possession of others, association becomes definite.

Sociology therefore deals with the energies of the individual which become social by acting on other individuals. In all social inquiry, therefore, the investigation pertains to the social forces involved, and to individuals only so far as possessors of these forces. Men can be known in society, but only by the characteristics they exercise. We study organizations according to the social energies concentrated in them. In a political society the political bonds are the objects of inquiry ; in an economic society the economic bonds ; in a church the religious ties; always what men have in common as members of society, not what remains private and unshared.

By ignoring this distinction errors of judgment become common. A man who gives a large sum to a charitable association receives credit for liberality ; yet his essence may be covetousness. What he gives is for selfish ends, to get more customers, perhaps. His public act is social ; his motive is private. The knowledge of it may die with him, though some effects of it are likely to appear in his conduct.

In the case of a Catholic priest, we have a sharp distinction between his social and his private function. His very position gives him a place before the public ; yet his vow of secrecy obliges him to keep sacredly from others what is confided to him in the confessional.

Such illustrations could be multiplied indefinitely. Each one can, however, find in his own conduct abundant evidence that social action is distinguished from that which is purely individual or private. Much in every life is exclusively personal, not being shared even with the most intimate friend. The variety of social action may depend on density of population ; thus an individual's social relations in a city are likely to be more varied than in the country. But individual and anti-social action in a city can also be greater than in the country. The man in a sparsely settled community may be almost limited to family association ; but he

may share his views and purposes and labors in that more fully than the man in the city shares his views and purposes and labors with all his varied associates.

The working of the social energies or of the associative factors involves a history. Their interaction results in a process. It is this process which is meant when we speak of social development. Sociology deals with the associative and socializing forces, with the society they form, and with the development of this society. The history of society is a history of the interaction of the social forces. By social forces we simply mean personal forces which act socially, together with the social effects produced by the personal forces acting socially. Money, a product of society, is called a social force.

While society is never to be confounded with the individuals in it, they contain the essential forces of society. The society depends largely on the character and aims of individuals. Those intent only on food will organize to obtain food; those intent on science will organize for scientific purposes. But the society also influences individuals, not only its members, but likewise outsiders. It is thus clear that individual progress and social progress are intimately related, though not identical.

The first sociological problem is chiefly this: the associative elements in human aggregation; that is, if men are thrown together (aggregated), what tends to socialize them? Each comes as an individual, but his total personality does not enter any organization that may be formed; what, however, is there in the individuals that can be shared and made an interactive force?

Thoughts, feelings, aims, an endless variety, can be communicated. Perhaps we might speak of thought as the bones, feelings as the nerves, and volitions as the muscles of the social organism; or we could speak of all as the tissues of society. From these social factors we then distinguish those parts of the individual which do not enter the social organism. A treasure buried in the soul differs from a treasure in circulation.

This does not interfere with the fact that the individual must in his origin be considered as wholly a social product, and largely so likewise in his training and development. Being absolutely dependent on the environment in early life, and born into such social achievements as language, literature, economic conditions, schools, the church, the state, it can almost be said that he is made

by society. His very constitution as the result of heredity is a social product. But this does not eliminate the individual as distinct from society. He may do something for himself, educate himself, choose his own course, and thus exercise his selfhood, and prove that he is not absolutely dependent on social influence. He can even oppose society or lead a hermit life. Unquestionably Kant's "Kritik of Pure Reason" could not have been produced unless others had thought before its author; but whatever social element might be discovered in the work, much of it is singularly Kantian and became a social factor only after he had produced the book.

Some social movements absorb individuals more than others. In the great migratory hordes which came into Europe from Asia at the beginning of our era, the individual had to move with the mass or be lost. The organic connection of each soldier in the German army with the total organism is very marked; and yet when thoroughly disciplined he is also expected to be prepared for individual action in an emergency, which individual action is, however, in harmony with the army itself. But many associations absorb only a small fraction of the forces of their members. Thus ten societies to which a man belongs may absorb one-tenth of his forces; another tenth may be absorbed by social relations in an unorganized form (such as company, social gatherings); two tenths of his forces may be given to the community, the church, and the state; this would leave six tenths for his family and for private (individual) affairs. By thus analyzing the forces which an individual exercises we see with what limitations the statement must be taken that an individual belongs to a society; perhaps one hundredth of him belongs. Even organizations so absorbing as the Catholic Church and the social democracy leave a large sphere for individual as distinct from social activity.

It is a common opinion that society is as its units (individuals), and on this theory social systems are founded. Yet taken literally the statement is misleading. A dozen savants form an association for recreation. They eat, drink, smoke, have games, and sedulously avoid learned subjects. Can you by knowing the individual savants determine what society they have organized? That society can only be interpreted by its aim, by the associative forces which enter and constitute it. Therefore it is not like the individuals, but only like the energies of the individuals united in the recreative association.

Only, then, if individuals were wholly absorbed by an association would that association be as the individuals. But no association can absolutely absorb the members; therefore in every instance the above rule applies, that the character of an association is not determined by the members, but solely by the social forces of the members, and these social forces constitute the association. The social energies thus furnish the scope of sociological inquiry.

REFLECTIONS.

Why does Social Analysis usually stop with the Individual? What are the Social Forces? The Individual and the Social Personality. What is there in Isolated Individuals that is not in Society? What in Society that is not in Isolated Individuals? Difference between Biography and History. Individuals no sure Test of the Association they form. How can Associations be tested by the Forces that enter them? The exact Sociological Problem: not one of Individuals, but of the Interaction of Social Forces. Different Parts of Individuals absorbed by different Associations (economic, political, literary, etc.). Difference in respect to the Amount of the Individual which Associations absorb.

SOCIATION.

Men are not, and cannot be, literally united in society; we say they are, but then we must define exactly what we mean. Their bodies are not united; their minds do not coalesce; they remain distinct as personalities. The individual personality in the same man remains distinct from his social personality; the strong man may at the same time grow in individuality and in sociality. In his private life (in all that pertains to him solely as an individual), the individual personality of a man acts; in society, the social personality. After what has been said, we shall not be misunderstood in stating that society consists of social

personalities as distinguished from individual or private personalities. This is only another way of saying what was said before, that society does not consist, strictly speaking, of individuals, but only of so much of them as is associated. *Social* we use here in the sense of all personal powers which act on others, whether co-operatively or antagonistically.

In order to make clear the notion that society consists not of (undiscriminated) personalities, but of social personalities, a new word is needed, a word to designate what men share, what associates them, what interacts as a social force. Association refers to the associative factor, and would designate what we aim to mark as distinct, were that word confined to the associative element as the essence of society. Association is, however, used for a union of men, thus promoting the old error that men are united. But we seek a term which rejects the old error, which gives the idea of association, but confines this association to what is actually associated. Now it happens that sociate is used in the same sense as associate; but *sociation* is not in use. This noun we now form. We use it to designate those personal forces which interact between men; to indicate what men share, what associates. It stands for all that makes society as distinguished from the sum of individuals. Sociation thus gives the essence of society (that which makes society society), and differentiates it from all other objects. So far as the personality is concerned, this new term distinguishes between the private and the social factors in men. Sociation deals exclusively with the social personality. Regarding a man as social plus private, it has nothing to do with the latter but to eliminate it from the sphere of its inquiries. When we say that

certain elements in men are extra-social, we do not mean that they are necessarily anti-social, but only that they do not belong to the social energies which constitute society. Sociation expresses the associative energies as distinct from what is not associative. In association *men* are conceived as the dominant factors; but in sociation the *forces* in men which become social are dominant. The opposite of association is men in isolation; the opposite of sociation is individual powers unassociated. Thus sociation always considers individuals only so far as they have associative, interactive factors, leaving a large realm of the individual unconsidered.

Suppose I have a dozen steel horse-shoe magnets lying on my table, for the purpose of studying magnetism. How do I contemplate them? Simply so far as they are magnets, so far as their poles have attractive and repulsive forces. The fact that the magnets are steel concerns me only so far as steel is related to the magnetic forces. I might consider the steel by itself, its composition, its origin, its quality, its weight, its relation to other metals, etc.; but then I should have to enter other departments than that of magnetism. The steel in one horse-shoe does not pass over to the steel in another horse-shoe; it is only the magnetic force that interacts; this I abstract from the steel itself and make the object of inquiry.

Let the twelve horse-shoes represent twelve individuals. Sociation does not consider them as individuals, but only that in them which interacts between them; it drops the individuals as individuals, for the purpose of concentrating the attention on the attractive and repulsive forces of their magnetism which constitute society.

Sociation therefore deals with social energy, and with individuals only as repositories of this energy.[1]

In some cases the bond of union is so definite and simple as to be at once apparent. In a society for vocal culture or in a choir, in an art society or scientific association, in an economic combination or labor union, the specific and limited character of the aim and of the force exercised is unmistakable. In every such instance, especially in a choir, it is striking that the association is of individuals only as the possessors of the particular force used.

By thus making society consist of what is actually social, really interactive, and of nothing else, we get the fundamental knowledge respecting the relation of individuals to society. Those who say that society consists of individuals, and mean what they say, cannot discriminate between what is individual and what social in the same personality. If society is truly an organism of individuals, the totality of the individuals must be absorbed by the organism. Others, however, emphasize the individual to the neglect of the organism, as if he had no essential social relations. The conflict ceases so soon as society is discovered to consist only of so much of individuals as is socially interactive. Only that part of me which is literary belongs to the literary society which I help to form; all in me that is not literary is not absorbed by the society, but belongs to another sphere. Since there is an individual (private) personality distinct from the social

1 If we regard physics, the science of energy, as inclusive of the mental powers, we might adapt to our purpose Comte's definition of Sociology as "social physics," though not in his sense. The science of social energies is a good definition of Sociology; but social physics seems to imply only physical force, and is therefore objectionable.

personality, a man cannot properly be called an organ of society, because he is something besides such an organ; he has elements which are not social. The individual is an organ of society in the same sense that the Capitol in Washington is a Senate Chamber. It is a Senate Chamber, but also much more.

Our view of sociation as distinct from association is proved correct by applying it to various social forms and controversies. Not only does it give new interpretations of what is otherwise obscure, but it also settles certain disputes otherwise interminable.

Let us apply the explanation here given to the old dispute between individualism and socialism.[1] The point is whether the individual or society shall be regarded as supreme. Special prominence is given to the subject in economics in connection with the *laissez-faire* theory. So long as the individual is considered in his totality as a personality, the controversy cannot be settled; because as such he is independent of society and also dependent.

But analyze the personality; recognize certain elements in the man which he shares with others, and which thus become social, while other elements remain individual and private; then the question is settled. It is at once seen that in that case individualism and socialism are no longer antagonistic, but each has a sphere in which it is supreme. There is a realm which belongs to a man as an individual: his intellect, his conscience, his feelings, his private affairs. This realm as the sphere of individual freedom and individual rights is to be guarded sacredly against intrusion and interference. He may be instructed and persuaded; but in these sacredly personal affairs he cannot be

[1] Socialism is here used in the general sense of social control.

coerced. This every just law recognizes. Here individualism reigns and must maintain its dominion.

The same individual, however, has a definite relation to society, and the social elements in him are as distinctly marked as the private. As a social personality, he moves in the realm where socialism reigns; that is, social laws prevail here, just as personal or private laws in the other realm. If he wants to speak with his fellows, he must use their language; he must adapt himself to them or them to himself (both processes are social), in order to associate with them. In other words, he must adapt himself to social laws in the social sphere. He may go as he pleases while alone, but in a crowd he must go with the crowd, or as it sees fit to let him go. If he takes the left side of the bridge at Dresden to cross the Elbe, he is jostled by the crowd coming the other way. Every few steps he is greeted with "*Rechts gehen!*" and if he does not go to the right, on the other side of the bridge, a policeman may take him there, in order that he may move with and not against the multitude. This is but an illustration of the proverb, that in Rome one must do as the Romans do.

Since therefore individualism and socialism are both justified, having distinct spheres instead of being antagonistic, the old controversy as to which shall prevail is settled. Both are to prevail, but each in its specific sphere. As a principle, each becomes false and unjust only when it encroaches on the sphere of the other. The new problem which confronts us in place of the old controversy is this: how much in the personality is purely individual, a private matter and therefore a man's own affair, which society may influence but cannot control? And how much is social,

belongs to society and therefore subject to social control?

We now have a law of universal application to the individual and to society. The individual (so far as social) acts on society, and society acts on the individual; but the line between individual and social control is distinctly marked. Henceforth the aim should be to individualize all that is individual, and to socialize all that is social. Light is thus thrown likewise on education. The individual is to be developed to the utmost for his own sake; education is to aim at the best personality. He has value in himself, and this value is to be unfolded to the greatest worthiness. But he is also a member of society, and therefore to be educated for social ends. His individual perfection and his social perfection are to be organically united, so that his individual perfection makes him the more perfect socially, and that his social perfection exalts him as an individual.

The law established applies to politics, to business, and to all social affairs. In every department we must distinguish between what is private and what social, in the personality. It is one and the same personality, but viewed in different aspects, now self-centred, then going out into society. The demand is equally imperative that there be the greatest individuality, and the most perfect sociality. Where the private and the social elements are properly harmonized, the strongest individuality is likewise the strongest social power.

Our analysis of the individual into private and social functions removes another common error. The statement is constantly made that by entering society the individual sacrifices some of his liberty. Only if society is false will it demand that personal liberty be

sacrificed. If it is meant that in society an individual cannot act as if he were isolated, the statement simply means that he cannot act contrary to the nature of things. In society a man cannot act as if he were out of society, for the reason that he is in it and not out of it. No true society interferes with the freedom inherent in man, but recognizes and encourages that freedom. By passing from isolation into social relations, the individual changes his conditions, but does not lose his freedom. Personally, in his private affairs, he is as free as ever he was. But while he retains all the real freedom he had in isolation, his life is augmented by entering society. Besides the real freedom he retains, he now sustains social relations and enters upon social action. Indeed, we may well question whether freedom applies to men isolated. Freedom from what? It is in society, where men can maintain their views in the face of false restraints, that freedom manifests itself.

Another error has been promoted by the theory that the individual is absorbed by society. It has been claimed that individuality will disappear as socialization advances. Hardly a more serious objection could be urged against socialization. Some claim that to associate is to stoop; but in many cases association means exaltation. Emerson says, that in society "the virtue in most request is conformity;" but by resisting foolish conformity independence is developed. Tauler said, "I never mingled with men but I came home less of a man than I went out." All, however, are not Taulers; his standard was that of a mystic and he naturally favored solitude; and the society accessible may not have been of the best.

The objection that with socialization individuality

vanishes is overthrown when the error on which it rests is exposed. The large sphere of individual freedom is also the sphere of individuality. To rob a man of this freedom by society would make society the means of slavery. The perfection of society is enhanced by social forces backed by individuality, forces which prevent a dead monotony by promoting diversity in unity. The true society, which distinguishes between the private and the social elements in the personality, encourages individuality.

The view given of sociation throws important light on communism, socialism, and all forms of society. If society is composed of individuals, how can society absorb the individuals? What is it, then, that absorbs the individuals? There is nothing but individuals; therefore they must absorb one another. The necessary limit of communism is what men have in common.

Our explanation of society also interprets another phenomenon otherwise unaccountable. If society depends on individuals (instead of the social factors of individuals), how does it happen that often persons of superior personal excellence and unusual development make but poor society? They meet rarely, are little communicative when they do meet, further no great social interest, are perhaps indifferent even to their own community and state. The answer is that society is not literally constituted of men, but only of their social elements, whose exercise may be sadly neglected. The excellent men under consideration have been developed individually, but not socially; each is imprisoned in his particular sphere and cannot enter that of his fellows. Perhaps abstract scholarship so absorbs the attention that the social organism receives none. Even institutions of learning may aggregate rather

than associate the professors. Thus personal superiority does not involve social superiority. What men are determines their individual character; what they share determines their social character. The sociation of personal forces is not identical with the association of men.

This distinction also throws light on history. The sociation of an era is not an absolute test of the character of that era. The men may personally be of a high grade, while the sociation is very imperfect. Thus a generation may be rich in biography and have little history. Another generation may be rich in history and poor in biography. A thousand strong men isolated receive no attention in history, while much attention may be given to a thousand men less strong, but organized. A million laborers in a country may be passed without mention by the historian; organized, they may form the dominant historic current. In order to compare one generation with another we must inquire into the progress made by sociation in them. A thousand separate wires may be invisible at a short distance, or so scattered that only one is seen at a time; but wrought into a single coil, it is distinctly visible and of immense power; yet each wire taken by itself is no stronger than before. There are degrees of isolation and sociation in different ages, and they are important tests of the ages themselves. There is an age of Louis XIV. because sociation in general was so imperfect; hence by a single name that age is characterized in France. Then the sociation of revolutionary forces took place, and the French Revolution stands not for a name, but for the volcanic energies of an infuriated people.

The view given of sociation shows why all attempts

to apprehend society as an entity or a discrete object have failed. Society is not an organism like a plant or an animal. It is something very real, but not an indissoluble unit. It consists of forces which change constantly. Individuals come and go, their social energies vary, and thus society itself is subject to change. Sometimes the social mechanism is so fixed that there is a certain continuity even amid great changes of individuals, as in certain churches, states, and institutions. When we speak of the Catholic Church, we mean a system of theoretical and practical energies (doctrines, institutions, practices); and of the millions who belong to that church, we think as Catholic only so far as they are the embodiment of these energies.

Having now given an explanation of sociation and its relation to the ordinary sense of association, it will henceforth be understood what we mean when we use the old terms and speak of society as composed of individuals. When we have spoken thus in preceding pages, the sense, after the explanation given, cannot be mistaken. Let association be used, but let it mean sociation. The beginner may find it difficult to treat society as a system of forces; but practice will overcome the difficulty, and he will soon wonder how he could ever imagine that society consisted of individuals as totalities, instead of the social energies of individuals.

Men are in society and never can get out of it. Were all other bonds severed, invisible ones would still unite them to the family and to humanity. But when we say that men are in society, we usually mean that they are in social groups, affecting them and affected by them. They exert power and feel the influence of the power exerted by others. But social power is not limited to per-

sonal presence in company. The solitary student may solve problems and work out systems which produce social transformations. The great uprising of Germany for freedom during the Napoleonic wars has been ascribed to the moral power exerted by Kant. Thus social energies work when their authors are not present or are already dead.

We now know what is meant when it is said that men unite or combine or associate. They have a purpose in view, and it is this purpose in each one which is united to the same purpose in the others. The essential thing is what in each individual is associated. I may have an associate in business with whom I do not associate in religion and politics. Each association I enter involves certain interests and purposes and energies; other interests and purposes and energies may be given to different associations or to private matters.

The Greek word for community κοινωνία is from κοινόω, to make common, to communicate, to impart a thing, to make one a sharer of something. This brings out the idea of the interaction of social energies between individuals as the essential thing in association.

The process of socialization may make the idea of society more definite. Certain aggregating forces bring people together, as natural advantages for food and protection, and social advantages in a city compared with the country. Men thus aggregated then associate for various purposes, exerting different social energies in different associations, forming societies for protection, for industrial pursuits, for pleasure, and for such higher ends as can be promoted better by union than in isolation. The first association that rises out of the aggregation may be general and vague, only society in embryo. By the process of socialization the social interaction can be developed indefinitely, forming all kinds of sociation of various degrees and intimacy. The character of the society formed depends, in every instance, on what personal forces become social, and the intimacy of individuals in a society depends on the degree in which things are held in common; hence the family is the society of greatest intimacy.

We can easily verify these statements by an examination of society. As a tree does not absorb the whole soil, but only so much as its constitution requires, so each society takes from its members what its character requires. Thus individual recreative, friendly, economic, religious energies become co-operative between

different persons and determine the nature of the societies formed. The test of societies here given is unmistakable: the nature of the associative forces determines the character of the societies.

Every society likewise testifies that the intimacy of the members depends on the degree in which social objects are shared.

Humanity constitutes a society only in the most general sense. Whatever makes a man human constitutes him a member of the human family, and only this human element is considered.

When we come to a particular race, as the African, we find the bonds more intimate, because more is shared. Not only do those of this race have in common all that makes them human, but likewise all that makes them Africans.

Still more intimate are the bonds when members of the same humanity and the same race also have the same nationality. All the national bonds serve to make them one.

The bonds of humanity, of race, and of nation are real, but do not depend on our consciousness of them; they exist whether we recognize them or not. But when these bonds are recognized it is evident that the ties of race and nationality unite more closely than the looser ties of humanity.

The closest ties are those of the family, because in the family more is shared than in other associations. Here, as in every other aspect, we thus see that in each case it is what men share that unites them and constitutes the association; and that the perfection of a society consists in the nature of what men share and in the degree in which they share it.

We must distinguish between what men really have in common and what they recognize in one another as common. Not what men have in common is the attractive power to draw them together; not even what they recognize as held in common is such a power. That which attracts men to one another consists of qualities they desire and seek. If another has only what I have, I may not need or want him; but if he has what I lack and seek, the strongest attraction may exist. It is like the attraction of negative and positive magnetic poles. Men may be too alike for intimacy; what they have in common does not coalesce. The bonds of union are formed by what is consciously needed and appreciated, and whose growth can be promoted by co-operation. Societies are formed when what men have in common interacts, attracts, coalesces.

A very definite idea of society is thus given. Sociation consists of the ties which unite men, of the interaction of personal forces in different individuals. Twenty men anxious for civil reform combine for that purpose. This purpose is the bond of union, the one factor which constitutes the association. Each man may have a hundred private and social interests which are not absorbed into that organization.

The idea of sociation is so emphasized here because heretofore the chief difficulty respecting society has been that its distinctive feature was not set in bold relief. Sociology itself was confused because the individual himself was merged in society; what he himself is was not distinguished from what he shares, that is, the purely individual factor in him has not been distinguished from the social factor. In social analysis we have stopped with the individual, whereas the social element in him is the ultimate object of the analysis.

Political economy is one of the social sciences. It exists for men, and men are always the producers, possessors, and consumers of the wealth which is the object of economics. Why is it that in political economy we think of the laws of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, without always thinking of men as the ones whom these laws concern? We consider the economic forces by themselves so readily because the science of economics is so fully developed; its laws of production have been made to stand out by themselves, so that we can contemplate them without continually considering the persons who are the producers.

That we cannot so readily abstract all the social forces from the individuals is due to the fact that Sociology is comparatively new; attention has been concentrated on the members of society, rather than on the laws of the social forces. Let Sociology have the age and development of political economy, then the social forces will be more distinct and the aggregation of individuals less obtrusive. Sociation as a process involves a development of all the forces which constitute society, and thus stands for the development of society itself. In large outlines we can indicate this process.

It begins in the most elementary manner, just as is the case in all evolution. The personal forces of different individuals interact and thus become social forces. The simplest form of society is constituted by that primitive interaction of forces which takes

place when the first process of association arises from mere aggregation. Thus some thought is communicated and responded to, this leads to other thoughts, emotions are aroused and interchanged, plans are adopted, social action results. This simple beginning has in it the germs for all kinds of sociative development according to circumstances and needs.

Sociation must therefore be apprehended as living, small in the beginning, but capable of endless growth. Thus we apprehend it as an organism. In this organism (not an organism of persons, but of personal energies) are concentrated all the factors and forces which constitute sociation. Sociology deals solely with this sociation, its origin, its development, and its culmination.

Taken throughout humanity and throughout history, sociation has contents so vast and rich that detailed description is out of the question. But certain great groups can be formed of these contents and become objects of special inquiry. Three such groups are here presented.

1. In the process of sociation many things occur which leave no evident marks behind. It is not meant that there can be social action which produces no effect whatever. All action must have some results. But the result may not be in the form of distinct traces, it cannot be pointed to as exerting historical influence.

Most social action is evidently of this kind. However effective it may be in exerting an influence on the actor and on others, nothing of it remains to be pointed to as an abiding energy in future processes. Thus words are spoken, schemes are discussed, plans are laid, and deeds are done, which are like drops that fall in the great stream of human history, which stream they help to form, but in which they remain forever indistinguishable. How little even of what was done last year stands distinctly before any mind? Some years of the past have left no traces whatever; decades, ages, centuries, with all their multitudinous activities, are now a blank to us. Yet there can be no doubt that this unrecorded and untraceable social action has been very effective in the evolution of society and the making of history.

2. In distinction from this social action which leaves no trace behind, we find that certain deposits are made which remain unchangeable. Perhaps long periods have wrought for their production and they are the culmination of extended processes of thought and effort. They remain stationary because they seem finished; men use them as they are, but do not attempt to alter them.

In this class certain games are prominent, as chess, checkers, cards, ball. There may in some be slight changes, new combinations, as in games of cards and ball; but in the main they are stationary. Proverbs, all thoughts that seem settled, certain institutions, as monogamy, and all severe dogmatism and traditionalism, belong to this second class. They are survivals, perhaps of the utmost value, petrifactions, fossils. Custom has something of this element. A large part of life, in some cases more than others, is attached to those fixed things. China is the classic land for illustrations; the caste system of India and other lands belongs to this kind of contents. In religious systems the Bible and the Koran are such culminations.

3. Distinct from the social forces which come and go without leaving a trace, and from those which form changeless deposits which perdure throughout the ages, we have a third class of contents, such, namely, as are represented in continuous processes of development. The tendency to processes of organization is very marked in social movement. As the mind generalizes and constructs multitudes of phenomena into the unity of a system, so in the progress of human history there is a trend to unite numerous social factors and forces into a growing organism. This is the department of Sociology, as seen above, which has received special attention.

In this process of integration and organization we place the family, which is a growth. It has in many respects become stationary, certain elements being regarded as fixed; still, in other respects it is capable of development. Here also belong the church, the state, and numerous other organizations and institutions, all of them with fixed but also with variable elements.

In language we have a good type of this organic process. Language is a body whose soul is thought. It is a growth from small beginnings, as roots, now mostly buried so deep in the past as to be beyond recovery, developing for countless ages increments visible and invisible, and still continuing its process of evolution. The dead languages belong to the second class, but all living ones to the third. Thus a language appears like an organism.

Philosophy, science, literature, are similar, though the organic connection is not always so clearly traceable in them as in the growth of language. There are of course in language, and in all social organisms, fixed as well as growing elements. In proportion

as any institution is stationary or developing, it may be called static or dynamic.

It is an interesting question why certain social forces tend to form permanent organizations, while others do not. Is it due to the dominant interest involved, which organizes certain social forces, as love, economics, religion, politics; or is there something in the forces themselves which leads to their organization? The play element, the recreative tendencies, whatever depends chiefly on spontaneity, seem too subjective to form organizations as readily as what is more objective, as economics, politics, and charitable institutions. Evidently we can look for organization only where there is continuity and likewise advantage in co-operation.

The idea of sociation may be brought out more distinctly by considering some of the lower forms of organisms. Some of these forms of animal life hardly present more individuation than is found in a plant, all the members of the organism being so united that each is an indivisible part of the totality, all growing together and depending on one another, similar to the different parts of a plant. In such cases we can speak of the social animal organism as absorbing the individuals; they literally constitute the organism. When we come to bees and ants, there is close organization; bees and ants are, however, not merely distinct individuals, but they act as individuals, so that they can be separated from one community and put into another. In the case of man we find that the individual counts least in some primitive societies, being most completely absorbed by the family or tribe. Civilization is largely a process of individualization. The social personality grows, but likewise the individual personality. In proportion as individuality, independence, personal interests and private affairs are developed, the individual is differentiated from society. His social force may be greater than ever; but it is impossible to make him merely a social cell, or to lose him in the totality. Society itself ceases to be a mere mass as personalities are more and more differentiated. A man is more than merely a social specimen in proportion as he has individuality and distinct personality.

Some processes of evolution have been referred to in this chapter for the purpose of making more clear the thought expressed by sociation. This in a measure anticipates the next chapter; but there is no danger of confusion. Whatever illustrates the actual nature of society will make the following chapters more easy.

REFLECTIONS.

Define Sociation. Distinction between Sociation and Association. Society an Organism of Social Forces distinguished from an Organism of Individuals. Illustration from Magnetism. From Physics. Application of Sociation to Individualism and Socialism. Relation of the Individual to the Social Organism. How far does Social Excellence depend on Individual Excellence? Is the Society of an Age an Exact Test of the Character of the Age? Sociation as a System. Growth from Aggregation. On what does Social Intimacy depend? The Relation of Individuation to Sociation.

B. The Principles.

Principles are beginnings, foundations, ultimate conceptions. We mean by the principles of society those essentials which constitute society and are the final interpretation of social phenomena. Wherever these essentials are, there society is; where one of them is lacking, society cannot be. These essentials exist in that primitive condition when society first appears, they continue through all stages of social development, and, if society ever reached ideal perfection, they would still be its characteristics, just as in the beginning. We want whatever is essential to society *per se*, the substance, that perduring element which is the test of all social existence in humanity. If, for instance, an interaction of the forces of different individuals constitutes society, then there must be society wherever such an interaction is found, and never where this interaction does not take place. The social energies of individuals may change, the kind of association be altered, and the whole character of society transformed; but there will continue to be society so long as the forces exerted by individuals interact.

Our first division therefore discusses the structure of society; the social functions are involved only so far as directly connected with the structure. Aiming solely at the fundamental anatomy and physiology of the social organism, we do not consider the changes wrought in the skeleton and the muscles by means of climate, food, and exercise. The growth, adaptations, and modifications of the body we leave to the second division. We weigh what is essential for the race; we do not follow the races as they unfold their peculiarities. Our attention is concentrated on the alphabet, not on the vast literature which is produced by combining its letters. The social embryo is the object of investigation.

The ultimate social basis which we seek gives society in its most general sense and most abstract form. All it contains is essential for the social structure. The student will therefore expect no account of any particular kind of society, nor of that concrete fulness which characterizes the actually existing societies. Yet this first division of Sociology is not barren; it seems inexhaustible. It involves a discussion of the forces which constitute and control society, and which are the sources of the social phenomena. The individuals who possess the forces must likewise be considered, and the relation of these forces to what remains unsocialized in the same individuals. The social energies are the key to the interpretation of society; that which attracts, repels, unites, divides men must be explained; the method according to which the social forces interact should likewise be studied. A complete knowledge of the social energies would enable us to understand all actual and possible social phenomena, just as a perfect knowledge of the chemical elements would enable us to

understand all forms produced by their combination throughout the universe. Indeed, our first division deals with the elements of society, while the other divisions treat of their actual combinations.

The chemical elements can be fully understood only according to their manifestations and combinations. So it may be claimed that the fundamental elements of society can be fully known only as they work in society. To this supposition, it seems, we owe the stress on social phenomena and the neglect of their ultimate sources, on the part of sociological writers. But do we wait until we understand their perfect workings before we consider hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and the other elements in chemistry? So soon as recognized they are treated as elements; then experiments are made with them in order to learn what combinations they can enter and what they can do. Perhaps the sixty or seventy known elements are reducible to a primitive one. But we do not refrain from their separate use until this reduction is accomplished. In Sociology our procedure is similar. We take the elements which constitute society as we know them, put them at the basis of social phenomena, and as their manifestations add new knowledge respecting their nature we thankfully accept it.

Since the individuals which are the possessors of the social energies are not abstractions, but living beings, they must be considered as such. And they must be apprehended according to their actuality, namely, in their real environment. It is impossible to abstract man from nature and yet conceive him as he really is; therefore we must take him and the society he forms in connection with the earthly conditions in which he is placed. Neither can the individual be viewed as

abstracted from his fellow-men. We must consider men in society as modified by their relations to one another and affected by their earthly environment. Not as empty abstractions, therefore, do we regard the social essences, but we seek to get all they involve; yet all we get must be in a principiant form, as an ultimate associative factor and force, not in detail, not as historically developed. If certain elements are essential to society, we aim to learn what these are; after we discover what they involve, we leave to the other divisions what has actually been evolved from them and what ought to be evolved. The principles of society thus include all those powers which, in the process of evolution, unfold the various social types, constitute states, create voluntary organizations, and develop the social phenomena. Society *per se* is thus viewed as that potentiality or possibility from which the social actuality emerges.

Every writer on Sociology considers principles as the most essential elements in the social system, and cannot do otherwise. They are the essence both of static and of dynamic Sociology. Thus we find that even those who do not adopt it justify our first division.

These principles are to bring into bold relief what is characteristic of human society. The chaos regnant in Sociology, as we have seen, is largely due to the fact that the peculiarities of man have not been distinctly marked. We seek that difference which gives distinctness. Little service is rendered by describing a Gothic cathedral as a building; we want to know what *kind* of a building it is. So long as all the features of human society are made prominent, except those which make it human, we cannot expect to overcome the prevalent confusion. Only after its exact nature has been dis-

covered can we determine the relations of society. It may help us to understand the ancient Greeks if we consider their indebtedness to Egypt and to Asiatic peoples; but we must go to the Greeks themselves to know the Greeks.

Every consideration leads us to emphasize the principles of human society as the first concern. They are so to mark this society that every one who grasps these principles at once recognizes it wherever found. When I deny that the physical processes alone explain chemistry, I do not reject them from chemistry. Just as we want chemistry as distinct from physics, so we want human society in its distinctness as given by its principles.

Some of the elements involved in our division can now be indicated briefly. As already intimated, if we get all that is involved in the principles of society, we shall have those elements which are required to interpret all the social phases which appear in the processes of history. Thus our first division involves the essence of sociation; that is, what it is in individuals which sociates them. These sociative forces naturally lead us to consider human nature, the character of the individuals whose forces compose society, their physical being and their mental capacity. Besides this large department which includes the whole of the social personality, we have also external nature, on which man depends, and which constitutes his perpetual individual and social environment. Studies like these deal with the first five disciplines in Comte's hierarchy of the sciences. Then all that pertains to the association of men with one another is involved, the reasons for association, the kinds of association possible, the means of association, how far association is a condition

of culture, how far a necessity for a livelihood and for protection, and how far a convenience or pleasure. It will be seen that every point under the first division is intended to explain the essentials of society. All this, however, is only preliminary, something like the axioms in geometry. The above shows that in human society we have a union of human and natural elements, and this affords a basis for the physical, mental, moral, and religious factors in association.

Now let us glance at the society whose general interpretation this first division seeks. Is it an entity, like a human being? Is it an organism? Certainly not of individuals. But even if we define society as a union of interacting social energies, it is not an organism in the literal sense in which an individual is an organism. We speak of a *Zeitgeist* or *Volksgeist;* but can there literally be a national mind? Can individual minds coalesce and in any rational sense form a collective mind? The social forces exist in concrete individuals, and pass over to other individuals. Hence we must consider individuals in certain relations, exerting influences on one another. Mr. Spencer says that "the properties of the units determine the properties of the aggregate." [1] This should be changed to read that the interaction of the social properties of the units determines the aggregate. We know that by sharing certain elements and exerting certain powers the individual organisms become the means of forming the social organism. "The characteristic of organic development is found in the progressive subordination of the part to the whole and the progressive differentiation of the parts into organs." [2] What principles promote or limit this subordination and differentiation?

[1] Study of Sociology, 52.

[2] "Social Peace," Schulze-Gävernitz, 289.

This will give some idea of the vastness and importance of our first division. It deals, in a principiant form, with what is fundamental for the whole science of society. In an age when men live in the concrete and make their investigations almost exclusively empirical, many find it extremely difficult to grasp comprehensive principles which contain in epitome the whole subject. But for clearness these principles are indispensable.

Some may be tempted to regard these principles as the only business of Sociology. The human mind, however, is not content with abstractions and theories; these are apt to interest it only for the sake of the reality which they interpret and to which they lead. Besides these principles, explaining the idea of society, we want to see their application in real life; that is, we want to learn what society is historically, and what it ought to be. By no *a priori* process can we evolve from these principles the social actuality; past failures serve as a warning against attempting to construct history acording to a preconceived theory of human nature and of human development. Whatever truth there may be in general conceptions on the subject, we can learn the actual evolution of society only from a study of that evolution. As we go to history for our knowledge of the historic processes, so we go to society as it is and has been for a knowledge of the application of the principles to the social reality. The principles are, therefore, but the basis for the further development of Sociology.

In a former age our first division might have been more readily than at present designated as that part which deals with the social affinities. Rightly understood this gives the true conception. Social affinity

must not, however, be conceived as an abstract innate human quality, but as solicited and developed by circumstances, by sociation, by culture, and by the influences exerted on the individual. With the elements of social affinity the repulsive forces must likewise be considered. The basis for the affinities and for repulsion of course lies in human nature; but this nature must be studied according to all the influences to which it is subject.

The principles of society, that which society in every form always involves, — by getting these primitive elements of society we not only discover what it must be, but likewise its possibilities. Owing to the abstractions it involves, the student will find this the most difficult division; as it, however, gives the essence of the subject, it is worthy of the effort it requires.

Individual elements and forces associated and interacting, the central thought. What are these individuals? Not as abstractions, but as realities, must they be taken. They always have an environment, and they must be considered with the environment, modifying it and modified by it. Man and his conditions are thus placed before us. Sociology, as we have seen, cannot be expected to evolve all the natural and human sciences involved in man and his surroundings; it depends on the sciences that have been developed, and appropriates their results as needed. A vast sphere is included in the very presuppositions of Sociology. The next step is what is commonly called the association of individuals. Just what is meant by this association? What kinds and degrees of association are possible? Then the causes which lead to association. The associative elements and their possibilities furnish fruitful themes, and they are not yet fully developed. After the idea of association is grasped we want to get what it implies. Fundamental questions arise on which all future progress depends.

Numerous social discussions of the day involve the question in what sense society is an organism and the individual an organ. In part the question has already been considered. Literally, an organism is always an individual; but there are analogies to an organism in society. Figuratively, then, we speak of society as an organism and of individuals as social organs. In the same

sense we speak of a social mind, a social consciousness, a social conscience. Literally they cannot exist. There is no consciousness in society except in the individuals in society. When Congress is of the same mind, the meaning is that the members have come to an agreement. The state is personified and called an ethical, political, juridical, or executive personality; but that is only a personification. State action may be a unit because an absolute monarch acts; or it may be a unit because the representatives of authority act as one man, agreeing and co-operating respecting a particular policy.

While the collective mind in the literal sense is a myth, many objects are embodied in the consensus of the collectivity. Public thought, feeling, interest, and movement are involved in the state, in institutions, in language, and in literature.

Even, however, by taking figuratively such expressions as the social (or public) mind, the social consciousness, and the social conscience, they have an important meaning. In our study of association we aim to discover the associative factors. We can call the common or social elements the mind of the association.

Thus the problem of a society becomes essentially that of its psychology, though the mind must not be severed from its bodily or natural environment. The following are fundamental questions in the study of every society: What is the character of its mind? What are the contents of the mind? Whence were the contents of the mind derived? How are they developed?

The mind of an association is in organic connection with the minds of other associations. Therefore just as an individual mind can be understood only when taken in its relation to other minds with which it is connected, so the mind of an association can be understood only as connected with the minds of other associations. Thus the associations of a state, of a nation, and of the world influence one another, and we can speak of a psychology of each particular association, of a psychology of different nations, and of a psychology of society as including associated humanity.

A definite object of inquiry is presented by the mind of a labor organization, of a capitalistic combination, of a literary society, of a church, and of a people. Of each we want the contents and consciousness. Mind is here used as inclusive of all that pertains to the idea, the sensibility, the purpose, and the action of an association. The genesis of a society is really the genesis of its mind.

The conditions of this genesis are found in the character of the social personalities, in the natural environment, in the actual needs and interests, and in the means within reach for realizing social ends. The different conditions which prevail explain the difference between the mind of a savage horde and that of a social group in a civilized stage.

So important is the social mind that the first division of Sociology should leave no doubt as to its meaning. That division must likewise explain what is meant by the social organism and what the relation of the individual to the organism is. What of the individual has society a right to appropriate, and what can he claim as an inalienable right of his personality? Some of the deepest problems of psychology are involved. The dependence of the individual on society never before received such emphasis; but society cannot even exist without the individual. In proportion as society is exalted, the individual should likewise be exalted. Our analysis has established that the social energies are individual forces; therefore to emphasize what is social also emphasizes what is individual. The individual and society are therefore co-operative. In some measure that which concerns each concerns all. Each works for all and all for each. Of the fruit each produces, it can be said: —

> "It forwards the General Deed of Man,
> And each of the Many helps to recruit
> The life of the race by a general plan,
> Each living his own to boot."

The above suffices for a general conception of the fundamental character, as well as of the richness and importance, of this division, though we are well aware that the music is not in the knowledge of the notes, but in the singing. We are only at the preliminary considerations on which the following divisions depend. The germ of the social evolution is not the tree in its concrete development, but the source of all it becomes.

We place stress on the dualism and monism involved in society. The individual and yet society, that is the problem. They are distinct, but not independent; just as the tree is distinct from the soil, but not independent of it. The sacrifice of the individuals means the annihilation of society. If individuals are the independent monads of Leibnitz, where is the organism? If society is the substance of Spinoza, where is the individual? How can the truth

in the extremes of atomism (individualism) and of monism (social organism in the literal sense, communism) be adopted, while the errors are rejected?

An interesting discussion of the community and the individual, from the Christian but also philosophical point of view, is contained, under the head of Socialism and Individualism, in the first volume of Martensen's "Christian Ethics." He regards Vinet and Kierkegaard as representatives of individualism. Besides pantheists, who lose the individual in the social organism, we find a number of modern writers who fail to do justice to the individual. Mulford, in "The Nation," speaks of the nation as a conscious organism, a moral organism, a moral personality, and uses numerous similar expressions. One need but reflect on seventy million persons forming another moral person in order to see that the expression is misleading, unless taken figuratively.

For clearness the student will find it advantageous to discriminate between society itself and its products. Language, literature, institutions, are social products, and likewise social instruments or agencies; we can, however, consider them by themselves and shall find it profitable to do so. There is no difficulty in understanding social progress as the progress of the social individuals, if we always take these individuals in connection with their environment. But can we not also speak of social progress aside from the actual progress of the individual members of society? May there not be progress in the social products, such as language, literature, government, while we cannot claim that the individuals have progressed beyond the preceding generation?

The close relation of individual to social progress must not be taken as identical. Individual progress means social progress only so far as the individual imparts to society the result of his own development. There may be a marked difference between the social potentiality and the social efficiency of individuals. Like isolated threads are the individual forces which can become social but do not; like a cloth woven from the isolated threads are these same forces when made social and actually interacting.

In order that the student may be able to grasp the idea of society, he will find it important to define exactly what is meant by *social*. What is individual pertains simply to the individual, as a thought or feeling or possession which he keeps entirely to himself. When he keeps from society what ought to be communicated we

pronounce him selfish, egoistic. It is in contrast with what is individual that the meaning of social is made evident. Social is what is communicated, shared, imparted to others so as to be theirs as well as mine. The thought, the feeling, the possession, which I share with others is social. Thus everything which a number of persons have in common is social; it is something which is not confined to an individual, but is a possession of society. My private opinion is individual; public opinion is social; property is private so far as wholly subject to private control; but it is social so far as society has claims on it in respect to taxes or otherwise. The individual himself is social in exact proportion to his relation to, and influence in, society. Thus the same object may be individual (so far as purely a personal concern) and social (so far as shared by society).

But why share anything with others? The complete answer would give the reason for the existence of society. This reason constitutes a prominent part of our first division.

A convenient and fruitful discussion of what is involved in human association may be pursued under the head of the following classification: —

1. Natural Conditions which make Society possible.
2. Social Aims.
3. Social Media.
4. Personal Social Forces.
5. Social Products.

Each of these is so rich as to be worthy of separate and elaborate treatment.

The first head includes those natural conditions of soil and climate which make it possible for society to live. It is the natural presuppositions of society which are here involved. There are certain aggregating forces which bring men together, and thus the condition for association is given.

The social aims, the second head, refer to all the conscious purposes of men in associating. The aims exist in individuals and may vary greatly; only so far as common to a social group can these aims be said to belong to society. We must distinguish between the social aim of the individual and that of society. An individual may make selfish ends his motive for joining a society whose aim is altruistic.

It is in considering the social aims that the distinctive features

of society appear. In nature we have causes which work with the absolute necessity of fate, involving inevitably the effects that are produced. But in human society an object can be chosen, remote, future, and its attainment made the specific aim. Thus the force is not behind a man (cause) pushing him resistlessly onward, but it is before him, drawing him toward it, fixed and chosen by himself. This teleological movement, this rational design, is wholly distinct from blind impulse or dark instinct or any other force to which a man is irresistibly subject. The aim is his own and is subject to him.

But society is not merely marked by the fact that it moves teleologically, but also by the character of its aims. The man puts himself into his purposes, and in the aims he pursues he reveals all that distinguishes him from his environment. Social design does not deny the mechanical necessity to which all life is subject; but it uses nature's mechanism rationally, for the accomplishment of the chosen end.

Social aims differ with the advance of society, and these aims are among the best tests of society. An individual may have an aim far superior to that of his environment; by making it social, society itself will be exalted.

Under the third head, social media, we include all the means of social communication, such as look, gesture, conduct, language, literature, art, not considered according to what they are in themselves, but as social agencies.

The fourth head includes the various forces which influence society. Laying aside natural causation so far as it affects society, we deal with the forces of the human mind revealed in psychology. Thus we have human needs, human passions, and human desires; all are to be considered as forces so far as they lead to association. The conditions of association may be given by nature; but the reasons for association are in men themselves. These reasons need not always be conscious, and often are not; nevertheless they have their basis and source in human nature. The personal social forces are of course in individuals; but they are only such forces of individuals as are exerted on forces in other individuals.

Under the last head the results of social action are considered. That society is a reality, not a vague notion, an empty relation, or a fruitless abstraction, becomes clear so soon as we inquire into the products of this action.

These products can be put under three heads: —

First, the effects of social action on the individual in society. He is not the same after he exerts a social influence that he was before; effort and exercise have changed him. The swinging of an axe in the air cuts no wood, but it develops muscle. Then, the society in which he moves also exerts an influence on him.

Second, social action affects society itself as well as individuals. The thoughts, the feelings, the motives communicated by individuals become a common possession; what one has, all share, and thus all are benefited. It is this common property which constitutes the social possession; and as this is increased, society itself advances. There is actual social growth; first a few social forces, then many; their action at first simple, then complex; education advances, and all share in the depth, breadth, and richness of thought; the forms of communication become more varied and more polished; the kinds of organization are increased, and higher degrees of development are attained in them, revealing all the differences between the endless social variety of modern civilization and primitive monotony. This actual social growth or evolution of the social organism is seen in every department of society, in the family, in the friendly and recreative social groups, in the industrial, literary, and æsthetic organizations, in the church and in the state. Thus the energy which constitutes society is like the electricity which at first plays wildly between the clouds, then is mastered step by step, until the present use of electricity is attained. Society as an actuality is beheld especially in the evolution of the social organism by means of social action. But this comes under our second division.

Third, we have results of social action distinct from the effect produced on individuals and on the social organism. While the social element in language, literature, and art is unmistakable, still they have a kind of independent and abstract existence. Words may exist in a dictionary which are not used in society; so books may be buried in libraries, and even a Raphael may be lost for ages. The treasures which Schliemann uncovered when he excavated the ruins of the seven cities which rose one over another, revealed social products which for many ages had not been social possessions. There are thus social products which have an abstract existence aside from society itself.

Considering these three distinct results of social action, we can

inquire into the nature and degree of each at particular times. Does the civilization attained mean the superiority of individuals? Or the superiority of society? Or the superiority of language, literature, art, institutions, things which are produced by society and yet are not the personal essence of society?

In considering the principles of society *per se* we discover the potential forces by whose interaction these various social products are created.

There is a temptation to specify some particular reason or motive for association, and to make this the interpretation of society and the essential theme of Sociology. The more specific such a motive is the more likely its failure to account for society. The reasons for association must, as we have seen, be sought in human nature. While the individual acts as a unit in entering society, a variety of motives may impel him, sometimes one and then another being dominant.

Human nature being the ground of association, the particular associations formed depend on the particular character of the social forces in the individuals. This human nature is not to be constructed *a priori* or determined speculatively, but to be taken as it is. We say little when we affirm that men associate because adapted to one another, yet that statement is fundamental.

Since the adaptation of individuals to one another furnishes the basis of all sociological construction and development, it deserves more attention in order that its meaning may be learned.

We mean that human association is always a result and a form of human adaptation; that we must look to this adaptation for the explanation of all kinds and degrees of association; and that the interpretation of this adaptation is the interpretation of society itself. This brings before us a fundamental problem of Sociology: What is there in individuals which so adapts them to one another as to become the ground of association?

The consciousness of need is the basis of human action; the line of action is determined by the hope of obtaining the supply needed. A feels a need which B can supply, and that becomes the ground of association. Thus all the needs of human nature for which a supply can be found by companionship with others are associative impulses. In union with B, A can better secure food than when alone; or he can better defend himself against an enemy; or he can gratify his passion and accomplish his desires;

he finds a craving of his nature satisfied by companionship; he can by means of the association promote education and all the interests of culture. In the most general terms, we may say that A and B associate because by means of this association pain is relieved and pleasure promoted and some interest subserved.

If now we could determine all the pleasures that can be enhanced, and all pains that can be relieved, and all interests that can be subserved by association, then we should also have all the motives for association. Here of course we take pleasure and pain and interest in the most comprehensive sense, as including everything which forms a ground for attraction. By this study of need and adaptation we find such motives of association as the following: industrial reasons and the whole realm of economics; reasons for safety against foes, military association and the state; the need of companionship, the vast realm of love and friendship; the need of recreation, societies for pleasure; the culture of the higher interests, education, literature, art, science, philosophy, ethics, and religion. Thus in every instance the study of society refers us back to the cause of association, to the motive lying at its basis, and to the adaptation of men in their union with one another to satisfy their needs. Here is the test for all society of the past and the present, here the condition for all society of the future.[1]

It is thus clear that it is not as an abstraction that we consider human nature or the adaptation of men to one another. This adaptation must be learned from its manifestations in society. The association of A and B depends on the impression each receives from the other. Thus their imagined adaptation to one another may take the place of the real adaptation. Mistakes in this respect are common. The attraction between individuals must not, however, always be thought to depend on full consciousness. Many are attracted and repelled without being able to tell why.

A and B are variable factors, living organisms subject to growth and decay. With themselves their adaptation changes, likewise their association. Thus we have evolution in individuals, in their social forces, and in society, resulting in differences in the kinds and degrees of association.

In thus taking the totality of human nature into account in

[1] For a classification of the impulses which lead to association see the next chapter.

order to determine the adaptability of men to one another, we indicate our relation to the sociologists who make a particular element in man the associative factor. No motive or force in man can be understood unless taken in its organic connection with the entire personality of which it forms an integral part. The struggle for existence can be regarded as the associative element only if viewed as the struggle or energy of the personality to maintain, to manifest, and to unfold itself. Competition is a common social factor, but not the only one. There is imitation, but it is associated with other psychical energies. Powerful influence may be exerted on an individual by the world about him, but there may also be in him a strong inherent force which is the determining factor in social action. That the mind is not limited to sensation in its constructions may be learned from geometry. We cannot draw an ideally perfect circle; yet all our reasoning about the circle is based on the conception of an absolutely perfect one.

Not what men need, but the need they are conscious of, feel, is the impulse to action. Men may need most what they want least. Since this consciousness depends on experience and development, we can understand why it varies so greatly at different times in the same man even, and still more in different men. Association is determined by what is needed, appreciated, and desired.

"The consciousness of kind," emphasized by Professor Giddings as the fundamental principle of society, is indeed a power of association, but subordinate. Certainly it is not ultimate. The consciousness of kind is thus defined: "A state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself."[1] Two pages further he states that "it is about the consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, that all other motives organize themselves in the evolution of social choice, social volition, or social policy. Therefore, to trace the operation of the consciousness of kind through all its social manifestations is to work out a complete subjective interpretation of society."

The fact is that we can go beyond the consciousness of kind and determine the associative power in it. Men of the same kind associate because specially adapted to meet some felt need; but if others not of the same kind can better meet the need, then association with them is preferred. A man may forsake his father and mother and kin, and cleave unto his wife; and perhaps

[1] Principles of Sociology, 17.

he prefers to take his wife from another gens or even another race. The wife, not another man, becomes the most intimate associate. One may have so much of his own kind that he prefers others who are different from himself and therefore can better supply what he lacks. Adaptation, affection, affinity, interest are the determining factors in association, to which even the consciousness of kind is subordinated. The consciousness of *what* kind is more important. When a man knows only his gens or tribe, and regards all others as enemies, we can understand his adherence to his own. But as society advances, his views are enlarged, and others may become more attractive than his tribe. Hence the breaking up of families, hence emigration.

This theory of the consciousness of kind lacks the same ultimate analysis beheld in making individuals the constituent elements of society, instead of the social factors in individuals. If I am particularly attracted to those of my kind, it is because they possess elements peculiarly congenial to me; if they lack these, and others possess them, then I turn to the others. Englishmen travelling on the Continent sometimes avoid one another; nor is it unusual for immigrants from the same country to prefer the companionship of foreigners to that of their countrymen.

Some points discussed in this chapter are considered in "Science of Ethics," by Leslie Stephen, 90–131. On 94 a good illustration is given of the perplexities in which those are involved who make individuals as totalities, instead of the social energies of individuals, the constituent factors of society.

REFLECTIONS.

Principles: Foundations; the First Thought in explaining Effects; the Last Thought in passing from Effect to Cause. Difficulty in apprehending Principles. Principles of Society the Constituent Elements in all Society. Importance of these Principles. Their Relation to Social Evolution. Define Society. An Organism in what Sense. Individuals as Organs. Aggregation, Gregariousness, Association. How far does Human Nature determine Association? Reasons for Association. Associative Factors in the Natural Environment. Richness of the First Division. Basis for Actual Societies. Review of the Chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETY.

The Problem. *Our first division discusses the universal principles of society. But what is the social actuality? Our attention is now to be occupied by the real interaction of the social energies and the historic associations produced thereby.*

We go to history for the purpose of getting social evolution as a system. What takes place in a particular part of an organism may be a type of the process in the organism as a totality. Thus we find in social groups, organizations, and states, a genesis similar to that in society at large. The sociological point of view, however, considers each part of society in its relation to the entire social organism.

The problem therefore is: how to obtain those large generalizations which are involved in the process of evolution. We can form no conception of the countless individuals of humanity from the beginning till the present; nor can we imagine any possible grouping of them which will present the social organism in the various stages of its development. But the kinds of social energy which constitute society are comparatively few, they can easily be classified, and their operation is manifest throughout history. It is the laws in the interaction of these energies which specially engage the attention of the sociologist.

We investigate groups, parties, classes, and institutions, but never lose sight of the unity which they form. Social analysis should be followed by synthesis. We study the societies which are evolved, but we behold in them the evolution of society itself.

THE planted seeds reproduce a thousandfold their own kind and also develop the infinite variety beheld in the flora of the world. This gives some general features in the process of organic evolution. When we contemplate human development, we find that the simple statement of the unfolding of plants from their seeds does not make all the phases of the evolution clear. Society not being literally an organism, its development cannot be fully illustrated by a natural organic process. The course taken is, however, largely from simplicity to complexity, from unity to multiplicity, and from sameness to diversity, just as in natural organisms. In the beginning of society we look for little variety; the thoughts and interests are few and elementary, the social forms simple. Nevertheless, these are the germs of all future development.

It is in constant contact with nature that humanity develops. Through the interaction of these two factors, what is involved is evolved, and the infolded is unfolded. It is not a creation, but a growth, a rearrangement of parts, something new which is nevertheless a conservation of the old.

When the acorn becomes an oak, and when from one oak forests grow, we have a process similar to that of the mere multiplication of human individuals. Something more, however, takes place in social evolution. Each tree remains distinct, not uniting or coalescing with others. In the human family, however, while each

being remains an individual, he has energies which coalesce and co-operate with those of others, and thus form society.

Social differentiation in the process of evolution expresses an important truth; but it must not leave the impression that society itself is divided. It is society that is evolved; differentiation means that society itself is unfolded, it is its unity that develops in richness. In the variety developed by the tree we have nothing but the tree itself; it is not a division of the tree, but an expansion. There is no reason why in the process of social differentiation there should not also be a process of unification. The growth in diversity may at the same time be a growth in unity. The ceaseless wars of primitive society may terminate in social unity at the same time that the greatest diversity is developed.

Three distinct processes are involved in social evolution. There is quantitative multiplication, a numerical increase of individuals, and mere additions of the same kind of social force. This may mean great advantages, just as a thousand dollars enable a man to accomplish more than one dollar. The quantitative increase gives society more power to subdue nature and conquer foes, and it is the condition for the division of labor, a factor of great importance in development. Those who devote themselves to a particular calling, such as the making of arrows, fish-hooks, spears, canoes, ornaments, garments, develop special efficiency. In this way quantitative multiplication promotes qualitative differentiation.

Besides, evolution involves the development of the same forces to a higher degree, a process of intensification and growth. Arrows and spears are improved, garments made better, the arts, thoughts, religions perfected. The movement continues along the same line, but goes higher

and higher. By this process new varieties may be produced, as new thoughts and systems are evolved from old ones. This is the process which usually takes place when a tribe or community is left to itself to develop its inherent energies.

The third process in evolution consists in the union of factors with qualitative differences, as when men or societies with different views or different degrees of culture combine. The different elements thus brought together are assimilated, and the result is unlike either of the original elements. Thus new beginnings are made which result in new processes of evolution.

It is to this third process that the greatest differentiations in the development of society are due. The son differs from father and mother; the children have both the characteristics of the father and the mother, or rather a union of both; thus variations constantly occur through heredity. By means of heredity acquired qualities are transmitted but also varied, each generation being the product of a different pair from that of the preceding.

Besides the differentiations by means of heredity, we have those produced by natural environment. As this changes in the same locality or as men move from place to place, society itself is changed.[1]

In some respects the differentiation produced by the contact or union of different societies is still greater, as when one tribe conquers or unites with another, or when peoples of different degrees of civilization coalesce, as during the migration of barbarians into Europe. The same process takes place in our day, in immigration, as when multitudes from different nations settle in the United States. There is then a commingling of different

[1] Spencer, "Principles of Sociology," vol. i., p. 16, Original External Factors.

races and nationalities and languages and religions and degrees of culture, and the final result must be the product of the interaction of all the energies thus united.

In this way new types are continually formed where evolution is vigorous, and each new type becomes the source of a peculiar process of development. The present social condition is the outcome of the entire evolution of the past. Each age contains the deposits of the past in the varied forms wrought out by heredity, by environment, by the union of different individuals and societies, and by the unfolding of the types which are the products of these processes. Some elements of the deposits are permanent, others variable. The distinction between the permanent and the changeable elements is among the most important discriminations in the study of the evolutionary forces.

The primitive social stage must have contained all that is essential to society. It could hardly have had more than barely the essential social factors, except that it was not society in the abstract, but in reality, in a concrete form. In distinction from society as a mere conception, it now becomes an actuality. Society is born. We have simple beings, uncultured, very near nature and in subjection to it, with few and rude wants, yet all human development potentially involved in what these beings were and had. The social forces were few, monotonous, pertaining chiefly to the securing of food, the overcoming of foes, and the gratification of the passions. The beings increased in number; necessity, desire, exercise developed and multiplied the social forces; and that process of evolution began of which the world to-day reaps the fruit.

Could we trace the social energies from their beginning through all their processes of development to the

present time, then we should have the *history* of these forces. Could we take a particular social force, say the economic, and give the laws of its development, then we should have a *special* social science. If we could take all these forces from the beginning and trace their interaction with one another throughout history, but confining ourselves to principles and laws, giving simply a comprehensive system of the actual working of the social forces, then we should have social evolution as a part of Sociology.

This shows how our second division is organically connected with the first, and why it is an essential factor in sociological inquiry. The first division is abstract. It shows what must at all times be the social structure. But we want to get society in its actuality. Hence sociologists discuss what is misnamed descriptive Sociology, and give an account of the family, the state, and the other institutions developed in the process of social evolution. By making a special division inclusive of the essential elements of the evolution of society we can avoid hap-hazard discussion and give unity to our investigation. If Sociology did not include the historic development and actual application of the principles of society, it would be necessary to create a new discipline for a systematic discussion of the actual associations formed in the process of evolution.

As our second division naturally grows from the first, so it is an application of the principles discovered to the social actuality and its history. Were social phenomena our ultimate aim, we should be lost in distractions. Facts are to Sociology what plants are to botany. Especially in this second division is it important ever to remember that the sociologist wants characteristics, types, ideas, which contain the essences extracted from

facts, laws which comprehend great series of phenomena, our study always being principiant, intent on philosophy, science, and system. We look for a seed whence forests spring, avoiding entanglement in a maze of roots and underbrush and trunks and limbs. Valuable service is rendered by history, ethnology, and anthropology; but Sociology has a different point of view, and merely looks to them for material from which social science can be constructed.

This division, including the entire historic evolution of society, involves so many factors and is so comprehensive as to be bewildering to beginners. Therefore subdivisions are necessary, each of which requires profound study and extensive research. The subdivisions adopted should include the entire historic unfolding of society in a logical form, giving a comprehensive view of the social totality. We aim at the discovery of the laws in language, literature, jurisprudence, religion, and the various social institutions. From the facts of a particular stage of culture we pass to the energies which produced them. Investigators in different fields have done valuable preparatory work; but the student will find that much research is still required respecting well-known institutions and organizations in order to determine their exact character and place in the social system. We want a philosophy of the existing associations, but also of those of the past. This means that we seek to apprehend society in the societies which are its manifestations.

While the entire personality is unfolded in the process of evolution, the social energies are largely concentrated in the will. A man's social life is shaped by the will to live and to make the most of life. This "most of life" depends on many factors, such as the

degree of culture attained, the taste and disposition, and the general estimates of values. Lotze is no doubt right in claiming that we are less concerned in what things are in themselves than in what value they have for us. Values are the attractions in social life. Here is the key to the diversity in association. One chooses as an end what another reduces to means or rejects as unworthy. It is the difference between Alexander and Diogenes which makes their worlds different.

The aim to live is fundamental and the most universal. There must be life in order that the values of life may be sought. Food, raiment, shelter, and protection are consequently objects of universal pursuit, and the grounds of numerous associations in all stages of civilization.

Divergences already occur in the method of pursuing these objects, and give rise to various kinds of association. Consider the horde that lives on berries, nuts, and by hunting, or that makes war on a neighboring tribe to eat human flesh, and the modern methods of industry. Still greater divergences appear respecting life's aim after a livelihood has been secured, — many living on a low plane, while a few cherish exalted motives. These differentiations increase with culture. Compare the monotony of life among the savages and barbarians of Australia, Africa, and America with the multiplicity of interests in Paris, Berlin, London, and New York. Each interest affects the social trend, and when significant or specially prized it may become the nucleus of organizations. Amid this variety of interests specialization becomes necessary.

Human needs are impulses to action; they induce effort and result in evolution. Some of these needs belong to man as man, and characterize him in the highest stage

of culture as well as in his primitive state. Other needs are the products of culture.

Can we make these needs and the motives which spring from them the basis of a classification of the processes of social evolution? The following scheme gives the main needs, motives, and impulses for social combinations and social evolution. This classification does not attempt to give the order in which the motives arose, nor does it indicate the dominance of a particular one at any time. The motives are not isolated; they are co-operative, though now one and then another becomes dominant.

1. *Economic*, all that pertains to a livelihood.
2. *Affectional*, relating to the family, friendship, love, sympathy.
3. *Recreative*, the play element, sport, amusement, games.
4. *Political*, regulative, protective, authoritative.
5. *Æsthetic*, instinct of beauty, art.
6. *Moral*, ideas of right, justice, ethical institutions.
7. *Religious*, spirituality, sentiment for divine being.
8. *Intellectual*, desire for knowledge, culture, truth.

No claim to completeness is made for this list. The egoistic impulse — one of the strongest — is omitted. It does not so much lead to a particular kind of social action as it lies at the basis of all the other impulses and controls the entire personality. In social life its effects are powerful. Associations may be formed or entered for egoistic purposes. The impulse leads to rivalry, competition, envy, hatred, revenge, ambition, and is manifest in the higher as well as lower walks of life.

Another impulse whose action is general rather than specific is the imitative. It is universal and of great

influence. The fact that it is so largely unconscious and beyond the control of the actor adds to its power. It is closely allied to reflexive and instinctive action. Good and evil are imitated, likewise faiths and fashions. By it dogmatism and traditionalism are promoted. It exerts a constant and silent influence in all the relations of life, makes thoughts and movements contagious, and produces social epidemics. Nothing succeeds like success. Public opinion is mightier than reason. Among the most powerful factors in conventions and elections is the belief that a cause or candidate will win. Thus men move in herds. Some give the key, and others sing; some pipe, and others dance. Even distortions and mutilations are promoted by imitation. Custom becomes omnipotent, and it seems as if almost anything might be made a custom. Even in what is most subjective — such as religion and morals — imitation exerts an inestimable influence. Locke said that "we are all a kind of chameleons, taking our hue, the hue of our moral character, from those who are about us."[1]

The effort to find a sufficient reason in conscious individual and social activity for human phenomena must in many instances prove a failure.[2] Our subconscious activity is probably largely under our control through purposive action; but we cannot become aware of it otherwise than in its results. Often it is hardly correct to say that we think, and feel, and act; it would be more proper to say that something thinks, feels, and acts in us. All persons, not merely the insane, do things of which they know not the motive or of whose motive

[1] Imitation as a social force is most fully developed by G. Tarde, "Les lois de l'imitation."

[2] This is made evident by von Hartmann in "Philosophy of the Unconscious."

they are but obscurely conscious. In times of excitement when passion is aroused, in powerful popular movements, in elections, crises, tumults, revolutions, wars, men are apt to be moved rather than to move themselves. This blind impulse, this unconscious imitation, this spontaneous bursting forth of latent and occult powers in human nature, must be reckoned with in considering the forces in social evolution.

We now consider briefly the eight impulses given above.

Not one of these was absent at any time from humanity so far as known to us; but at different stages of evolution they varied greatly in degree and in the manner of their combination and interaction. Every one has led to numerous combinations or organizations. The first place is naturally given to economics, on account of the prominent part it has played in society, even the family being dependent on it. Under the head of the affectional impulse we place the family, love, friendship, sympathy, a large and important group of associations, some organized, as the family, others less formal, more spontaneous. The recreative element receives a place by itself, because really important and apt to be overlooked. It has a function from primitive to cultured man, and from childhood to old age. It is so subjective, spontaneous, that it has not led so generally to organization as some of the other impulses, being in this respect much like the spontaneity in friendly social gatherings. Games of various kinds are formed among barbarians. Peoples have their national games, as the Greeks the Olympic; athletic and other sports are prominent in our day, and healthful, elevating recreation for the masses has become an important problem.

The need of political organizations is evident; but

the impulse leading to them is composite. Defence against foes, internal peace and prosperity, love of dominion, are among the strongest. The authoritative element in the state can be traced back to the family and throughout other institutions up to the most perfect political organization of modern times. All the other needs and impulses mentioned are individual as well as social; but it is the peculiarity of political institutions that they depend wholly on society. It is only in his association with others that the individual realizes the need of a state.

The æsthetic factor is seen in the rude forms of the earliest art, in the brilliant colors and numerous decorations among barbarians, as well as in the artistic products of modern times.

The moral, religious, and intellectual factors dominate much of the higher culture, but are not altogether lacking in the lowest known stages.

Frequently these impulses are so united as to form strong compound impulses, as in altruism and charity.

To trace these various factors and the societies they have formed means to trace the social evolution. The question is not merely what degree of development each has attained, but also how the various factors were related. In the state, for instance, there is not only room for all, but all work together.

Connected with each of these factors, and with every association formed by them, is the question of progress, — a problem of depth, of importance, of great difficulty, and much in dispute. All progress means change, but all change is not progress. Change involves progress only when it consists of advance. Human progress is variable. In general we can say that it means a growing realization of life's aim; such a development of the powers as

enables man to accomplish the higher purposes of his being. Great advance is of course possible in the industries; but this is to be prized mainly because it enables society to devote itself the better to the attainment of the higher interests, such as intellect, morality, and spirituality. Only in proportion as these are developed and made supreme can we regard human movement as proceeding toward that goal the approach toward which is the essence of progress.

The theory once prevalent that in human nature itself there is an impulse to progress is now questioned. Barbarians are so contented if they can only live and enjoy themselves that progress seems to be forced on them only by the direst necessity. Even among peoples in a semi-civilized stage there are long periods of apparent stagnation or even of retrogression. Both Africa and Asia furnish abundant proof. Continuous progress in a particular people or in humanity can hardly be predicated. Can it, for instance, be claimed that from the time of the Greeks till the present there has anywhere been continuous progress in art, in literature, in history, and in philosophy? Where can we to-day find a people equal to the Greeks in these departments?

There may be progress in one department and retrogression in others. Now religion, then philosophy, then science, then art receives most attention and exerts the greatest influence on social life. Sometimes special emphasis is placed on a particular phase of a subject, as in our day there has been in the department of art a marked development of music.

One difficulty consists in the number of elements which enter into progress. The causes are so complicated that it may be impossible to determine the exact place and influence of each.

When the whole period of social evolution is considered, it is evident that the subject can be grasped only by means of comprehensive generalizations. From society *per se* we pass to the characteristics of the great social groups which have been subject to evolution. The classification of impulses given above may indicate the lines to be followed.

In social evolution Sociology seeks the laws of society. The difficulties in this respect are great, always leaving the attainment far behind the aim. Often the investigator cannot determine the exact limit of the application of a law, the data not all being within his reach; then he is obliged to be content with what is general, customary, frequent, or applicable to a particular series of phenomena.

History as but the unfolding of an idea, a manifestation of reason, or a process of the Absolute, is an attractive conception. But it has neither been justified by Hegel and his disciples, nor by the actual historic development. We look in vain to history for a logical order of development even in historic philosophical systems. Unquestionably there is reason in history, but not as developed with the consistency of a system of logic. There is reason, not, however, the ideal reason, but the weak, undeveloped, variable and fallible reason of actual men, greatly influenced, frequently dominated and controlled, by interest and passion. It is this kind of reason which runs through history like a thread. Not reason or any psychical factor is the sole causative force at any time, but always connected with other factors.

Not a single or simple force, then, explains the evolution of society. All the forces of all men, together with those of the natural environment, must be taken into the account.

We must again refer to the law of the struggle for existence as applied to human development. Whatever the survival of the fittest may explain, it cannot explain everything. Too much is made of it when isolated and treated as if the sole factor in social progress. Exercise is the great law of development, whether in the form of competition or co-operation. Indeed, competition is possible in society only if co-operation in some form exists.

If we look to law in the sense of a causative interpretation of facts, we shall likely find the law of the survival of the fittest of little application to social phenomena. The law itself is almost tautological. It means the survival of those who have the conditions to survive, a statement so self-evident that it hardly seems necessary to make it. The very thing we want to know, what the conditions of survival are in society, is not given. These conditions vary with society itself. It is not the physically strong who are always preserved; they may go to war and be killed, while the weak remain at home and live. Social conditions may be such that those physically the weakest and in character the most worthless survive, while the strong and worthy are enslaved and perish prematurely.

Whatever the value of the law in biology, its application to human affairs has thus far been of little service. What does it avail to tell us that individuals and societies which can survive do survive, when in every case we have to find out by some other method what the conditions of survival are? Owing to human reason, teleological action, and social conditions, even the effect of the natural environment may be minimized.

In order to make investigations into the social actuality fruitful, what is substantial, not merely formal, is to

be sought. The substance determines the form. Hence our emphasis on causes, forces, essences, the factors which affect the solid reality. The substances with which we deal are the social energies. What are they? Under what natural, personal, and social conditions do they work? How are they related to one another? What modifications take place when brought into co-operation or antagonism with other energies? What are the social results of the co-operation and the antagonism? Energy is always the reality which we investigate. How, for instance, is the economic force affected by the æsthetic, the ethical, and the religious?

The value of concentrating the attention on the actual social energies is evident from the introduction of new forces. Perhaps no conquest over nature has been greater than the extraction of iron from the ore. That nameless and timeless achievement is the condition for nearly all the great inventions of modern times.

The incursion of the barbarians into Europe is a question of the forces they brought and modified. Humanism, the Reformation of the sixteenth century, printing, gunpowder, the discovery of the New World, political economy, the press, popular government, the arousing of the consciousness of laborers, all are to be viewed as forces.

We can speak of a unit of force. The individual acts as a unit, now his forces being concentrated on private, then on social, affairs. A great variety of forces embodied in a social group may act as a unit, according to an end and purpose; as in the case of a political party in an election. This unit of force is expressed in constitutions, programmes, resolutions. Sometimes it is impossible to determine all the interactions of the various forces in a local social group, to say nothing of those in-

volved in a state or the entire human family; but we may study the forces as a unit, the purpose and direction of them as a totality, as when we speak of the characteristics of the times, or of the trend in Russia, England, and the United States. If it is impossible to see the massive base and icy sides and rocky crags of Mount Blanc at a single glance, the peak in which the mountain culminates and which forms its most conspicuous feature may be beheld.

With this great sphere of inquiry definitely before us, how shall we enter upon the investigation of social evolution? We can proceed chronologically, the beginning being made with primitive man, and passing from him to our own time. Prehistoric man must be studied in the meagre remains of him before records were made in writing. Much research has of late been devoted to this subject, resulting in interesting and valuable material. From the savage we proceed to the barbarian, and pass through the long evolution which culminates in modern civilization. We can hardly expect to do more than get the characteristic marks of the various stages, showing how man changes in the process of development, and how society changes with him, what human and natural forces are dominant as successive degrees of culture are reached, and what social forms prevail. Even by limiting the inquiry to what is general and principiant, the results are exceedingly rich. It is a social panorama of humanity under all the modifying influences of soil and climate, of heredity and culture, which is thus presented.

This investigation of society according to its progressive stages of culture can be made more definite by connecting with it the study of particular institutions. These institutions of society are all involved in the degrees of culture mentioned, and a general idea of them

is essential for understanding that culture. But they can, as we have seen, be taken separately and made objects of special inquiry. In institutions which are types, centres around which society congregates and from which its influences radiate, the ages themselves may be studied. Society, in a measure, is concentrated in them, and an interpretation of them is an interpretation of society. Among the institutions which spring from the motives classified above, and whose nature and history deserve especial study, we name, first of all, the family in its narrower sense, and then in its most enlarged sense when it includes the descendants from a common origin for many generations. The state is another institution whose constitution, origin, and history deserve especial study. Religion or the church has exerted an influence that gives it great prominence. Connected with these are language and literature and art, as social products. In all these cases we have social forms and products which perdure and develop, while the generations which wrought at their formation pass away. The form in which they have come to us represents the combined labor of the entire past; they are the embodiment of the deposits of human culture from the beginning of the race.

Each of the institutions involves such a variety as to admit of numerous subdivisions, and these are necessary for the most successful investigations. One need but take up an ecclesiastical and a political encyclopedia or treatise to learn what a multiplicity is involved in church and state. The stages of culture and the development of institutions can also be studied by nations. Thus we can inquire into their character among the nations of remote antiquity, or in Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, and in modern times. We can also investigate

what they become in the great historic systems, as in Judaism, Christianity, and other religions. A little reflection reveals to the student of history what a vast realm of investigation and classification for the understanding of social evolution lies open before him.

Another method, with some advantages over the above, can be adopted. Instead of beginning with the past and moving toward our own age, we can begin with the observation of our times and investigate the existing state of things. Concentrating the study on our age and mastering it, we make its interpretation our chief aim. From our own age we then turn to the past and ask for the social forces whose historic development has culminated in our times and created our society.

The student can easily abstract our age and make it an object of thorough inquiry. The fact that he is in the age and part of it offers advantages and also disadvantages for the investigation; but the advantages predominate. Even by thus mentally isolating our age for its more profound study, we cannot afford to forget that it is a product of the past and can be interpreted only if we trace its genesis in history. We want to know the existing social products on account of our organic relation to them and their value to us in receiving and exerting influence. The very word "products" refers us to the seeds and growths of the past as causes. We might also separate the past social development and make it a special division, thus devoting one sub-division to the past evolution of society, and another to the social condition of the present. But that evolution ought to be taken as an unbroken whole, and should be studied throughout its entire process and in its culmination. We want, in this study, to learn the working of the essential elements of society in the marvellous realism

of the day; we desire to know the exact nature of our culture and of our institutions. As we seize the present as the culmination of past processes, so we can make the culture attained the standard by which the lower forms are measured. But we are by no means wholly dependent on the past for a knowledge of the lower stages of development. In America, Africa, and Australia, we can study barbarian, if not savage, states of society, so that humanity as it now is presents a correct picture of a large part of the stages through which the human family passed in its processes of evolution. But whether we go from the past to the present, or from the study of our own age to its evolution, we are always intent on a comprehensive and systematic view of society.

The genesis of society as here apprehended is thus an integral and important part of Sociology. It is the one to which sociologists have given most attention. It deals with that social realism which constitutes by far the larger realm of sociological inquiry. In this social genesis we take a theoretical interest, and study it for the purpose of learning what processes have taken place in humanity; we likewise take a practical interest in it, because a knowledge of the forces at work in society will enable us the better to use and influence the present.

As the past is the key to the present, so both are the key to the future. Our age is to the coming one what the last age was to ours. Evolution is a continuous process, and our division includes the future as well as the past. We have room here for all that can be known of coming processes. Comte and others laid especial emphasis on *prevision* as an aim in Sociology; but to treat this as the principal object, and as if Sociology existed for its sake, is a mistake. We want to master society, whether or not prevision is the result.

In natural science we sometimes have prevision, as in the calculation of an eclipse. But even with respect to nature foreknowledge is very limited. In a general way we may foretell the seasons; but how little can be foretold definitely is proved by the weather predictions in the old almanacs and at present. We can sow seeds, but cannot determine the harvest. Even respecting a single individual, prophecy is hazardous; certain data are not within our reach; but how much more difficult when numerous individuals are involved, all of them uncertain quantities? In Sociology the factors are so indefinite, so varied and variable, so multifariously combined, so extremely complicated, that prevision on a scientific basis is at present out of the question. If certain factors meet under given circumstances, we may have some idea of the result. But will they meet? Even if they do, our prediction is opinion and faith, or a guess, rather than science. There may be progress in this respect, just as in case of meteorology. But can we ever hope to foretell the coming of a Copernicus, a Shakespeare, a Goethe? The unforeseen advent of a Napoleon may upset all our calculations. According to our knowledge, faith, and hope, we may form a general notion of the future of human events, but that is all. The character of the notion is apt to depend on our optimism or pessimism. Particulars are out of the question, and our general view, even, may be a failure. Prophecies are usually harmless; they are apt to be forgotten before the time comes to which they refer, and the prophets do not live to correct their own predictions.

This of course does not mean that we cannot learn the nature and working of the social forces. But we may know how they work and what they accomplish under certain conditions, while the conditions of the

future on which all depends are beyond our ken. A study of natural forces reveals to us how they will act when they meet; but only under the operation of laws similar to those governing the heavenly bodies can we tell whether and when they will meet. Not for the sake of prevision chiefly do we study the natural forces; we want to know them in order to use them for our purposes. While we may not be able to tell how they will act when left to themselves, we can so combine or separate them as to accomplish our ends. So we want to master the social forces for the purpose of using them. We may not be able to foretell what society will be; but by prevision of what it ought to be we can work toward the desired social end.

While definite prophecy and scientific prevision are out of the question, there may be well-grounded expectations respecting the future. With the natural forces the same as in the past, and with human nature, however modified by heredity and environment, essentially the same, we can learn from the rich experience of the past what characteristics may be expected in the future. But even general laws as the basis of a philosophy of history may be out of the question at present. No past experience can be a perfect type of the future, for the conditions constantly vary; and if progress is made beyond the past, no inferior stage can be the exact interpreter of the higher one.

Besides the past, of which in some measure a repetition may be expected in the future, an interpretation of the present may reveal tendencies whose outcome in the immediate future can be predicated as probable. Sometimes a trend contains a prophetic element; it is like a seed which contains the plant that will spring from it. Yet even respecting such a trend we cannot

be unerring prophets, except in a most general way and under supposition of certain conditions. Something unforeseen may occur unexpectedly and give a new direction to the trend. "The philosophy of history at large, explaining the past and predicting the future phenomena of man's life in the world by reference to general laws, is in fact a subject with which, in the present state of knowledge, even genius aided by wide research seems hardly able to cope." [1] The very nature of the objects of Sociology limits its efforts at mathematical definiteness and certainty. "It will not do to forget that, according to the nature of its material, Sociology never can get the same positive certainty as the natural science of what is inorganic." [2]

Owing to the checks which individuals receive in acting on one another, and to the constitution, the laws, the government, and all the permanent institutions within whose limits a people move, a nation is of course less variable than an individual. Large bodies move more slowly and change less rapidly than small ones. There are therefore reasons for prevision in the case of states and also of masses of men which do not apply to individuals. But constitutions, laws, and institutions of all kinds, and organizations are also liable to change. If their transformation is less rapid than that of individuals, on account of the numerous factors which must be changed, it is more permanent and produces greater results. Take such a change as that from feudalism to industrialism, from despotism to a representative government, and from a monarchy to a republic.[3]

[1] Tylor, "Primitive Culture," i., 5.

[2] Schaeffle, "Bau und Leben," i., 466.

[3] Bacon says that "states are great engines moving slowly." While this is true in general, in crises states may move with rapidity toward

A survey of the whole field does not lead to a rejection of the various efforts at prevision; in this second division we have room for all within their reach. We do not, however, want to cherish delusive hopes respecting the possibility of predictions. The true student will be thankful for any revelation of the future legitimately learned from the experience of the past and read in the signs of the times; but he also knows that the precious metals found in history and our age have a present value, regardless of what their currency in the future may be.

Since Mr. Spencer treats society from the evolutionary point of view, his Sociology really pertains only to our second division. So far as he discusses society itself it is merely for the sake of getting a basis for his social evolution. In the three volumes entitled "Principles of Sociology," he first discusses "The Data of Sociology." The first chapters, on "Super-Organic Evolution" and "The Factors of Social Phenomena," pertain to society in general. Then follow over 400 pages on primitive man and his views of things. The material of this part really belongs to evolution itself, giving the supposed beginnings of the human family. Then over 150 pages are devoted to "Inductions of Sociology," in which we have a discussion of what society itself is. The first chapter is headed: "What is a Society?" He says: "This question has to be answered at the outset. Until we have decided whether or not to regard a society as an entity; and until we have decided whether, if regarded as an entity, a society is to be classed as absolutely unlike all other entities or as like some others; our conception of the subject-matter before us remains vague." The remainder of the first volume and the whole of the other two are devoted to Social Institutions; namely, Domestic, Ceremonial, Political, Ecclesiastical, Professional, and Industrial.

The Institutions named are all in society; but they are in it, they cannot be the whole of society. Society being larger, their

revolution or reorganization, or through processes of transformation. Illustrations are seen in Greece, Rome, France, America, Italy, Germany, and other states.

discussion does not exhaust Sociology. In the sphere of æsthetics, of religion, of politics, of education, of the industries, much social action cannot be classed as institutional. Institutions themselves are advanced because individuals and societies find them inadequate, rise above them, and lift them to a higher plane. Society is an unbroken unit, an atmosphere in which we move, whether or not we are in institutions; it is a web in which there are other than institutional threads.

By subjecting man severely to his environment during the process of evolution and then evolving him into a network of institutions, it looks as if he were wholly subject to mechanical processes. How would it do to place the first emphasis on what is to be evolved, namely, man himself, and then treat the environment and institutions as ministers of their lord? The experiment is worth trying.

Our second division shows the intimate relation of our subject to history, without being identified with it. The system of the actual working of the social forces is our aim now, not the history of associations. Not now as in the first division, do we emphasize human adaptation to society, social need, social force as the social essence, social attraction and repulsion, in the abstract; we are intent on seeing the working of these in the actual construction of society.

As in this second division our aim is great generalizations from facts rather than history; so we take the standpoint of sociological inquiry instead of that of the special social sciences. Each social factor is to be viewed as an integral part of the totality. We can illustrate this by the economic and sociological view of the laborer. By economics he is regarded as so much strength or skill to be used in production, and the exploitation of his strength and skill has often been pronounced a natural economic law. But Sociology views the laborer as also so much political force, as ethical, religious, æsthetic, and intellectual; that is, Sociology regards him in all his relations to society, and in these relations his economic force is but a fraction. In order that the laborer may receive his proper place in society, the economic must yield to the sociological view. The capitalist, the politician, the professional man, must all be viewed in their totality of powers and relations, in order to occupy their proper place in society. It is characteristic of our second division to contemplate societies from the comprehensive sociological point of view.

It is thus evident that there is a clear distinction between the first and second division. At the same time, as in our second we aim at the *philosophy* of the marvellous social realism of the past and present, it is sufficiently distinguished from the ordinary historic disciplines. Not history itself, but the principles unfolded, the forces at work, and the laws operating, in history, are the objects of our search. Our aim is better expressed by what Hegel and others have called the philosophy of history, or still better by the social philosophy of history. How far a social philosophy of the past and present can be constructed, we must leave to the study itself to determine.

Of the importance and richness of this division, the above outline gives no adequate conception. We have all the evolutionary forces in their actuality, with the progress they produce, with the institutions and social forms that result from their operation. What the principles of the first division give potentially respecting man and his environment, is now to be followed in its reality. How intellect, feeling, and will work; the body and the physical environment; what men start with, and then become by heredity and social environment; imitation, aspiration, competition, social friction; the growth of language, religion, institutions; the individualizing and socializing influences exerted by the progressive development of society; what is wrought socially by voluntary activity and by necessity; how far man is independent and dependent — these and numerous other factors are included under this division. The present, with an importance for every member of the age that is only faintly realized, offers the most inviting field for investigation. Take, for instance, a country like the United States, with the remarkable social varieties and numerous distinct social groups; what a study! And then to relate the United States to the social organism of humanity!

We recognize the social energies in history, and their operations are the aim of our search. The causative connections in society are of especial interest to us. The general ideas we are after in this division are well illustrated by Lotze's "Microcosm," particularly the third volume, in which he discusses the meaning of history, the historic forces, progress, and society. Grasped in the totality of his historic relations the individual is immeasurably exalted; and the true conception of him is in this totality, not in isolation. Herbart says: "No man stands alone; and no known

age is independent; in every present the past lives, and what the individual calls his personality is itself, strictly speaking, a web of thoughts and emotions which, for the most part, only repeats what the environing society owns and uses as an intellectual possession. . . . The whole mass of perceptions comes as certainly from the world outside of us as does our mother tongue." Not as isolated, but as connected, causatively, we want to study the ages and nations and institutions.

We can perhaps classify all association as follows: —

First, natural, that into which we are born, the family, the environment, the state, and the like, and that which is required by the very condition of things for sustenance and defence.

Second, voluntary, such as literary, æsthetic, and numerous other societies which we enter from choice.

Third, natural and voluntary, partly due to the nature of things, partly to choice. The latter associations are probably the most numerous. Indeed, after the will is developed, we cannot see how the force of circumstances and voluntary activity, sometimes one being more potent, then the other, can be altogether separated. Yet as the one or the other predominates, we can speak of the association as natural or voluntary.

We must also distinguish society as formally organized and society in a more general sense. Even among unorganized masses there may be a community of thought and feeling and interest, which produces a certain solidarity and similarity of movement. Schaeffle (pp. 392–393) gives a classification of these unorganized societies.

International and super-national bonds, what are they? If thoughts, interests, institutions, churches, which are not national, yet prevail in different nations, ought they to be called international? In that case international denotes locality merely, not nationality at all. The query thus arises whether there are not objects which should be called extra-national or super-national. They would include all elements, for instance, which are not characteristics of nations, but of humanity, independent, therefore, of national existence.

In this second division the various factors which enter society can become objects of special inquiry, namely, individuals as possessing and exercising the social forces, nature, the relation of men to nature, and the associations formed by men. In these four

factors the changes which characterize social evolution can be concentrated. For us the first three have significance for the sake of the fourth, society, in which they are involved.

1. Men as possessors of the social forces change, and with them the forces likewise. This change characterizes humanity at large. Acquired characteristics are transmitted, and thus generations are permanently affected. The laws and limits of changes through heredity are imperfectly understood; but that the changes actually take place cannot be questioned. To the physical and psychical modifications of individuals must be added the effects produced by an increase in numbers.

2. Besides the changes in the individuals of society, there are those in the natural environment. How vastly different the same people under different natural conditions! Where nature does nearly everything for them, as in the tropics, they need not exert themselves greatly, and readily yield to the enervating influence of the climate. Neither can great progress be expected where the mere struggle for existence absorbs the energies. To make the most of life there must be the means to secure a livelihood. Energy is, however, developed, and that makes this condition more favorable than the other. But leisure without energy and energy without leisure are both unfavorable.

The most effective changes in the natural environment are the permanent ones. Migration, emigration are important factors. When a tribe moves inland from the seashore, it may become agricultural instead of living by fishing and hunting, and thus its mode of life be permanently revolutionized. A people moving to the seacoast may become commercial, as the Phœnicians. Great changes are produced by removing to a different soil and climate.

3. Men change, their natural environment changes, but also their relation to that environment. The view of nature changes. The ghost and the fetich vanish, and natural objects are taken as natural. By knowledge and skill man subdues nature and makes it his minister. He learns to make fire easily, he manufactures rude implements for farming, he employs bow and arrow and spear in warfare, he tames animals and uses them, he makes boats and facilitates travel and transportation. What a revolution has been wrought by steam and all the modern improvements in the use of nature!

4. To the changes in individuals and in mere increase in num-

bers, to the changes in nature and in man's relation to it, we add the changes in the social environment. These are the changes which most deeply affect men in their associated relations. There are social creations into which society puts its thought, its feeling, and its will, which mark and promote the progress of humanity. These are permanent and cumulative social products. Before writing, amid the migration of tribes, many traditions, arts, inventions, may have been lost. Not every people had its Homer. The permanent effects in social environment were produced by such treasures of culture which abided, to which generation after generation added its share. To the changes in the social environment belong all those influences which affected the association and relation of men. Changes took place in the family, in the agricultural and industrial relations, in the religious bonds, in manners and customs, in the government, in ethical views and in conduct, in æsthetics, in language and literature; and all these affected the condition of society and the progress of civilization.

These four ideas are not isolated. All the factors under each head are intimately connected, and those classified together are also organically united to the factors under the other heads. The changes in individuals, in the natural environment, in men's relation to nature, and in the social environment, produce one another, are co-operative, and belong to one and the same process of development. But with all their intricate interaction and organic union, the analysis of social movements into these four ideas will help us to understand social groups, nations, and humanity; they aid us in interpreting the past and present, and in forecasting the future.

The comprehensive view aimed at by Sociology may lead to hasty generalization. Not only is there danger of making general or even universal what is only particular, but also of postulating causes which do not exist. A particular cause must always produce the same effect; but the same effect may result from a score of causes. Death can result from poison, suicide, or hundreds of diseases and accidents. The temptation to substitute imaginary for real causes is peculiarly great respecting primitive man and wherever trustworthy historic data are wanting. The scientific student knows how to estimate the writers who show how an event may have occurred and then dogmatically affirm that thus it came to pass.

Many causes, for instance, may have led to the formation of the state; but in the absence of valid information we can only surmise which was the producing cause. Social forms and customs in a region may have originated in one way, while in others similar ones were due to a different origin. It is at times difficult to decide whether a custom or form originated with a people or was transmitted to them by others. The same superstition may originate in different ways; this is also true of ethical conceptions, of authority, respect, shame, and the like. Does the possibility that religion may have arisen from fear prove that as its actual origin? Why does religion still continue after the fear or superstition or ignorance, which was supposed to give it birth, has vanished? Of some customs and institutions we can hardly say more than that they have a basis in human nature, that they meet some need; and if that is all we can say, it is better to say no more, certainly wiser than to become dogmatists in order to hide our ignorance.

In order to understand the historic evolution of society, all the social forces must be taken into account, each in its proper place and in its interaction with the other forces. When we consider this requirement for mastering the history of the past, we realize how little of it is within our reach. Effects are recorded, but the real causes are often obscure, leaving room for the conflicting interpretations of the same event by historians. The purpose, on which so much depends in human action, is often hidden even from observers, and still more from those remote in space and time from the scene.

The study of the ages is largely an inquiry into their dominant energies, some thoughts, or feelings, or purposes, which rule. While all the energies operating in society at a particular time must be known for the interpretation of the associations of that period, special importance attaches to their relative dominance. Often society best expresses itself in a specific aim which concentrates and controls the associative factors. To an age, as to an individual, the ruling passion may be the key. When money becomes the absorbing aim, morals, religion, and personalities are subordinated to its attainment. The rule of Napoleon illustrates the dominance of the military spirit, with its love of conquest and glory. Sometimes religious motives determine the character of ages, as has so often been the case among Jews, Christians, and

Mohammedans. Especially when supreme interests are at stake and intense feeling is aroused, do we find some dominant purpose as the concentrative and directive energy of the age.

In this study of ages according to their ruling types it is essential for sociological purposes to inquire how the dominance is gained and maintained by particular social forces. How does it happen that these forces do not work harmoniously, each in its place and co-operating with the rest, no marked prominence being given to a particular one? And how does it come that now certain forces take the lead and then yield the prominence to others? It requires no proof to show that the golden mean is not kept by the social energies in their relation to one another, and that history does not move along the line of that symmetry which was the ideal of the Greeks.

Were society literally an organism the course of history would be inexplicable; but if it consists of the energies of the different organisms, then its history can be understood. History, then, changes with these organisms and their relations to one another. Society itself is modified by the influences which affect individuals. These influences are countless and subject to constant change. But not only are the horse-shoes altered, and with them their magnetism, but the relation of the horse-shoes is changed. The prophets of the ages differ; the schools they form differ; and thus the ages they mould differ. So interests vary, and with them the tendencies they promote. We emphasize society, but do not forget that, in spite of the opposition to hero-worship, one man may make an age or be the embodiment of its ruling motive. What he becomes he impresses on the community, as the head of a family, the chief of a tribe, the priest, medicine-man, sage, teacher, or warrior. What is true of a limited social group also applies to large bodies. The dominant purpose may depend on authoritative persons and associations, on natural conditions, on new discoveries, or on social tendencies. A change of rulers in Constantinople puts Europe in a ferment; a famine in India changes the world's market; Mohammedan fanaticism may be aroused and engage Christendom in warfare. A single strike may assume such vast proportions as to endanger nations. Give Russia the control of Turkey, and with France as its ally the control of the Mediterranean, how will English supremacy in Egypt be maintained, and England keep its route through the Suez Canal unobstructed and its rule in India uncontested?

In every age it is what seems of peculiar importance which determines the dominance, what meets the most pressing need, what relieves pain and affords pleasure, what is most appreciated, most ardently craved, and inspires the highest hope. It is thus evident that the appetite, the feeling, and the general state of consciousness, have much to do with the matter. The variety in the dominance of particular social forces at various times is due to the changes which take place in the needs, feelings, and convictions of men, and in their circumstances. It would be strange if what is deemed of greatest importance at a time did not enlist the greatest energies. An error believed is no less effective than a truth believed, in determining the courses of men. A false prophet who appeals to the passions may be more effective than a true prophet who appeals to reason.

A social force may continue its dominance after the occasion which gave it the supremacy has passed away. The military spirit often continues after the foe who aroused it has been vanquished. So every other social force may live as a past impulse rather than present necessity.

Only in the most general terms can we give the interpretation for the continued dominance of certain forces. The needs and occasions which determined their dominance may continue. The foe may be conquered, yet it may be necessary always to be prepared to meet a foe. But another reason is weighty. Exercise develops the faculty or power exercised. Although at first the use of the power may be a trial, its exercise in the course of time becomes easy, natural, and even a pleasure. The strength it gains determines the line of least resistance. The mind by conscious effort is trained to move unconsciously and resistlessly in particular directions. What is true of a single individual is true of all individuals. Habits are formed, customs arise, traditions prevail; the appetite grows by what it feeds on; a power continually exercised develops, it attains the pre-eminence, and then more easily retains than it originally gained the dominance. A man is absorbed in an effort to obtain a competence; but when he has obtained it, all his powers have been trained solely for this end, and his life itself is devoted to accumulations for which his past training is the only reason.

Individuals, society, institutions, being all permeated, trained, and carried along by this dominant force, it is difficult to change

the trend, even if the most urgent reasons for doing so exist. Reason has no weight with an irrational conservatism, which does things only because they were done in the past. A few feel the need of change, they impart their feelings, which thus become more general, and their very antagonism to conservatism tends to make them radical. Conservatives consider only what is to be conserved, and are blind to the new that deserves acceptance; the radicals consider only what is new and calculated to overcome conservative ills, and are blind to the good in the past. In the conflict which results, revolution may be the only solution. Especially in times of crises are there but few who equally appreciate in the old the good and reject its evils, and the truth of the new while free from its errors and extremes. But in distinction from the extremes of conservatism and radicalism, these few are the truly progressive ones. History is largely a movement and conflict of extremes, and progress the union of the truth in the extremes.

This is not the place to discuss the numerous principles which have been thought by different investigators to determine social evolution. One, however has gained such prominence and general acceptance that it deserves brief discussion even in an introductory work. In his "First Principles" Mr. Spencer applies the biological law of evolution to society, and claims that in it we have a principle of so fundamental a character as to indicate the progressive development of all association. He holds that in the case of living organisms the process of evolution is invariably from homogeneity to heterogeneity of structure; that is, the development consists in differentiation. "It is settled beyond dispute that organic evolution consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous."[1] "From the remotest past which science can fathom, up to the novelties of yesterday, that in which evolution essentially consists, is the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous."[2] This transformation is not regarded as the only factor in evolution, but it is regarded as being without exception.[3]

This law is applied by Mr. Spencer likewise to all human and social affairs. "Whether it be in the development of the earth, in the development of life upon its surface, in the development of society, of government, of manufactures, of commerce, of language,

[1] First Principles, 148. [2] *Ibid.* 174.

[3] All the factors are given on p. 216.

literature, science, art, this same advance from the simple to the complex, through successive differentiations, holds uniformly. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which evolution essentially consists."[1] Beginning with the nebular hypothesis, he attempts to trace this law throughout inorganic matter, through all forms of life, and through every phase of human association. At the close of his elaborate examination he pronounces the law universal. "Among all orders of phenomena that lie within the sphere of observation, we see ever going on the process of change above defined; and many significant indications warrant us in believing that the same process of change went on throughout that remote past which lies beyond the sphere of observation. If we must form any conclusion respecting the general course of things, past, present, and future, the one which the evidence as far as it goes justifies, and the only one for which there is any justification, is, that the change from an indeterminate uniformity to a determinate multiformity which we everywhere see going on, has been going on from the first, and will continue to go on."[2]

This supposed principle is an illustration of the caution that should be exercised in formulating laws of universal application, and in applying biological evolution to social evolution. This theory of evolution is the most essential factor in Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Behind it is the Unknowable, which is beyond the reach of our faculties; but this evolution lies within the legitimate sphere of human inquiry.

The general acceptance of the theory may make us hesitate to criticise it; but the very fact that it is so often thoughtlessly repeated and pronounced absolute and final, makes criticism the more necessary. While the process described is common, yet it is not a law universally applicable. It is a philosophical hypothesis whose application to society is limited; and for this reason we deny its claim as a sociological principle or law. As an effort to subject human society to biological and even cosmical laws it is manifestly a failure, not taking into account sufficiently the peculiarities of human society.

Let us follow closely Mr. Spencer's reasoning and illustrations. He illustrates the process from the homogeneous to the hetero-

[1] Op. cit. 148-9. [2] *Ibid.* 218.

geneous by referring to a wandering tribe of savages. "As we see in existing barbarous tribes, society in its first and lowest form is a homogeneous aggregation of individuals having like powers and like functions: the only marked difference of function being that which accompanies difference of sex."[1] As social evolution progresses, "a differentiation between the governing and the governed" takes place, which continues till one man becomes governor and the supreme power finally becomes hereditary in a family. "Gradually, as the tribe progresses, the contrast between the governing and the governed grows more decided."

In another place[2] he teaches the same doctrine. In the beginning, "political authority is neither well established nor precise. Distinctions of rank are neither clearly established nor impassable." But in the process of evolution "the distinction between the royal race and the people grows so extreme as to amount in the popular apprehension to a difference of nature. The warrior-class attains a perfect separation from classes devoted to the cultivation of the soil, or other occupations regarded as servile. And there arises a priesthood that is defined in its rank, its functions, its privileges. This sharpness of definition, growing both greater and more variously exemplified as societies advance to maturity, is extremest in those that have reached their fullest development or are declining."

Mr. Spencer overlooks a large number of facts,[3] and forgets that by means of reflection and by choosing particular ends for which to live, man can take a course different from that of inorganic matter and the animals beneath him. There has been as distinct an evolution from political heterogeneity to political homogeneity, as an evolution which developed "the distinction between the royal race and the people." There was a process which resulted in making one the ruler and all the rest subjects, or which made a few noblemen or aristocrats the rulers, and the masses the ruled. But since then the very opposite process has been powerful. This evolution moved from heterogeneity to homogeneity. The distinction between sovereign and subject was wiped out, and all became equally sovereign and equally subject. From the freedom of one or a few and the subjection of the many, the

[1] Op. cit. 158. [2] *Ibid.* 188.

[3] They are by no means only "apparent exceptions," p. 190, but real and weighty ones.

evolution has proceeded toward the freedom of all. Nobility by heredity, once making such marked distinctions in society, has yielded to homogeneity of rights and privileges, regardless of birth. In the eighteenth century the evolution which had made the king the state turned from heterogeneity toward homogeneity, by proclaiming equality of rights and the sovereignty of the people. The same process has taken place respecting the ballot and the right to hold office, property qualifications being abolished and homogeneity established. Not only have we evidences of this species of evolution in the United States, France, and Switzerland, but students of the times declare the trend to political equality one of the strongest characteristics of our age.

This evolution is clearly the very opposite of that described by Mr. Spencer, and a single instance proves that what he establishes as a rule in many cases is not a law. Nor is this striking exception to his supposed law explained by his later and more complete statement of evolution as involving a process from indefiniteness to definiteness, and as a process of integration. The definiteness between sovereign and subject vanishes, and the result is not produced by an integration of heterogeneous parts, but by actually putting homogeneity in place of heterogeneity.

The same process is seen in other departments. For many ages woman is severely limited to a particular sphere, men having a complete monopoly of certain callings. Then there is a growth of homogeneity, women becoming preachers, doctors, lawyers, taking the places of men in stores and offices, and becoming competitors of men in factories. Or shall this be called a development toward heterogeneity among women, while with respect to humanity it is a development toward homogeneity? It is clearly not an integration of heterogeneity in society, but its supplanting by homogeneity.

Evolution has developed individualism in the industries, with a sharp distinction between capitalists and laborers. But is there not also a decided tendency in the direction of socialism? There is a movement toward industrial partnership, making laborers partakers, with capitalists, of the profits, whereas formerly some took all the profits and the rest were mere wage-earners. Still stronger is the trend from heterogeneity to homogeneity in the case of co-operative societies, in which all are capitalists and all laborers.

Even so strong an advocate of individualism as Mr. Spencer cannot deny these facts; nor can the tendencies toward liberty and

equality, whether in politics or the industries, be disposed of by pronouncing them evidences of decay. They are conclusive proof that the perfection of national development may involve a trend toward homogeneity as well as to heterogeneity. The fact is that progress consists in the development both of diversity and of unity.

Is further proof required? Mr. Spencer's statement that in the process of evolution "there arises a priesthood that is defined in its rank, its functions, its privileges," is a half-truth. It is just as true that there is a process of development when priest and people are more and more assimilated to each other, and there may even come a time when it is declared that all, without exception, are kings and priests unto God.

But one more instance. Processes of differentiation take place among nations, churches, and organizations, developing peculiarities sharply and increasing the heterogeneity; but no less marked is the opposite process, which increases their homogeneity at the expense of their heterogeneity. Nations learn from one another, recognize and cultivate mutual interests, become assimilated to one another, form alliances, create international law, and establish courts of arbitration. The term "cosmopolitanism" is significant; such is the homogeneity produced by civilization that out-of-the-way places must be entered to behold the former heterogeneity. Many of the old distinctions between the city and country even are vanishing.

Denominations which once developed their peculiarities and repelled one another, are now discovering and emphasizing elements of unity and becoming more heterogeneous. This is seen in the union of Lutherans and Reformed in the same state church in Germany, also in the nearer approach of Protestant churches to one another in other lands. It is seen in the tendencies toward union on the part of the English, the Greek, and even the Roman Catholic church. The same process is seen in other associations whose antagonism was greatest at the start and decreased with age. In philosophical and theological schools the tendency to coalesce and unite is a common phenomenon in the process of evolution.

The evil in the false theory of Mr. Spencer consists in that it puts society on too low a plane, subjecting it to a biological law, but not doing justice to human foresight, to teleological action on the part of man, and to social ideals. Then, the adoption of this

law fetters society to past processes of differentiation, when human advance may require a development toward homogeneity.

We admit the extensive application of Mr. Spencer's theory of evolution, but are obliged to reject it as a sociological principle. It has its place; but it is not a universal law for interpreting the past and the present, nor is it a guide for prevision respecting the social development of the future.

Simmel ("Sociale Differenzierung," 9) regards social phenomena as so complicated that no definite estimate of their results is possible. This in fact seems to be the general conviction. In "Essays in Philosophical Criticism," edited by Seth and Haldane, we read (p. 104): "The application of the historical method to the social sciences has a difficulty of its own, and the historical prediction which Comte claims for Sociology can only belong to it to a very limited extent." L. Stephen develops the ethical doctrine in harmony with evolutionary principles, but he regards prediction impossible. He says (18-20): "I need not say how short-sighted are the ablest statesmen, and how constantly that which happens is precisely the one thing which nobody foresaw, but which, after the event, appears to have been just what every one should have foreseen." But if we cannot tell even what the morrow will bring forth, what shall be said respecting more remote periods? Numerous questions respecting the effects of influences on an individual are unanswerable; but how much more difficult the question becomes when thousands and millions are concerned? "If we can give some vague answer to such questions, it is clearly not such an answer as can be called scientific, or as enables us to give any definite prediction of results. . . . When we reflect upon the extreme difficulty of obtaining the necessary knowledge, of appreciating the state of mind of millions of men, of discovering the latent passions which may be smouldering amongst them, their state of accessibility to new ideas and new conditions of life, we may well feel the untrustworthiness of our so-called scientific methods. The discovery of a new principle in mechanics or the promulgation of a new religious creed may alter the whole social state, or bring about political and social convulsions. But how can we predict new discoveries or new creeds? To foretell a discovery is to make the discovery yourself, and to make it before its time. . . . Any one who should have prophesied the history of the present century at its beginning with any precision would

have had himself to foresee the course of science, the attitude taken by the greatest thinkers, the influence upon men's imaginations of new conceptions of the world, and to have traced out an incalculable series of changes in the relations of classes, and to determine the effect of all these changes upon the material conditions of existence."

So much space has been devoted to the subject because some think there must be social prevision because Comte said so. Others seek to reduce Sociology to a science and a method which are to insure the exactness and prevision of natural science. These errors had to be met.

If we cannot predicate an innate impulse to progress of human nature, we must suppose the conditions for progress to exist there. The capacity with which man starts must be the germ of all his future development. The very necessities of his existence are calculated to call forth his energies. He must struggle with nature and with his fellow-men. But even in the primitive state there is something else than struggle. Affection, friendship, family ties, tribal relations, and the force of circumstances lead to co-operation. If there had been nothing but the perpetual warfare about the cradle of our race which some imagine, it is hard to see how humanity could have escaped extinction.

As culture advances, man not only emancipates himself more and more from the dominion of nature, but he subdues it by making it minister to his purposes. As he grows and gets a taste of knowledge and art and all the higher concerns of life, we can understand how he may have an impulse toward more culture. But so long as he has no knowledge of the better things of mind and heart, we cannot well conceive what there is for him to aspire to. In some degree wonder may be excited and aspiration aroused; and the primitive religions may sometimes reveal an effort, or at least a desire, to rise. But whatever impulse beyond the existing stage may be found, it is a dark feeling rather than an intelligent forward movement. Of how many in our most advanced nations can it be said that they are impelled to make life progressive?

A distinction ought to be made between social and associative forces. Hatred and revenge are social forces so far as they affect society, but they are not associative. They separate rather than unite men. "Anti-social" might be used for such affections so far as disintegrative; that would mean that they are not only anti-associative, but actually destructive of society.

Mr. L. F. Ward ("Dynamic Sociology," I., 460) says, "Society, in its literal or primary sense, is simply an association of individuals." A few pages further on he gives a discussion of "The Social Forces," which he divides into those "absolutely essential to life" and such as are non-essential. The former include the preservative and reproductive forces; the latter, or non-essential, the æsthetic, emotional, and intellectual forces.

REFLECTIONS.

Relation of the Second to the First Division. The Idea of Evolution in Modern Thought. Subdivisions. Study of our own Age. Its Relation to the Past and Future. Classification of Social Impulses. Reason in History. Substantial and Causative Factors in Evolution. How are New Forces introduced into Society? Co-operation and Antagonism of Forces. How far have Social Creations an Independent Existence? Sub-conscious and Semi-conscious Forces. Possibility of Prevision. Does a Social Organism depend wholly on its Members for its Character? The Social Mechanism. Social Stagnation. Progress in Humanity. Transitory and Permanent Factors in Evolution. Social Institutions. The Sociologist's Aim in the Study of History. Value of Types, Characteristics, Laws. Unity in the Diversity of Social Development. Development from Homogeneity to Heterogeneity. Review of the Chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS, OR THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY.

The Problem. *Why not stop our sociological inquiries with the evolution of society? In order to justify this third division, its organic connection with the other two must be shown. If we learn the forces of society and the conditions of progress, why not apply the results to the future development of society?*

It must be determined what is meant by ethics as a department of Sociology. The emphasis must be placed on morality; but the moral ought to be put into harmonious relations with all the other social factors. The problem pertains to the entire progress of society, and therefore to the total conditions for this progress.

Its conditions of progress must be sought. The aim of progress should be settled in order to fix the goal of social effort. Is this aim social or individual? What is the ideal of social ethics? The question of prevision in Sociology has special significance for this third division.

We make a distinction between theoretical and practical ethics, the science and the art. It is our aim to get the principles for social progress as the basis for ethical action.

Nature has causes and facts: the mind sets an end for itself and works teleologically. Especially in ethics does the importance of design, purposive action, become evident.

Is man wholly subject to nature, or can he subject nature to his purposes?

Many of the most perplexing questions of the day are involved in this division, such as the freedom of the will. The beginner cannot hope to solve these hastily, nor need he cease his sociological investigations until they are solved. Aside from these problems in or near the realm of the unknowable, he will find many others which are solvable and of inestimable importance.

The definite problem is: What ought society to be, and how can it be made what it ought to be?

HAVING now the principles of society *per se*, showing what must be in order that society may be, and the evolution of these principles, showing what society has become through the process of actual development, only what society ought to be remains to be considered. The first division gives the most general idea of society, what is characteristic of all association, what the social structure is, what forces constitute it, how they interact, and what potentiality they involve; the second traces the working of the principles in history as they produce actual society; our third division, sociological ethics, treats of what the social forces ought to become, what their interaction should be, and how the most perfect society can be evolved. By considering what must be, what has been, and what ought to be, completeness is given to sociological inquiry, including all departments of social knowledge. So far as prevision is concerned, which has a special significance for ethics, we treat it here as an inference from our second division, under which it is discussed.

If a planet moves in an imperfect ellipse, it may be a legitimate problem for an astronomer to inquire into the

conditions necessary to make the ellipse perfect. If a chemist fails to find an element in its pure form in nature, he seeks to produce it artificially. We try to get rid of bacteria from the air we breathe and the food we eat; cities spend vast sums to secure pure drinking water; houses, ships, and furniture are disinfected in order to destroy the germs of contagious diseases. Our whole medical system is based on the theory that ills can be removed and health promoted. Empiricism has prevailed extensively in medicine; yet if some shallow empiric were to charge the medical faculty with inconsistency for trying to promote health while they never have specimens of perfect health to examine, they would answer that they study diseased humanity for the sake of health. If the objector replied that after studying diseases their work was done, because there are no facts of perfect health to investigate, they would likely deem no further controversy necessary. Helmholtz found only imperfect eyes; but he knew that they were imperfect only because he had an idea of what a perfect eye is. The wise teacher considers the ignorance and errors of his pupils in order to remove them.

The bearing of these facts on our subject is clear. We have the foundation and the historic superstructure of society in the other two divisions. As we contemplate that superstructure we aim at its explanation. Its genesis explains only *how* it became what it is. But you must eliminate reason from the mind to stop with that. Neither Darwin nor the scientific gardener or bird fancier ends his inquiries with the origin of species; that is but preliminary to the problem what can be made of the existing flora and fauna. But if the question of progress toward perfection is legitimate respecting plants and animals, in scientific inquiry, shall

it be pronounced unscientific respecting man and his associations ?

The student who masters sociological problems will have revelations respecting the status attained by social science when he discovers that it is necessary to justify the inclusion of ethics in Sociology.

When Comte insists on making Sociology a positive science in the same sense as physics, it may be questioned whether there is room in it for ethics. The claim that science involves a strict adherence to phenomena would make the historic method the only valid one. But if we go to the historic data for the sake of drawing a social science from them, it does not appear why we may not draw ethics from them likewise. If it is argued that ethics is not found on the surface of the facts, we answer, neither is science found there. The trend to unify knowledge by putting it in the form of science is not a whit less rational, a going beyond the mere facts, than is the construction of a system of ethics. Hence Comte, instead of limiting his inquiries to social phenomena, often leaves the impression that he values them for the sake of the ethical factors involved in them. He discusses morals and morality, the conditions of progress and the welfare of society, treating the perfection of humanity as the aim of social development, and his positive method, as distinct from the theological and metaphysical, as the ideal process for the accomplishment of the ethical aim. This emphasis on ethics is to his credit; it may be the product in part of his former relation to Saint-Simon, with his socialistic measures. Practical considerations gave Comte the impulse to sociological inquiries, and his system terminates in ethics. If this conflicts with his positivistic philosophy, so much the worse for that philosophy.

To discuss associated humanity and leave out ethics, is like a theology of the Olympian gods without Zeus.[1]

The special social sciences leave no doubt as to the place of ethics. The system of ethics is itself rapidly becoming a social science; how shall Sociology treat that science if it has no place for ethics? Since the days of Savigny the laws of the state have been treated historically. But this has not done away with their rational consideration. What they are and how they became what they are does not eliminate the question of what they should be. Jurisprudence is largely ethical and deals with what ought to be. We know crimes only because they fall below the moral standard. Every lawyer, unless a mere pettifogger, has ideals of right. Political science deals with history and with present actuality, but also with rational ideals. The true statesman stands on reality, but reaches out toward ideals of the state. In economies the historical method has been made prominent during the last half-century, but it is essentially a system of rational principles, or aims to be, no matter how men may act in their industrial pursuits.

The man who limits Sociology to social phenomena has no voice in sociological ethics. The facts to which he limits himself say nothing on the subject. Whoever says that ethics *ought* to be excluded from Sociology, has already admitted the *ought* as a legitimate object of inquiry. If he has an ideal of Sociology which excludes ethics, how can he claim that Sociology is limited to social facts and the historic method, and therefore has nothing to do with ideals?

[1] Let any one read what Comte says of ethical factors under the head of Social Physics if he wants to learn what prominence is given to ethical subjects in the Positive Philosophy.

In claiming ethics as inherent in Sociology, we of course regard Sociology as more than a "descriptive" science. That this is a misnomer has already been shown. Science is rational, not less, but the more so, because it strictly adheres to facts as its data. Only an irrational exclusion of thinking from phenomena can prevent the inclusion of sociological ethics in the social science.

Mr. Spencer is more guarded than Comte; but one need only look at the close of his third volume of "Principles" to see that he cannot avoid ethical considerations. These are involved in his discussion of individualism and socialism, as well as of other subjects.

Mr. Giddings' position may seem to exclude sociological ethics. When he defines Sociology as "an explanation of social phenomena in terms of natural causation," he makes this more specific by saying, "Sociology is an interpretation of social phenomena in terms of psychical activity, organic adjustment, natural selection, and the conservation of energy."[1] But in spite of the *a priori* reduction of "psychical activity" to "natural causation," his definition does not exclude ethics. The "psychical activity" constantly deals with ethical factors. Hence we find on the next two pages that an "end" of society is recognized, and also an "ideal." "The function of society is to develop conscious life and to create human personality; and to that end it now exists. It is conscious association with his fellows that develops man's moral nature. . . . Accordingly, we may say that the function of social organization, which the sociologist must always keep in view, is the evolution of the personality through ever higher stages until it attains to the ideal that we name humanity."

[1] Principles of Sociology, 419.

In making a separate division of sociological ethics we simply propose to treat systematically an essential factor in Sociology which is now so generally treated casually and in a desultory manner. Sociology is "strictly an explanatory science," as Mr. Giddings says, and so we propose to resort to all legitimate means for explaining the ethics of society. When we are informed that society has a "function," an "end," an "ideal," and that it develops "man's moral nature," we take the statements seriously. These are the very things with which sociological ethics is concerned, and we ask for nothing more than to be permitted to treat these subjects scientifically.

In sociological ethics we deal with the social ideal and the means of its realization. When we have found the standard of what society ought to be, we can make it the measure of past attainments. Historians constantly apply their ideals as tests of men and measures. Injustice may of course be done personalities and institutions of the past if judged by our age instead of their own. Care must be taken not to attribute to them our own ideal. The chief value of sociological ethics, however, consists in the fact that it not merely gives us a test of society, but also becomes our guide in social action. We take ethics here in its broadest sense, involving all the interests and the total welfare of society. Instead of confining it to morals in a narrow sense, we include in it all that pertains to association, such as education, the industries, politics, and the other factors which apply to social well-being. It is our aim to discover the principles and laws of social progress.

Discussions of ethical elements in society abound, but we have no sociological ethics; that is, we have no ethics as a component part of Sociology, so organically

related to the other two divisions as to form a complete sociological system. We distinguish between social ethics and sociological ethics; the former is *a* social science, the latter an integral part of *the* social science; the former is a system by itself and can enter into social details; the latter confines itself to general ethical principles, and considers these not by themselves, but in their relation to all the other social forces. Social ethics treats the ethical factor as abstracted, isolated from the other social factors; in sociological ethics, however, the ethical factor is treated in connection with all the other factors in the social organism. In the one case, then, we look for social ethical abstraction, isolation, detail; in the other, for what is inherent in the organism and general. The two have a common ground in principles; but it is peculiar to sociological ethics that the correlation of ethics to the total factors of the social organism is considered; and in social ethics it is peculiar to consider ethical details of societies, which are omitted in sociological ethics.

The sense in which we use sociological ethics is easily apprehended. Social ethics proposes to give a system of social morality; in sociological ethics we aim to give the principles of social progress. The view thus taken in sociological ethics is thoroughly ethical, considering what ought to be, in distinction from what must be and from what has been, in order that the utmost social progress may be promoted.[1]

[1] In sociological ethics, as in the other two divisions, society is viewed as an organism. In other words, nothing in society is treated as isolated, but as in organic connection with all the other social factors. In the social relations the dominance of ethics is to be established. This cannot be done by separating the ethical factor from the other social forces and developing it by itself, but only by correlating it with the other forces as subordinate to it and as subservient to ethical principles.

It has already been shown that religion is one of the most powerful of

In some respects our third division is more difficult than the other two, and certainly not less important. Indeed, the majority of social investigators are apt to regard the other divisions valuable in proportion as they culminate in the third and promote social development. We must go to society *per se* and to its historical evolution in order to determine what is required for future progress. We cannot use the forces at work in society unless we understand their nature and operations; so the actuality of society must be studied in order to learn what is still required. The social worker, no less than the artist, must understand the nature of the material he is intent on shaping into his ideal.

Social reforms are in the air; earnest workers think that these reforms absorb the mission of the age. Many of the reformatory efforts, hasty and shallow, are in danger of retarding the progress they seek to promote. The work itself rests on a false basis, the means are inadequate, and the very names of reforms and reformers are liable to become a byword and reproach. The deep and difficult work demanded requires more than good intentions and an altruistic impulse. It is the purpose of our discipline to transform the altruistic impulse into rational and permanent purpose.

Our age has developed a mania for the exposure of social ills. Criticism of the most radical kind goes hand in hand with negation and destruction. "After us

the social forces. Its connection with ethics is peculiarly intimate. Although religion primarily indicates the relation between God and man, it may also exert the strongest influence on the relation of man to man. The latter relation is here viewed as predominantly ethical. The unparalleled ethical principles of the New Testament are indissolubly connected with the religious teachings. In various places, most elaborately in 1 Cor. xii., the figure of the body and its members shows that the ideal of Christian society is a perfect social organism, the very thing aimed at in sociological ethics.

the deluge," say the apostles of annihilation; and they care not when the waters shall subside and the green earth appear again. No wonder that, when all the energies are exhausted in efforts at destruction, none are left for construction. Yet if the destructive forces are to be beneficial, the positive, edifying ones must be connected with them. The best destruction may be by construction, just as disease is destroyed by promoting health, and darkness vanishes by letting in the light. Where truth enters, error is doomed. Evolution may work the most thorough revolution, just as education overthrows ignorance. Root out an evil merely, and the briers may flourish more luxuriantly than ever; but plant a good tree in its place and no room will be left for evil to strike root. Regenerative forces are required; but how shall they be secured? Speculation may help us; it must, however, be supplemented by an investigation of past remedial agencies, the method of their application and the manner of their working, the power of the individual and of collective action, the value of education, of religion, morals, the family, the church, the state, and other institutions and organizations.

It is important to distinguish between what is desirable and possible. That we cherish ideals in ethics does not imply that we deem perfection attainable. It is a goal toward which progress moves. Carlyle is right: "Alas! we know that ideals can never be completely embodied in practice. Ideals must ever lie a great way off, — and we will thankfully content ourselves with any not intolerable approximation thereto." Not less true is it that the ideal is the ultimate goal of ethical action and the strongest impulse to moral purpose.

Men who consider only what is desirable are apt to become visionary and to attain no practical results.

Progress is gradual; and we must start from what has been attained in order wisely to take the next step forward. We cannot do to-morrow's work to-day. The effective ethical idealism is thus also the strictest ethical realism. Where shall we get our seeds for future sowing, except from the harvests of the past?

Among the most important distinctions in social work is that between a temporary removal of ills and a permanent cure. It is one thing to save a few drunkards, and another to remove the causes of intemperance. So with poverty, with strikes, and all the evils of the day; momentary relief must be distinguished from permanent remedy. Certain influences are thus found to have their day, while others abide; it is those that are permanent which necessarily have the greatest value. This gives a definite aim to ethics; whatever temporary relief may be furnished, the ultimate aim should always be the establishment of the purest continuous social environment and the best permanent institutions. These things abide, while the individual passes away. Thus an improvement in language, in literature, in education, in the family relation, in the state and civic institutions, and in other lasting social arrangements, influences whole generations and may abide as long as time itself. It is for this reason that the great benefactors of humanity have established new or improved principles, have corrected theories and purified systems, and have founded institutions of lasting benefit to society.

We cannot enter into an elaborate discussion of what is included in sociological ethics. It will be an advantage to consider ethical questions in the light of the progress of humanity itself, and equally so to view all social action from the sociological standpoint, instead of treating each social force as abstracted and isolated. The

principles of the great social problem, of the burning questions of the day, of socialism, communism, anarchism, all find their place in this division. Social rights and social duties, liberty, equality, fraternity, are involved.

Social progress must necessarily be slow and imperfect so long as the old method of considering the individuals of society as the ultimate social analysis continues. How can we expect the social forces to be properly understood and used to the best advantage before we discover them in the personality and distinguish them from what remains individual and private in that personality? Our greatest hope of progress consists in concentrating attention and effort on these social forces, in sharply distinguishing them from what remains private in the individual, and in properly developing their power, their interaction, and their results, the associations. It is only by mastering these social forces that the sociologist gets control of the powers by means of which social progress is accomplished.

For social development we need to win the social personalities; but so long as individuals are regarded as composing society, these personalities need no longer be won, for society already has them. Let it, however, be recognized that society has not the individual, but only a fraction of him, much remaining unpossessed of what is really social; then a new purpose respecting him will be created. It will thenceforth become the aim to make social all he now ignorantly or fraudulently withholds from society. Education, ethics, the law of the land, and religion will make it their mission to make a social conquest of the social personality.

The social organism will also be better understood. Its true nature being known, the energies can be more

wisely directed to its development. The economic, political, and religious forces can be studied as organically united, as constantly interacting. It will become evident that to treat them as isolated or as abstractions is a perversion. By thus concentrating attention on the actual social energies, a knowledge and control of them, such as has heretofore been in vain sought, may be expected. We have a right to look for greater success when we cease handling merely the rough ore as it comes from the mountain, having learned the art of extracting the iron from it and using that only for our social ends.

The most varied application of this study of the social energies can be made to all social forms and institutions. When we have learned what particular forces constitute a society, we can inquire how they ought to work. We know that economic forces control industrial associations; and we know also that these associations need ethical forces. An institution which is a concentration of various forces sometimes needs to make dominant a force now subordinate; thus many a state would be transformed if it made the highest interests, instead of the lower, supreme, and if the energy of statesmanship dominated over the Philistine forces of degraded politicians. Thus every social group and institution can be tested by its social forces, and progress will consist in developing the forces, in adding new ones, or in changing the relative dominance of the forces.

The emphasis we place on the permanent social energies does not mean that the persons who are in society are underestimated. These persons receive the benefit of the enduring forces. Each generation begins its work at the beginning, with such advantages as are conferred by heredity and by the social accumulations of culture. The children do not begin in intellect and

morals where their fathers ended; but they must achieve their own intellectuality and morality amid the treasures of past evolutions. Intellect and ethics are not pushed on from generation to generation, as money and land are transmitted; but the conditions for intellectual and moral development are given; and as these conditions vary with the ages, so do the opportunities of society and individuals. What shall be made of these opportunities depends on persons themselves. Just as diseases are contagious but not health, so what is worst in an age may be absorbed while what is best is missed. Not by unconscious absorption, but only by personal energy can reason and ethics be made supreme.

By permanent social forces we mean such as are in persons and their environment, but work so constantly as not to be affected by the passing away of individuals. They continue because embodied in social institutions which endure from generation to generation and mould the generations themselves.

In making a special division of sociological ethics our subject is lifted out of the ordinary processes of natural law. Ethical considerations are based on the supposition that man is not resistlessly pushed forward by physical causes, but it is taken for granted that he can set a goal for himself toward which to move. He can resist the operation of particular forces, choose the end for which he will live, and bend all his energies toward the attainment of that end. Whoever appreciates the value of teleological action knows its superiority to the vulgar conception of life as a mere struggle for existence, in which the survival of what is called the fittest is the result. Even when life means more than existence, when it includes what is commonly called well-being, it is a mistake to suppose that life itself is

necessarily the end of existence. Those whose conception is most exalted are inclined to regard life as not an end in itself, but as means to an end. Thus life is estimated for what of truth and beauty and goodness it can appropriate and advance. Those who live for an idea subordinate life to it; and they prefer to adhere to that idea and let life go, rather than retain life and lose the idea.

So prominent has the contemplation of natural law and of historic processes as the working of this law become, that for some the teleological view hardly exists. Social evolution for them is a vegetative process, with whose course rational choice and voluntary purpose have little or nothing to do. For such our third division does not constitute an integral part of Sociology. Yet deliberate purpose has had much to do with social development in the past, and it will increase its force in proportion as social advance is made in the future. While purposive action has heretofore been so largely confined to individual ends, we have a right to expect that it will be more and more directed to social ends as Sociology distinguishes the social from the private forces, as society itself gains in prominence, as altruism takes the place of selfishness, and as social progress is studied and appreciated. It has been said that with his purposes a man himself grows; and with the dominance of social themes as never before, with the advance of sociological study, and with the steady increase of social interests, we have a right to expect the growth of the social personality at the expense of the selfish personality, and a corresponding growth of effort in behalf of social welfare.

As a practical division of our subject the following classification will help the beginner.

1. *The Ethical Ideal.*

This involves the question of the ultimate aim in social action. Suppose that we could at once transform it, what should we make society? Is the individual the ultimate aim, or some organization or institution, as the family, the church, the state; or is it humanity, or humanity in its associated capacity?

It is quite common to regard individual welfare as the ultimate aim. To those who regard individuals as the constituent elements of society, such a conception is not surprising. They think individual feeling is to be promoted, the feeling of pleasure, happiness. Such an end, however, arouses serious doubt. The feeling of pleasure is so subjective, depending on so many peculiar individual conditions, that it is hardly conceivable how so subjective and variable an object can be the aim of all social action. What gives one pleasure causes pain in another. J. S. Mill, in his "Autobiography," assures us that experience taught him that personal happiness is missed, or apt to be missed, when made the direct aim of life, that it is more sure of being secured if some other purpose is chosen as the object of life, when pleasure comes in incidentally, of itself.[1]

[1] The interesting passage, contained in Chapter V., is as follows: "I never, indeed wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken *en passant*, without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be inefficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of

Those who regard pleasure as necessarily the aim of life make a serious mistake. They forget that the reason can select an aim, say truth, not because it affords pleasure, but because it is the truth. The man, indeed, chooses it because he values it most highly, but he values it most highly because it is the truth, not because it affords most pleasure. The mind has the power of abstracting the truth from all considerations of pleasure, and of choosing it for its own sake, regardless of the pleasure or pain the choice involves.

Another and still more serious objection arises when we make individual happiness the aim and end of social progress. So long as only individuals were seen in society, no other definite object could well be presented as the social aim. Society consisting of individuals, their welfare meant the welfare of society. But now we have society without absorbing in it the individuals, and therefore we are able to make social progress itself the social aim. It need hardly be said that we do not abstract this social progress from the individuals in society.

We ought to expect the end of social progress to be the perfection of society itself, not the feeling of an individual, who is only in part in society as a social per-

life. Let your self-consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, exhaust themselves on that; and if otherwise fortunately circumstanced you will inhale happiness with the air you breathe, without dwelling on it, or thinking about it, without either forestalling it in imagination, or putting it to flight by fatal questioning. This theory now became the basis of my philosophy of life. And I still hold to it as the best theory for all those who have but a moderate degree of sensibility and of capacity for enjoyment, that is, for the great majority of mankind."

We may well wonder whether, if personal happiness is missed when made the direct aim of the individual, happiness is not also likely to be missed if made the aim of society. If individual happiness is felt to be insufficient when made the personal aim, must it not be still more so if made the social aim? The logic of the passage is against the choice of happiness as in any case the end of life.

sonality. The well-being of society as the end to be attained by social progress means that the social forces are to be made as perfect as possible; that all of the individual belonging to society be given to society; that the interaction of the social forces be made healthy; and that the societies formed by this interaction be complete in themselves and rightly related to one another. The perfection of society is thus the ethical aim of society.

It is beyond question that such a social state will have the most marked effect on individuals. Society cannot make them happy; it cannot force their subjective state into happiness. But while leaving to individuals what belongs to them, society makes the very conditions which individual welfare requires. Indeed, since the personality in which the private and social forces are not absolutely separated acts as a unit, we expect the perfection of the private forces to develop toward perfection parallel with the individual's social forces. A perfect society thus involves the perfection of the individual, though that society itself is composed only of the social forces of individuals.

Social perfection, then, is the aim of social progress. This is the immediate as well as the ultimate aim, without any side-glances at this or that effect on the individual. Only when it considers the total social organism is ethics sociological.

Under this general aim come many specific purposes as subordinate, and yet all contributory to the same end. Thus we are called on to deal directly with concrete evils about us. So vast is the realm of social needs that our severe limitations may oblige us to confine our studies and work to special departments. The stream of social progress is composed of many tributaries, and we may find it necessary to confine ourselves to a single

tributary. Even in that case an ideal toward which to work is required. Always the aim is the best sociation and most perfect social development. Whatever department may be chosen as a specialty, it should not be viewed as isolated, but as an integral part of the social organism.

The attention is naturally concentrated by persons on the particular social groups to which they belong. Each group has its ideal; but Sociology is concerned about societies as parts of society. Hence its aim is the progress of society, of social humanity, and of societies as its constituent elements. There is to be no one-sided development of a particular social force or social product, but of all social forces and products together and harmoniously, of the social organism as an organism.

As already intimated, the process is essentially constructive. When our age has been pronounced strong in criticism and destruction, but weak in construction, the charge is very serious. Destruction may, of course, be the way to construction, as the removal of rubbish prepares the way for the foundation of a building; but in that case the destruction itself aims at, and ends in, construction. But sometimes destruction itself seems ultimate, just as the habit of war may lead to slaughter for the sake of slaughter. Scholarship may become possessed by the spirit of nihilism. We are sure that evils can best be overcome, and the good best promoted, by positive and constructive efforts.

The ideal of social progress, therefore, involves such a constructive development of society as will eliminate the evils by unfolding the good. With economics at the foundation, the higher interests are to be reared on it. Economics as the beginning and end of society cannot bear the light of reason. Progress develops economics, but

builds on it intellectuality and morality. Progress consists in giving the supremacy to sociological ethics, individual and social ethics being its ministers.

2. *The Ethical Actuality.*

One thing the dominance of natural science has impressed on all departments of thought: the value of reality and the importance of facts as its interpreter. The actuality is the source of all laws, the ground of speculation, and the basis of valid systems. There is a rigid logic in social progress; it must not only start with the attainment already made, but likewise be adapted to it. Like the solution of a proposition in geometry, the next step in ethics can be taken only if all on which it depends has preceded. All improvement, therefore, like education, depends on systematic progress. A Roger Bacon may be so far in advance of his age that he leaves little direct impression on it, except that he was in league with the black art; only when society catches up with him does it learn the lessons he tried to teach. The social actuality must be known in order that there may be economy of effort, no attempt being made to do again what has already been done; in order that what is yet required may be learned; in order that the social factors to be moulded and developed may be understood; and in order that the next social step which logically follows may be taken. These considerations indicate the importance of considering thoroughly the social actuality as the substance to be shaped into the social ideal.

Even then we learn that but an imperfect notion of the progress actually attained by humanity is within our reach. The present state of mankind is anything but homogeneous. An infinite variety is presented by the stages of development from barbarism to enlightenment which now exist. However confusing the scene when

the whole of humanity is viewed, it is not so difficult to obtain a conception of the actuality as formed in a limited sphere, as a social group, a community, or even a state. Such a conception may be sufficient for the practical purposes toward which efforts for social reform are usually directed.

3. *The Means for Realizing the Ideal of Progress.*

Definiteness of purpose is of first importance, since that determines the nature and direction of the progressive efforts. There can be no rational ethical work in behalf of society without keeping in view the end to be attained and the actuality to be transformed.

In sociological ethics we never lose sight of the fact that society itself, the total social organism, is to be developed. Among the benefits derived from the study of Sociology is the comprehensive view it gives of society as inclusive of humanity. This enlarged conception enables each one to appreciate himself as related not merely to his family and immediate social environment, but likewise to the whole of mankind. This saves the individual from a false, narrow patriotism, as well as from degrading selfishness. With this enlarged conception the individual is enlarged and his social work augmented in point of importance. This comprehensive view, which embraces humanity as the aim of social progress, does not interfere with ethical effort in a limited sphere. Indeed, it is through specific work in a particular department that the best efforts in behalf of humanity are likely to be made. But however specific the work and limited the sphere, it is to be inspired by the consciousness that it is for the entire human family.

This far-reaching view is involved in the very conception of the social organism, a totality with which all social groups are in vital connection. The ethical de-

velopment of a family, a voluntary association, or the state, is the progress of humanity in a limited sphere. In all progressive movement there is a diffusive power. Others are inspired by it and affected by its contagious influence. Thus even unconsciously moral views and acts are promoted; still more will they be advanced when made a direct aim and when means to the attainment of the end are adopted. In view of the organic solidarity of humanity no course of any of its factors can be indifferent.

The subject is too large for adequate discussion here. Everywhere the aim must be the translation of the social ideals into the social actuality. Practically, of course, it is a task of details; but even the principles cannot be fully considered here. The development of the social personality as a specific aim in education; the perfection of existing social groups and organizations; the evolution of the state; the creation of new associations to meet special needs; making dominant the forces which are actually supreme, but in reality subordinated: these are among the chief aims. A deeper investigation of the working of organizations is likewise required. This working may retard as well as promote progress. An idea that needs organized forces for its promotion is made the reason for association; but long after that idea has received the deserved recognition and the age has passed beyond it, the association is still tethered to it. Thus organizations foster a conservatism that ends inquiry; they stand for a traditionalism which hinders progress; and existing for effete and stagnant elements which are embodied in the constitution, they fall behind the times and lose their original mission. It therefore becomes an important problem how far organizations must be destroyed or revolutionized for the sake of

social progress, and how far new organizations are required.

Among the most important topics of sociological ethics is the perfecting of societies for the sake of perfecting the total social organism. What affects the parts affects the whole. It has been suggested that what individuals are to the social groups, that ought the states to be to humanity. Each state ought to be an ethical leaven for the whole human family. In order that this ideal may even in a small measure be attained, there must be a regeneration of states. So are they now devoured by selfishness that they behave more like sharks than like constituent parts of the same human organism. Might makes right. Colonization likely means rapacity and brutality. Who suspects the Concert of Powers to mean humanity? And what humane considerations are the inspiration of Jingoism?

Frequently the civilizing influence of the enlightened states is accidental rather than intentional. The knowledge and laws developed for home purposes are communicated to others and may prove a blessing to them; so commerce may promote civilization in some measure, in spite of the evils that attend it. But of what nation can it be said to-day that it recognizes itself as a responsible member of the great social organism, and its mission as an ethical leaven of humanity? Nations can give only what they have; what then is the character of their ethical influence?

At a time when extreme communistic views threaten to lose the individual in the mass, it is no less important to consider the relation of the personality to social progress. So great an emphasis may be placed on organized effort as to attract attention away from personal responsibility for social welfare. Much will be gained when

the individual discovers that a proper regard for self involves a proper regard for society. Selfishness is the death of sociality; but a true self-regard is increased when one recognizes his social personality as a constituent part of the social organism. A true individuality is the condition for the highest personal social power. The man who does not appreciate himself cannot appreciate others; if we are to love others as ourselves, then a decrease of self-love justifies a decrease of love for others. No man can find his proper place or perform his mission, unless he recognizes himself as a member of the great social organism of all ages and of all humanity.

We distinguish between the perfection of the social mechanism in which individuals move, and the perfection of the social personalities. The individual in society is restrained by social etiquette; he adapts himself to existing manners and customs. Whatever his own convictions may be, for the sake of others he respects certain traditions. Long before able to think or act for himself, the individual breathes the atmosphere of the family, and is moulded by the principles, faith, and practices of the home. The laws of the land are the boundaries in which the true citizens move.

These permanent institutions are an expression of society, but they outlive the society of any particular period. All who move within their sphere receive the influence embodied in them. Sometimes reformers claim that their aim is to reform institutions rather than individuals. Their meaning is that they want to improve the institutions in which all individuals move and by which they are affected. The advancement of these institutions means the advancement of the social organism, so that all the members may reap the benefit. If everywhere the family could be improved, then hu-

manity itself, all whose members belong to the family, would be improved. Better methods of education mean better influences on all who are educated. To lift the church on a higher plane involves the exaltation of its members. A better state, more equitable laws, and more efficient government will accrue to the welfare of all the citizens. Through individuals and organizations institutions are improved, and the improved institutions benefit all who are subject to their influence. The whole industrial world would be transformed if the ethical were made to dominate over the economic force, instead of being made subordinate.

The position that social science deals with what has been, but not with what ought to be, is illogical. If it has no place for ethics, then it admits its inability to deal even with the past. The admission is universal that it must interpret social phenomena. But in the phenomena to be interpreted those of an ethical nature are prominent. The social student is confronted by ethical systems, individual and social; history abounds in theories respecting what the family, the state, the church, and voluntary organizations ought to be; every law enacted comes with the force of an imperative; reforms have been inaugurated and reformatory institutions established; thus at every point in his investigations the historian meets moral problems and is obliged to pronounce moral judgment, if he wants to estimate the historical actuality. All through history, therefore, we have the imperative as well as the indicative mood.[1]

What now is to be the attitude of the sociological student to the ethical facts, demands, theories, and institutions which he encounters in studying what has been? It is his mission to interpret them like all other social phenomena. But this involves an ethical system as the test of historical ethics.

Sociological ethics is thus involved in the very affirmation that Sociology deals with the actuality of human society. The ethical factor belongs to the weightiest actuality.

Those who insist on making ethics a product of evolution will

[1] Cohn, "System der Nationalökonomie," i., 75–78.

of course put it on a level with the other evolutionary products in Sociology and demand its recognition in the social system; and all who recognize the scientific character of ethics will demand that it be incorporated in the science of society as a constituent social factor.

In sociological ethics, as shown above, we do not limit the discussion to what is ordinarily called morality, but include all the elements of social progress, whether pertaining to the natural environment, the body, the intellect, the emotions, or the will. Those who object to this inclusiveness, and insist on confining sociological ethics solely to the elements of morality, ought to consider whether society can be truly ethical by abstracting morality from humanity and treating it as something by itself, unconnected and unrelated. Society can be truly ethical only if the social forces receive their proper place and development in the social organism. It is not ethical to develop the heart at the expense of the intellect, or the will at the expense of the emotions. There must be harmony, unity, completeness. Sociological ethics could not be complete if any element of social progress were neglected. From the point of view taken by Sociology it is immoral to separate morality from its organic connections and develop it in a one-sided manner.

There can be no mistake with respect to the attitude of sociological ethics toward the theory which treats evolution as something to which society is subject, but over which it has no control. We can recognize the power of mechanical processes in social affairs without ignoring the power of volition. The perversion begins when psychology forgets the inherent energy of the mind and enslaves the personality to its environment. The true nature of many social processes is missed by the failure to recognize teleological action, rational ideals, and human initiative, in human society. The cardinal distinction between the unalterable working of a natural law, and the ability of man to use that unalterable law for his rational ends, is overlooked. Thus instead of being blindly and irresistibly pushed forward by an evolutionary force which works through environment, heredity, habit, and custom, men can be controlled by reason, can oppose the natural evolution, and can choose to move themselves instead of being pushed resistlessly on.

We but give the environment its due when we again emphasize

the necessity of considering the nature of that which is environed. Imagination may likewise attribute to heredity what no scientific induction warrants. Some theories of heredity seem ready to restore the "innate ideas" which Locke thought he had annihilated; but all that can be postulated at birth is certain capacities, whose development depends on environment and on personal energy.

The real supremacy of mind, if duly recognized, will again emancipate thought and enthrone reason. We do not mean that speculation is now wildly, as in former times, to spread its wings and soar in aerial realms; the advance of science has made that impossible. But it means that to the modern emphasis on reality shall be added the real energy of thought in the search for truth, as exercised by the profound thinkers from Socrates to Lotze.

Professor Bastian, one of the first of living ethnologists, in taking the Philosophical Society of Berlin through the Ethnological Museum of that city, explained the process of development from the savage to the civilized stage, using the rich treasures of the collections as illustrations. He laid special stress on man's subjection to nature in the lower stages of culture. "But," he said, "the serious mistake made by Buckle is, that he thought what is true of man in his savage state is also true of him during all the stages of development, namely, that he always remains under the dominion of his environment. The truth, however, is, that man frees himself from his environment in proportion as he rises in civilization, so that instead of being nature's slave he becomes its master." In this ability to rise superior to his environment we have the condition for the formation of ethical ideals.

We have not the conditions for determining scientifically just why certain objects are chosen by the mind as the aim of its teleological action. Therefore it is far more scientific to confess our ignorance in this respect than to attribute the end chosen to environment, to heredity, or to the mechanical working of some unknown law. The mind itself is not sufficiently known or under our control for us to say definitely what is inherent in it and what is due to the environment. The very fact, however, that the mind can and does act teleologically lifts it out of the mechanism of nature, — a fact of momentous significance in social affairs, and most of all in sociological ethics.[1]

[1] Haeckel ("The Evolution of Man," chapter v.) says: "Erasmus Darwin transmitted to his grandson Charles, according to the law of latent transmission

The reality of the past, based on the history of what has actually occurred, naturally impresses us more than any conception of the future. Yet for the past, which has made its indelible record, we can do nothing; at best we can only appropriate what it has wrought. We can, however, devote our energies to the future, which can do nothing for us. It therefore seems unreasonable to take a deep interest in the past and none in what is yet to come to pass, unless we are intent solely on having something done for us, not considering what we can do for others.

The indefiniteness of the future compared with the solid actuality of the past, may lead some sociologists to emphasize the historical evolution of society, while they have no room for sociological ethics. The same reason may make it difficult to interest persons in a progress which is not tangible but pertains to coming generations. Not many recognize their solidarity with humanity sufficiently to take an earnest interest in benefits to be reaped through their efforts by others, but which they themselves shall not share. We have a right, however, to expect the study of Sociology to intensify the conviction of this solidarity.

In sociological ethics the idea of progress is of especial significance. So long as the notion itself remains vague the principles it involves will be obscure.

Respecting both the nature of progress and the objects to be benefited by it, different views have prevailed. Hardly any one in an enlightened land would now regard an individual, say a monarch, or an imperial family like that of Russia, as the sole or chief recipient of the blessings of progress. The general trend in favor of equalization is depriving the nobility and aristocracy of the claim to supreme consideration. There is still class dominion and class legislation, giving peculiar advantages to a select few; but the prevalent theory, at least in free countries, whatever the practice may be, regards the people, without the old artificial distinctions, as the objects of well-being and of exaltation. It is, however, astonishing how recent this conception of the aim of progress is, and in how small a part of the human race it even now prevails.

(Atavism), certain molecular movements of the cells in the ganglia of his powerful brain, which had not made their appearance in his son Robert." Molecular movements transmitted to a grandson is surely remarkable. How is it known, or can it be known, that they were transmitted?

When we limit our inquiries to particular spheres, the nature of progress does not seem difficult. There are gradual increments which escape observation; but the results become evident in long periods. Epochs also occur when great improvements are suddenly introduced. Ocular demonstrations can be given of the development from the use of tallow candle for light to that of electricity; no less marked is the progress from Fulton's simple steam engine to the vast and complicated machinery which propels our largest ocean steamers. The advances made throughout the ages can also be traced when we pass from a single object to large departments of human thought and skill, as in letters, in philosophy and science, in æsthetics, politics, and economics. History makes a specialty of these subjects. But it is not so easy to furnish a concise definition of human progress which gives only its essence while inclusive of all its details.

Progress is not mere movement, but movement which means actual advance. It is growth, development; but evils may grow and result in deterioration. Human progress always stands for improvement, for advance toward a desirable goal, toward an ideal. It consists in the evolution of something in itself valuable, in unfolding truth and destroying error, in creating more of the good and making the good better.

Progress solves old problems and perhaps discovers in the solutions greater problems than the ones solved. The advancing movement of the ages consists of solutions and revelations of problems. We master a system and pass beyond it; we catch up with a thinker and can dispense with him who formerly seemed indispensable; we get the contents of an age and move on toward the next; we drop something, but always get more than we lose; whatever has abiding qualities is preserved in the higher form into which it is developed. There is the tragedy of death as well as the joy of birth in progress.

We must not forget that to hand down the achievements of the past is but one factor in the process of culture. What is thus transmitted promotes civilization only if personally appropriated and elaborated. An Aristotle may be obscured for ages because the appreciation of his works is lacking, and even the Bible may be a buried treasure.

The ultimate aim of social progress cannot be anything short of social perfection. All the parts and forces and functions of

society are to be made perfect. Just what this most advanced perfect stage must be cannot be described beforehand. It is a general idea toward which all social progress is to tend, the definiteness of the idea increasing in proportion to its realization.

At each particular social stage it is not so difficult to determine what elements of progress are specially in demand. Certain ills are to be removed, certain excellences to be promoted. So far as practicable, the progress sought at any age is to be a stage in the development toward social perfection. But the strongest impulse to progress is in the felt needs of an age, not in any remote ideal. "The distant future of a country is so unimportant by the side of its immediate needs to the men in possession, that even if they were reasonably certain that a particular evil ought to be guarded against at an immediate sacrifice, they would rarely be possessed of the moral force required for the effort. As a matter of fact, however, only a few persons can feel reasonably certain as to the future, because only a few busy themselves with distant speculations." (Pearson, "National Life and Character," pp. 9–10). It is also to be considered that those who want to affect the future must do it through the generation in which they live.

It is clear that the individuals in society are to share in the progress. As we have seen, individual and social progress are organically connected. The individual is to share the development of society, just as society is to be a partaker of the advancement of the social personality. This, however, is very different from making individual feeling the aim of social progress. Society has in itself the end of its development, not something outside of itself.

In sociological ethics we have both a science and an art; the art is, however, but an application of the science, and can be treated as a corollary of the science. We need not hesitate to include the principles of this art in Sociology. The science of sociological ethics treats of principles: what ought to be, what the social ideal is, what the social good is, what is right, and what should be the aim in social action. As an art, social ethics seeks to realize the ideal. The worker is an artist who takes the social actuality as the material which he is to shape. For the individual, for every social group, and for society at large, this ethical transformation of the actuality into the ideal is the practical problem. As Michael Angelo shapes the rough block of marble into a Moses

or a David, so the social worker wants to shape the social reality into a form which now exists only in his mind. What is subjective, a mere mental concept, is to be made objective. For complete ethics both the scientific and the artistic concepts are essential.

Schäffle (i. 195) shows the importance of studying the actual situation. He says: "Whoever does not understand and consider the existing social condition, with respect both to what is good and to what is bad, will neither be able to explain the historic processes of the past, nor to accomplish social reforms, however good his intentions may be."

The relation of the individual conscience to what may be analogically, not literally, called the social conscience is important. Shall the individual be independent in his ethical judgments, setting himself against society, his personal convictions against those which are historical, his notion of right against that of the community? One is more apt to be mistaken, we are told, than the social consensus of the past and the present. Yet what is the individual worth if his morality is a kind of public contagion, if his convictions are not his personal elaboration and possession, and if he does not maintain them at all hazards? The common morality is the popular test, and he who falls below it is condemned as inferior; but it is equally certain that distinction in excellence is to be obtained only by rising above the ordinary level. The social conscience reveals itself in the press, in laws, in customs, in traditions, institutions, creeds, and political parties. What is called public morality is frequently nothing but public legality; from the ethics of the individual personality, social morality must necessarily be distinguished.

We must distinguish between quantitative and qualitative progress. The quantitative consists in the multiplication of the same kind of objects or forces; the qualitative in the improvement of the objects or forces. In the one case there is a growth in mass, in the other a development of the character of the mass. Thus in a nation we can distinguish between the increase of population, say from three to seventy millions, and the intellectual and moral development of the people. The same kinds of societies can be multiplied, or the societies themselves improved.

Let us suppose that the highest of the existing social organizations is so multiplied as continually to include a larger portion of

humanity, what will the effect be? The benefits of that organization will be spread and a constantly growing number of human beings blessed by it. The freedom attained by one people can in this way exert a contagious influence on others.

But great as the blessings thus conferred are, it is only the working and diffusing throughout humanity of an already existing leaven, not the introduction of a new power. This new power is gained by the creation of something better than now exists, by an improvement in the social forces and in their working. Even those interested in processes of civilization seem, as a rule, more intent on the spread of civilization than on attaining a higher civilization than that already existing.

How is a higher civilization than that now existing to be attained? We cherish the hope that the answer to this will be furnished by the study of Sociology, especially by the development of sociological ethics. Much will be gained by the social education of the individual, that is, by such a development of his social forces that whatever of him belongs to society shall be given to society. This will insure a direct development of the social forces themselves, the primitive elements of society. The sociological conception of the individual as an integral factor of humanity must stimulate his sociological thinking, feeling, and volition, so that he will rise above a conception which is limited to self and to the various societies joined by him. The interests, the affections, and the activities will be enlarged and exalted.

The heightening of the social forces is not, however, the only means for attaining a higher civilization. There can be improvement in the interaction of these forces and in the associations formed. Not only are there in civilization forces not found in barbarism, but the mechanism of the forces is improved, as we have seen, and the societies formed are made superior. Thus there may be an advance in social aims, in the objects of social interest, in the means for attaining these objects, and in the results of social action.

Among primitive people exertion that leads to progress seems to be the result of necessity, of the natural and social environment, far more than of an innate progressive impulse. We can well imagine an absence of competition and of the need of exertion which means the peace of the graveyard.

On the other hand, there may be in individuals and societies an

inner impulse toward progress, particularly in higher stages of culture. As the body grows from infancy to manhood, so there may be stages of the harmonious development of society, just as the mind may attain an intellectual development which shall contain an impulse to deeper and broader knowledge, and higher and purer truth.

Ward discusses in his second volume numerous subjects which pertain to sociological ethics, such as teleology, progress, and the end to be attained.

In "The Social Problem" the author of this Introduction discusses the ethical aspects of many of the social problems of the day.

REFLECTIONS.

What is meant by Social Ethics as a Part of Sociology? What it includes. Relation to Individual Ethics. Exact Aim of Social Progress. Explanation of the Trend to subordinate the Individual to Society and make Social Ethics supreme. What Aid is furnished Social Ethics by the Principles of Society *per se* and by Social Evolution? Individual and Social Responsibility. Criminals as Social Products. The Ground of Responsibility. Evolution and Revolution in Progress. Conservative, Radical, and Progressive Elements. Destructive and Constructive Forces. Reform and Regeneration. Basis for Union of Reforms. The Permanent and the Variable Elements in Social Progress. Does the Aim to develop Great Personalities conflict with the aim to elevate the Masses? How far does an Advance to higher Social Forms affect the lower Social Forms? Distinction between the Improvement of the Social Organism and Individual Improvement. Importance of improving Social Institutions. Reasons for Sociological Ethics. Review of the Chapter.

Completeness of the Division of Sociology.

Sociological ethics completes the division of our subject. A review of the scheme thus presented gives a clear, comprehensive, and exhaustive analysis of Soci-

ology; that is, there is nothing which pertains to sociological principles and phenomena which does not find its place in these divisions. Each of the three divisions furnishes a distinct subject, each is extensive and rich enough as a department for separate treatment, and neither of them includes material foreign to Sociology. The main difficulty consists in the vastness, the variety, and the complexity of the materials.

But even with these three divisions, is not the subject unmanageable? For the second division subdivisions may be necessary, such as have been indicated. Thus the genesis of society can be divided into the evolution of the various social forms and stages of culture: how primitive society developed, how civilization began, and how the highest civilization was attained; the family, the state, the church, voluntary organizations can also be treated separately. The conditions, causes, and degrees of culture in different nations can also be discussed, as the social development of the Hebrews,[1] Greeks, Romans, and more recent peoples of Europe and America. After the general idea of Sociology has been attained, it may be most profitable to take up the evolution of society in general, and then specialize by taking up certain periods, nations, and institutions. Even for a general idea of Sociology a thorough study of different social groups is essential, leading the student from an institution, a social organization, or some particular phase of culture to the science of society. For the apprehension of society as a totality, it is important for the beginner to trace the connection between

[1] From the ethical point of view, Israel is by far the most interesting and most important of the peoples of antiquity. This is due both to the character of the social arrangements and to the completeness of the account given of them in the Old Testament.

allied social groups, then between those less closely related, also between such as are in conflict with one another, thus following the social bonds throughout a nation to internationalism and humanity.

Whatever our analysis for purposes of clearness and specialization, we need the comprehensive scheme given in the divisions for an exhaustive conception of society. Human association as a whole, embracing all kinds of societies, is the condition for understanding any particular social form. This is but saying that an organ can only be understood in its relation to the organism. Hence our emphasis on including in the science of society every kind of association, from the family to humanity. But it has been shown that this does not imply that now every element of society is the exclusive possession of Sociology. In many instances Sociology is perhaps only to furnish the large scheme or outline in which all the elements are included, and to indicate their place in the sociological system. It has been clearly stated that their independent development can then be left to specific social sciences. Economics and politics can continue as separate disciplines for independent development. The aim to make Sociology perfect may itself grow in distinctness, exactness, and comprehensiveness, in the process of sociological development. With the sole purpose of leading the student into the subject as our guide, we do not profess to mark out the exact course of sociological thought, or to determine the character of Sociology during any period of its progress. Our theory of prevision forbids this.

The student who wants to adopt only finished results, and to finish his education with their appropriation is out of his place in sociological investigations. Even the results already attained in Sociology cannot be

appropriated in that way. They must be earned to be possessed. The great truths of the science of society are not transmitted from teacher to pupil, but must be personally elaborated. Then there is a large still unexplored territory which the student should enter as a pioneer.

In many instances it would have been more easy to give accounts of institutions than to map out the work which requires the attention of the beginner, and to indicate the course for original investigation. Here our aim, however, is not to make finished sociologists, but to prepare the way for sociological investigation and to guide the sociological inquirer. Hence problems have been given, problems which involve the greatness of our subject, which are an inspiration to research, and which impel to efforts at solution. The true student masters what has been done, for the purpose of getting the means for accomplishing what yet remains to be done. The special application of this to sociological ethics is evident. Sociology without ethics is a torso.

It may require much reflection on the part of the beginner to apprehend clearly the vast amount of material included in the three divisions. Society as a totality is to be analyzed; the analysis must include all the contents of society, so that a synthesis of the parts found by the analysis gives the social totality. Our divisions give the analysis of the subject, and the synthesis of the divisions again gives us Sociology.

Let us suppose society represented by a tree. The soil and roots are the principles, the elements from which the tree grows and on which its life depends. The tree above ground represents the historic evolution; in the branches at different heights we see the various stages of evolution; in the fruit, the culmination of the growth, we behold the present. We then inquire whether in the roots and the trunk some conditions are not found for the improvement of the fruit in coming generations: that gives us sociological ethics.

Are there any more aspects in which society can be viewed?

Using terms of evolution, we say that there is something to be evolved, the original elements or principles; that we have the evolution itself, the history and present attainments of society; that there are definite tendencies toward the future, but that we can also treat the future teleologically, choosing a certain end (design), and then working for what we conceive ought to be. This teleology includes what men ought to be physically, intellectually, morally, spiritually, in their associated capacity.

REFLECTIONS.

Sociology as a Totality. Its Divisions and what they include. Does any Sociological Conception lie outside of these Divisions? Distinction between the Principles of Society *per se*, the Principles of Social Evolution, and the Principles of Sociological Ethics. Review of all the Divisions.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE METHOD IN THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.

The Problem. *Perhaps on account of the variety in the materials we ought rather to speak of* methods. *The course thus far pursued will make the subject more easy; we need but become fully conscious of the processes we have followed.*

Method, a plan of work; the aim, the complete mastery of a subject in the best way, according to the principles of utility. Owing to the neglect of method, the work of students is hap-hazard; they are not fully aware of what they do, because they do not know why they do it. Even if there are various ways of doing a thing, one may be superior to the rest.

The subject determines the method. Whatever unity may underlie the varied phenomena of the world, different methods are required for mathematics, chemistry, psychology, and social affairs. The different factors which enter the science of society may require different methods of treatment, and often it becomes a problem which *shall be adopted.*

The social present must be learned from personal observation and from the investigations of others. What others record of their investigations must be critically scrutinized, just as in the case of historical documents. The observation of social facts, still more than of natural facts, requires special training. When the facts are obtained,

we try to fathom their meaning and to learn their causes. We want to know how things became and why they became. No step beyond a mere knowledge of facts is possible without induction and deduction. Analysis is necessary, but also synthesis; indeed, in Sociology the analysis is for the sake of the synthesis. The growing importance attached to statistical inquiries in the science of society makes it necessary to determine their exact province and their limitations.

After it has been definitely stated what *is to be done by Sociology, we naturally take up the problem* how *it is to be done.*

By devoting a separate chapter to this important subject we can concentrate, develop, and supplement what was said about method in the preceding chapters. An elaborate inquiry is not necessary, since the method of our discipline is essentially the same as in the other humanistic studies and is frequently discussed in philosophy, particularly in works on logic. As this is not an introduction to Sociology, but to its study, such suggestions are offered as are likely to be of special service to beginners in social science. For them the subject, which is usually placed at the beginning, will be more easy here, after the preceding chapters have been studied. The very discipline in the method furnished by those chapters will aid them in understanding the subject. Particularly for those who want to make independent sociological investigations will a discussion of the method be valuable.

So universally is the *a priori* method now rejected in theory that there ought to be no necessity for discussing its abuses. While Sociology involves much that would formerly have been treated metaphysically and

speculatively, such a treatment would hardly be attempted consciously in our empirical era. No claim is made that society can be interpreted by postulating certain powers as inherent in human nature, and then speculating on the association and evolution which must result from their exercise. It is not possible to form any presupposition which will relieve us of the necessity of making the most careful inquiry into the immediate causes of social phenomena. Yet while with the theory on this subject there ought to be no question respecting the metaphysical principles, there is difficulty regarding the application. The assumptions with which Sociology has teemed from the beginning serve as a warning to future investigators.

The social realism should be made an object of constant study. Even in doing this prejudices are apt to lurk in the mind, which anticipate and pervert the results. We have shown that other departments of thought are by no means to be ignored; but whatever aid they may give, they cannot furnish the subject-matter of Sociology. Just as in every other discipline we discover the elements by means of an analysis of the subject itself, so must we proceed with society. We may consider the known forces in inorganic and organic matter; but we must study their effects on humanity in these effects themselves. Analogy should not be identified with likeness, nor similarity with sameness; mere precedence is not cause, any more than night produces the day that follows. The severest scientific scrutiny is required in order to prevent a mere habit, whether it be philosophical, spiritualistic, or materialistic, from being made the law of being. On a valid basis the inferences must be strictly logical, in order to counteract the illusions of analogical rea-

soning. It is not a whit more evidence of ignorance to attribute to God what we cannot otherwise explain, than to attribute it to matter, to natural law, to biology, so far as these belong to the unknowable.

An earnest desire to interpret everything must not be taken for the ability to do so, still less for the actual interpretation. True science insists on the limit of reason as a matter of experience, if not as an axiom. Wherever faith may soar or philosophy speculate, the ultimate problems are clearly beyond the demonstrations of science; therefore terms which imply that ultimate solutions have been found should be avoided. Such expressions as natural causation, natural law, material force, require explanation in order to be of service in sociological interpretation. Since every object is to be studied and explained according to its inherent character, it might be well to adopt such terms as personal laws and human laws for what pertains to personality and to humanity. This retains the peculiar personal and human elements, without prejudice to their ultimate interpretation. So in distinction from what may be called the metaphysical, speculative, and biological methods, we propose the *sociological* method as the only one fit for our subject in the present state of knowledge. By the sociological method we mean that the nature of the sociological subject must determine the method of procedure, and that no discipline that is foreign or of doubtful application be made the law of Sociology. The social forces in individuals are psychical, whatever influence may be exerted by nature; they are distinctively human forces, and as such they must be taken. They are not to be confounded with physical or mechanical forces. They are conscious, volitional, purposive, at least in their highest develop-

ment, in which respects they differ from what is merely mechanical. The sociological method concentrates the attention on what is peculiar to society, and considers its peculiarity as societary. In thus advocating a sociological method we merely recognize and apply a principle generally accepted, namely, that whatever similarity of method may prevail in different disciplines, each subject distinct in itself must also have a method according to its distinctness. The subject-matter and the aim are the factors which determine the method of inquiry.

Light will be thrown on the sociological method when we illustrate its working as compared with the method in the special social sciences. In economics, for instance, as before shown, we consider simply the economic force in its operations; but in Sociology we consider the economic force in its relation to, and co-operation with, all the other social forces.

When we speak of a sociological method, meaning that the nature of the material considered determines the law of its investigation, we do not prejudice the solution of the ultimate problems; and while this method excludes all foreign laws, it has room, in their proper place, for all material and spiritual elements wherever found. Another advantage in adopting the sociological method consists in the fact that whatever elements are used must be in the sociological form. Thus the biological factors used are not brutal, but human and social.

While carefully moving within the limits of scientific inquiry we are not to be mere social empirics. We must be truly rational as well as empirical. By a strange perversion the mere accumulation and classification of facts are called scientific, while rational

interpretation is thought to be unscientific. Those who take sensation for thinking lose the essence of science. Facts are valuable for the sake of their meaning. A fact of nature is not a law of nature, but involves a law, comes under it, illustrates it, and the law latent in the fact is the problem which the fact involves. The same is true of social facts; we learn what they are, and then aim to get their philosophy. The process is inductive. The strictest adherence to reality is necessary in order to avoid those fictions which so often stand for actuality. But deduction is the counterpart of induction. If by induction a law has been drawn from the facts, then we apply it in all cases like those in which it was discovered. After it is once established, we need not rediscover the law of gravitation before using it; its proper application is our sole concern. If the exercise of a social energy is the condition of its development, then we can reckon with this law without renewed verification. When law is used to designate only an order of phenomena, it must not be identified with cause. The law of gravity is a statement, not an interpretation, of gravitation. The limitations of a law should be considered. Undue influence is attributed to it when abstracted from other laws and made the explanation of phenomena which are the result of co-operation with other laws. To ascribe the uprising of laborers to their industrial condition is to miss one of the most powerful factors in the phenomenon. They have been in a worse condition when there was no uprising. Their agitation is largely due to their own industrial, intellectual, and political advance, and to the prevalence of the modern ideas of human rights. Man must have bread to live; but he has other interests than the bread he eats. As in explaining a

chemical compound, all the elements entering into the substance, and their proportions, must be found, so it is with all social phenomena. The analysis must be exhaustive. Society can be interpreted only if all its energies and the co-operation of all its laws are recognized.

Unless thoroughly disciplined in philosophy, the student will likely need most help in discovering the most general principles of Sociology. How can he discover them and what they involve, and thus get those essentials which are presupposed by the historic evolution and the ethics of society?

The intelligent use of "society" implies that some definite meaning is attached to the term. What is that meaning? It stands for a specific organism of energies; what are the characteristic features of that organism which distinguish it from other objects? These are fundamental questions which must be answered. Human society deals with humanity, but even with humanity only according to its social features. This gives the exact point of view. Fix the attention rigidly on what is beyond all question recognized as society, say one hundred men united for purposes of scientific culture. What constitutes this body of men a society? The answer will give society *per se*, in distinction from those particular forms of society which depend on time, place, and circumstances; we are after the permanent and essential elements which exist after all that is accidental and variable has vanished. All real society is in time and place, and has certain peculiar qualities; but our aim is the concept or idea of society which underlies all actual society, which is in all real society, but more than which all real society contains.

There is but one concept of society, but the actual

societies may have endless forms. The one hundred men might be increased or diminished, and the society still exist. The members of the society need not be men; some or all may be women. The society might have some other than an intellectual aim. The purpose, then, is not essential. So the fact that they meet at a specified time and in a particular place is not essential to the idea of society. Individuals are evidently necessary. Yet one on earth, another on the moon, and a third on Mars, would not be regarded as constituting society. The one concept left as essential is that of human beings in an associated capacity. But do we consider these beings as totalities or only their social elements?

This association of human beings for a definite purpose is the old and most fully recognized conception of society. In recent times, however, the conception has been extended so as to apply to persons not united for any definite purpose, nevertheless otherwise associated. Even direct contact is not deemed essential, as the members of a large denomination constitute a society without knowing or seeing each other. It is in this larger conception that we speak of humanity as a society, the members having essentially the same faculties, the same environment, the same conditions of association, and some actual connection through families or otherwise. One need but become conscious of the really existing associative elements among men in order to understand why we speak of humanity as human society.

Human beings really associated, whether consciously or not, that is the fundamental concept of society. Test the matter. Can there be society unless such association exists? Or can there be such association

and yet no society? The notion of human beings associated is the most abstract and the emptiest, a mere beginning, and yet exceedingly fruitful. It is a notion found wherever society is, and thus actually inclusive of all human association. Our attention, by means of this definition, is concentrated on human individuals as possessors of the social forces, on their sociation, and on what is necessarily involved in such sociation. Men instead of things engage our central thought; we have a human science distinct from what is called natural science, without professing to fix man's exact relation to nature; we have a social science in distinction from the science of individual man; and we have society as in this world and with a natural environment. What are the individuals whose social forces constitute society? The view is from a social standpoint, but as such it involves human anatomy and physiology, psychology, psycho-physics, and anthropology, to say nothing of the relation of these to biology and the other natural sciences. This psycho-physical being is to be taken according to what he is socially, his capabilities and possibilities, in connection with the capabilities and possibilities of his natural environment, in order to determine what the necessary presuppositions of society are. One need but grasp the meaning of the individual forces as constituting society, in order to appreciate the vastness of the study opened to us.

To this must be added the idea of association. What is its meaning? Is a mere aggregation an association? Is a mere aggregation of human beings possible? Are there not associative elements in human aggregation which involve more than an aggregation of things? It is the associative element we seek to interpret. It

means some bond of union between the individuals, some relation to one another which makes them different from what they would be if wholly isolated. What associates men, and what determines the character of the association? Is it nature, or some human necessity, or a higher voluntary purpose? Besides the kinds of association, we must consider the degrees possible, from the loosest tie to the most perfect union. Thus all the motives and powers which unite men are involved. A vast field is thus opened which is but little cultivated. Let one but try to discover and analyze and classify and systematize the forces which enter into human association, and he will soon discover how complicated and rich the subject, and how great the task which still remains to be accomplished.

This is but a beginning. With the individuals whose social forces constitute society, and with the idea of association fully apprehended, what effects are wrought by the association? Does the individual remain independent, or does he become dependent? Does he sacrifice, or gain, or both? Is there, after the association, anything besides individuals? Here the problem of society as an organism must be solved. An organism of what?

We have already spoken of man's natural environment. We must not abstract men from their conditions, but must take them with those conditions. Men with their attachments are the social factors in which the social energies inhere. The king with his dominion, the millionaire with his wealth, the politician with his reputation, — all men must be taken exactly as their possessions and environment make them. Since human power is so largely conditioned by natural force, we must consider the influence of nature on men associ-

ated, and their effect on nature. Thus to the study of individuals and of their association, the study of nature must be added.

Wherever at any time or in any place society is found, the conditions for the above analysis are given. But suppose that from society as empirically given we draw the idea of society *per se*, how do we know that our analysis and synthesis apply to all society whenever and wherever found? A flippant empiricism which knows only what it sees and handles, and does not know that, makes an answer necessary. Some actually question the propriety of announcing principles of universal application, claiming that experience is the limit of knowledge, and that what we thus learn cannot be applied to what we have not experienced.

If experience reveals a law, the universality of its application rests on the principle given in the formula that A=A. This must not be taken in the usual sense of the law of identity, but of equality. It is meaningless tautology to say that A is A; but there is a rich application in the law that A equals A, that every A, wherever found, equals every other A. Suppose that A is the definition of vertebrate; then whenever you find A you have a vertebrate. A stone *per se* is equal to every other stone *per se;* that is, whatever constitutes an object stone (not this or that particular stone) is exactly the same as that which constitutes any other object stone (not this or that particular stone). I define tree, and the idea obtained is the standard to which every object must conform in order to be a tree. The fruitful law that A equals A is thus without exception. What constitutes society *per se* now has always constituted it and always will; and if from any empirical society I learn what society itself is, I have the idea

of society as it must ever and everywhere be. This reveals the importance of the idea, being involved in all society. It is this that gives empirical study its greatest value; the evanescent facts reveal principles and laws that are universal and eternal.

This abstraction of principles from the existing association of human beings constitutes the method for our first division. In these principles we have society potentially. How has the idea been actualized; what real factors have the potential factors become? This leads us to our second division, the social actuality as seen in the process of historic evolution. Little more need be said on this subject, as the different methods for considering the vast material involved have already been indicated. Whether the evolution be treated chronologically, or whether we begin with the culture of our age and trace its connection with the past to the beginning of society, or whether the development of social institutions be the method adopted, in each case the material is so vast and the intellectual requirements are so great that a field for endless research is opened. Large generalizations which concentrate the materials gathered from all sources will have to be resorted to. The general principles on which all things rest are few; but if we want to know mountains we must consider their separate peaks as well as their common base. Certain things are common to all ages, though not necessarily in an equal degree. If ages have distinctive features, peculiar characteristics, marked types in thought and life, the study of these is of special importance. When we speak of a stone, a bronze, and an iron period, we have in each case but one fact, yet of such magnitude as to determine the character of the period. What meaning, for instance,

in calling an era the age of steam? Thus to give an age a name is to interpret it.

Greece and Rome are distinct peaks on the common base of humanity; what distinguishes them from oriental antiquity? By means of their dominant ideas we seize the Middle Ages, such as the supremacy of dogmatism in theology, the power of the church and the hierarchy, the fascination of asceticism and mysticism; these are the forces in the thought and life, in the state and institutions. Our own age is to be interpreted by its all-controlling thoughts and passions; these are the keys that unlock its secrets. The dominant thoughts are like the fruit in which the tree culminates, puts its quality, and most fully expresses itself. As we master society by obtaining its regnant ideas, that interminable confusion occasioned by an empiric survey of mere details is resolved into beautiful symmetry. We study society in its characteristics, as industrial, religious, political, literary, æsthetic, philosophical, scientific, or recreative. When we get the kind of thought that dominates, we ask for its quality, namely, the character of the industry, religion, *et cet.* Different characteristics are found in the same society; what are they, what are their gradations, and how do they blend? In this way society is made to stand before the mind in distinct outlines, and is comprehended according to its essentials. I may not be able to examine the million trees which constitute a primitive forest; but I shall comprehend the nature of that forest if I know that it consists of oak and poplar and hickory and maple and elm and beech and walnut, and at the same time know the character of these trees.

By a logical process we pass from what society is to what it ought to be. The method is, again, both

empirical and rational; with the actuality we compare the mind's ideality. From the reality we learn what needs and evils prevail, what forces are at work, and what effects they produce. To the lessons learned from history and observation respecting the regenerative powers of society, valuable materials are offered by philosophical and Christian ethics. But while the student need not always begin at the beginning, any more in this than in the other divisions, much preparatory work having been done for him, he should always be discriminating, critical, and independent, in the use of his materials.

As in the other divisions thought is concentrated on society *per se* and on its historic evolution, so in this third division the mind is concentrated on the ethical elements of society. Will and purpose now come to the front. The mind's ideal become *Will* is the genius to transform the crude social material into forms of beauty. Reform hardly expresses it. Some things are to be reformed; others are to be destroyed; others still are to be developed. Good seeds exist — unfold them; good trees grow — trim them, graft on new scions; briers must be rooted out. Regeneration, evolution, revolution, all are needed for progress. While will is predominantly involved in ethics, all the intellectual and emotional powers are associated with it and aid in furthering ethical ends.

In interpreting society as it now is we find the industrial and æsthetic stages largely dominant. Gratification and the means of gratification are leading purposes. It is a question of dominance. Industry and æsthetics are not destroyed by ethics, but are taken from the apex and made steps of the social pyramid. Ethics means the good so ordered that each thing is in

its right place and right relation. Here again we see how sociological ethics is deeper and broader than reform. Reforms are apt to be isolated; but in ethics we have a system of regeneration, of evolution, and of revolution. Reform becomes a system; the evils are found to be united, so must the forces be that would overcome them; not isolated, but organically connected powers must work for the improvement of the social organism. Thus we deepen and broaden and systematize our notions of reform, or put ethics for reform.

The scientist cannot always demonstrate; then he invents a hypothesis or theory to account for the facts, leaving the verification to future ages. Newton's theory of light was of this nature. So when the course of a planet varies from the path it ought to take according to known conditions, the existence of another but unknown planet causing the variation may be postulated, and afterwards the planet discovered. These are evidences of the influence of imagination in scientific investigations.

A similar process is pursued in sociological ethics. There is a forecasting of what ought to be; but this does not forestall future improvements in the theory. No more in ethics than in natural science is theory purely imaginative; it is a construction based on facts and in harmony with them. Thus in ethics we deal with ideals, but as immediately related to reality. We are tempted to call it realistic idealism. So far as the material admits of it, scientific exactness is the aim.

Careful definition is no less important in ethics than in mathematics. A recent discussion has made this plain. The solution of the labor problem was pronounced an unrealizable ideal. It is an eternal struggle, it was said, and this struggle is held to be

the only possible solution. But why, then, strive to solve it? We must distinguish between *the* social problem and *our* social problem. Nothing beyond our reach is part of our social problem. If it is settled that we cannot square the circle, then it is no longer problematical. It is not a problem how I can draw myself out of a marsh by tugging away at my hair. Our social problem in ethics is what we can do, and only because we can solve it is it our problem. There is an ethical problem for humanity at which the whole of humanity, throughout all ages, will be called to work, but there is also an ethical problem which is peculiarly ours.

In all these cases we have hints for ethical work as well as for study, and the two go together. We aim at principles here as in the other departments, principles for theoretic comprehension and practical application. General ideas we want, ideas which grasp the details. In sociological ethics we deal with the character of the social forces, of the association they form, and of its environment. The ethical force in each social form is to be determined. The ethical element in institutions is important, as the family, the church, and the state. Education is one of the roots; but is not the ethical quality of mere intellectual attainment overestimated? The place of ethics in the school, theoretical and practical, deserves careful attention. History shows that intellect by itself is not necessarily regenerative; the *kind* of intellect is the determining factor. Everywhere the moulding forces are to be seized, such as literature, laws, politics, economics, religion.

A study of the past and present puts it beyond question that the ethical process of society is not mechan-

ical, but psychical. The changes in the character of society are inner. The outside influences may be great, and the modern emphasis on the environment indicates progress; but in intellectual, moral, and spiritual concerns it is the mind and heart and will with which we must reckon. However external institutions may be improved, the improvement of society itself is essentially that of its individual members, the families, and the other social groups. The ethically organic process is necessarily gradual. Spasmodic efforts, moral spurts, and religious enthusiasm, have their place, especially in inaugurating reformatory movements; but to ethicize humanity requires time. The change in conditions by means of the American and French revolutions did not make men free, equal, and fraternal.

The estimate of ethical forces is peculiarly difficult. Not only are they deep and often hidden, but they pertain to the volitions of men, which are less subject to the control of others than intellectual convictions. In nature and logic we deal with what must be; in ethics with what ought to be, but without the ability to make of that a necessity. The difficulties in the subject can be inferred from such problems as the freedom of the will, the nature of conscience, the supreme good and its attainment. Through ethics we are introduced into the deepest mysteries of the personality. These mysteries are augmented by the fact that we deal with them, not merely as found in individuals, but also in the complexity of the social organism.

Having now the divisions before us, we can consider their relation to one another. They form but one social system and thus present a variety in unity. The method is essentially the same for all divisions, but

the emphasis differs. The first division is formed by a process of abstraction, using society as it is for the sake of getting the principles of all that society can be. Our second division emphasizes the empirical and historic methods; yet the same process of abstraction is required as in the first, in order to get the laws of society as it is and has been. The work is always principiant. The third division, sociological ethics, requires both the empirical and the abstract method, just as the other two, in order that the ethical principles and laws may be obtained.

So great is the variety in sociological materials that all the methods adopted in scientific, philosophical, and historical investigations are involved. The rule is that the method must be adapted to the material, not the material tortured into a pet method. So intimately, however, are the different departments of Sociology connected that while a particular method may be more prominent in one than in the others, all the methods co-operate to construct the compact system known as the science of society; and whatever throws light on any part illuminates the whole system.

The student who has mastered the meaning of the sociological method will know what estimate to place on seeming and even pretentious explanations which are deceptions. When intent on substance, he cannot be content with empty phrases and merely formal interpretations. A cosmical law to him is meaningless until the nature of the law is explained. If he knows natural law only as a force that works blindly and with absolute necessity, then he also knows that man can set an end toward which to work, that he chooses between alternatives, and that therefore he is subject to a law that is not known as natural. A comet mov-

ing resistlessly toward the earth could not, according to natural law, avoid collision; but if it moved teleologically and had the directing of its course it might. Man can and does move thus; therefore something else than natural law reigns in him. This distinction must be insisted on until the natural is transmuted into the teleological law. Natural selection among brutes is not the final law for social struggle. Even social democrats now admit that Lassalle's iron law of wages, according to which wages always tend to the level of the bare existence of laborers and their offspring, the future laborers, is not absolute. The combination of laborers and the humanity of employers may abrogate it. No biological theory of evolution has yet been discovered as the ultimate law of human society. Whatever value attaches to these methods, their severe limitations must be recognized.

We insist in Sociology on causative interpretation. But for that very reason we reject *a priori*, metaphysical, and fictitious explanations. The real causes we find in the social substance. The social energies of individuals constitute this substance. The persons who are the possessors of these energies are affected by the land and its products and by money; they create institutions which are an embodiment of the social forces, and then these institutions in turn affect their creators. Not as abstractions, therefore, do we take the social energies, but as affected by their relations to things. Society consists of the social energies of persons subject to the most manifold influence.

These social energies of persons being the social substance, we go to them in our study of social causation. Our sociological method leads us to inquire what these energies are; what affinities and repulsions exist be-

tween them; what the conditions of their coalescence and interaction are; how they interact; what changes take place in them by means of the interaction; what sociation results or what societies they form; and how the forces themselves can be perfected, how their interaction can be made harmonious, and how their social product can be made the best possible.

The social energies as the social substance (the anatomy and physiology of the social organism, the foundation of the social superstructure) constitute our first division.

The social energies as they unfold the actual or historic societies (their social genesis or evolution) constitute our second division.

The social energies developed according to the perfection of the potentiality involved in them (ideal social progress, sociological ethics) constitute our third division.

This recapitulation gives the substance with which in every instance our causative method deals.

A man without a method has been called "a vessel without a rudder." Sir William Hamilton says, "All method is a rational progress — a progress toward an end."

It is a correct observation that in general men care more to do a thing than to know how it is done. But for the student to know how to do a thing is the condition for the best intellectual work. This simply means that instead of haphazard efforts and a waste of energy he is to be fully conscious of self and his subject, and master of his powers and of the materials on which he works. Socrates, Bacon, and Kant made epochs in thought by directing attention to the methods of research and pointing out the way that leads to truth.

There is a peculiar fascination in comprehensive generalizations and universal laws, so that their mere statement may insure their acceptance. Rigid criticism should be the rule, in order to determine the correctness of the generalization and the sphere of the

application of the law. If, for instance, claims are made for a law as cosmical, it should be determined what is meant by cosmical: whether it is held that the law works on all occasions or only under certain circumstances; whether it is isolated or works in conjunction with other laws. It may also be a legitimate inquiry whether the law is found by an *a priori* method, or is the result of an actual investigation of the cosmos. Has the whole cosmos been traversed, or only a part? Especially when cosmical laws are promulgated in the name of an empiricism which denounces speculation have we a right to know the authority for an affirmation which puts into one monistic formula all that pertains to matter and mind. The law may be correct, but we want to know whether it is correct.

In social science the difficulties of method are much greater than in the study of natural science. This is due to the nature of the material. Sociology deals with facts behind which there is a world of thought and feeling and volition, which is not subject to direct observation. Human phenomena often hide rather than reveal the motives of men.

To observe correctly objects of nature is itself an art learned only after long scientific discipline. Scientists have argued that mathematics and the study of nature ought to take the place of the classics in a collegiate course, in order that the student's power of scientific observation may be the better developed. Special training is also required for correct observation in the human disciplines. The study of mathematics and nature, it has been claimed, does not prepare directly for the complicated psychical processes of society. They must be studied in the human disciplines; and in the study of these the mind must be trained for social observation.

Observation, however, is only the first step. What is observed is also to be interpreted. Not the bare fact is ultimate for the sociologist; he wants to know its secrets, what it involves, what has caused it, whither it tends, how it is related to other facts, and what law works in it. A single fact requires a many-sided interpretation of thought; but we have a whole universe of facts to be mastered, all related, intricately interwoven, co-operating, and antagonizing. The magnitude of the task presented impresses us too deeply with our limitations to permit the spirit of dogmatism to prevail.

Not as in nature can we isolate phenomena in Sociology. No particular social force is alone, as nitrogen or oxygen may be.

Therefore our social analysis does not give us distinct, sharply separated entities, as natural science. Whatever isolation is possible in social study, the analysis is always for the sake of the most comprehensive synthesis, — a task still more difficult than the analysis of a particular social phenomenon.

Our method aims at nothing less than humanity in its associated capacity. By means of observation and from history we seek to draw inferences respecting humanity as a society. But never can we observe all facts now occurring, or master all the events of history. Therefore a complete knowledge of the facts never can constitute the basis of our inferences. Our inductions being incomplete, we cannot claim demonstrations, but must be content with hypotheses or theories, which are always to be held liable to correction by new facts of observation and history. Nevertheless, certain facts are so numerous and invariable as to give a basis for valid inferences of a general character. So many evidences, for instance, exist to prove men self-regarding that we cannot question that this is a potent force in human conduct. For many things we can claim an approach to law, if not the establishment of the law itself.

Another factor is to be noted. We do not contemplate with the same degree of impartiality human, as we do natural, objects. The former lie nearer self-interest, appeal to prejudice and passion, and may be seriously affected by traditionalism and dogmatism. The testimony in courts, and narratives of the same event show with what allowance judgments respecting human affairs must be taken.[1]

The genetic method is pursued in all historical investigation. To trace a single social force, as that of economics or æsthetics, is beset with difficulties on account of the numerous factors involved and the hidden processes of which the phenomena are but imperfect manifestations. What varied motives, besides that of a livelihood, may enter into business? And who is prepared to interpret

[1] The eminent historian Leopold von Ranke was so deeply impressed with the need of a thorough criticism of historical documents in order to get at the truth, that he laid it down as a rule that, so far as possible, we must go behind the records to learn the character of their authors. Such questions as these are fundamental: Did the author want to tell the truth? Was he biased or controlled by self-interest and class preferences? Was he competent to judge of what he wrote? Were the facts within his reach, and did he make a faithful use of them? In order to learn the truth, therefore, we must go beyond the records to a study of the character of their authors.

the art impulse from its rudest beginnings in savage life to the highest creations of genius?

Even physical facts affecting society may be obscure on account of the variety of possible causes. Psycho-physical ones are much more difficult on account of the mysteries in the connection of body and mind. To these must be added the psychical facts which are the immediate results of individual action in society. Then we have the endless interactions and complications of what are distinctively social forces. It is the entire social web, with its many unseen threads, which the sociologist seeks to comprehend. If he follows a single thread or unravels the web, he fails to get the totality he wants to seize. The more microscopic his investigations, the more liable he is to miss the great conception of Sociology. Only by connecting the largest synthesis with the closest analysis can he hope even approximately to gain his end.

From the investigations of Süssmilch, particularly since the time of Quételet, the statistical method has been used in human affairs. Numerous scholars have in recent years tried to develop it into a science and to fix its exact application to social phenomena. Since it deals with figures, its exactness has been emphasized. Its value is great, but often its services have been overestimated. As it contemplates masses and seeks averages in their movements, it frequently gives facts of a general and barren character. It may show that more male than female children are born, that suicides are specially numerous in Saxony and contiguous regions, and that there is a singular regularity in actions which seem hardly subject to law; yet of the causes, the very things we want most to know, no revelations are given. In moral statistics the number of crimes punished may be known, while the number actually committed and the reasons for their committal may be unknown. The heart and its motives are not subject to mathematical calculations. This applies to religious as well as to moral statistics. If a score of men at the age of sixty apply annually for admission to an alms-house, the mere statement of fact reveals nothing but so much poverty in old age. They are feeble and cannot support themselves. What we are most anxious to learn is, why they are poor and feeble. Are the causes due to heredity, to the natural environment, to the individual, or to society? Must we look to accident or misfortune for the explanation, to the failure of crops or to business crises, to indolence or

intemperance? Which of the hundreds of causes of feebleness and poverty were the effective ones in these particular cases? Highly, then, as we value statistics, its limitations are manifest, and it must usually be coupled with other investigations in order to furnish the social facts most of all desired.[1]

Not by rejecting empiricism, but by making it the means for rational interpretation shall we secure the best results. Buckle says: "For one person who can think, there are at least a hundred persons who can observe. An accurate *observer* is, no doubt, rare; but an accurate *thinker* is far rarer." Besides observers we have memorizers — both mere empirics. It has been declared that our whole culture aims merely at reproduction. In view of this it has been said: "Teach men to think, not what has been thought."

Every student of Sociology should enter upon original research. For this his own environment offers abundant material. Let him take the social groups to which he himself belongs and give their philosophy. In a lower stage of culture social groups are limited; in the progress of culture these groups increase, interests are multiplied, and the relations of men are enlarged. The powers, the interests, the relations of a man of culture far surpass those of the uncultured. What, now, are the relations of a man of culture? Analyze the sphere of his thought, his feeling, his activity. What determines his social relations? What are the associative elements? What effect is produced on him by association, and what influence does he exert? The dominant ideas of groups, of nations, of stages of culture are of special value for interpreting society. How are formal organizations related to unorganized groups? There are numerous social organisms, and all must be understood in order to interpret a community, a state, or a nation. Some associations have little coherence, they approach mere aggregations; others are more like organisms, but even in these great differences prevail with respect to the closeness of the union of the members. The numerous kinds of association must be studied separately, but also in their relations and interaction, as a totality or social unity. By this method our present vague, general, empty, and abstract conception of society will become rich in content, a counterpart of the social actuality. We should never forget that we want social thought for the sake of the social actuality for which it stands.

[1] For moral statistics the work of Öttingen, "Moralstatistik," is valuable.

While methodology teaches the true method, it also guards against false ones. A method may be chosen hastily and be without reason; a method with limited application may be applied to objects foreign to it; systems are formed before the preliminary investigations justify them; and thus processes are made absolute and final which are one-sided and defective. The history of philosophy and science teaches that men may become slaves of their methods, and deceive themselves as well as others. The same lesson is taught by the development of Sociology from Comte to the present time. The method which a trained sociologist adopts as the result of his investigations may seem to have sufficient reason and yet be faulty. For a beginner to adopt it without critical investigation would be mere dogmatism. Method and system are tools, not chains.

Our ethical convictions do not permit us to experiment with society as we do with brutes in vivisection or otherwise, solely for the sake of investigation. No human being is to be reduced to mere means for the sake of learning lessons for the benefit of others. Nevertheless, experiments are constantly made in politics, political economy, reform, and in other departments, and valuable lessons may be drawn from them. The difficulties, however, are all but insurmountable. Social phenomena cannot be isolated, modified, subjected to numerous tests, and observed at different times and by different investigators under the same conditions. The peculiar conditions of a given time may never occur again, and it may be impossible to determine how far the same do occur again. This makes it seem as if exactness could be obtained only in the form of abstractions, not in concrete reality. Therefore the attainment of social and historic laws is so difficult, and many have declared them impossible. For this reason the student may find it of greatest service to seek what is customary, typical, of general, if not of universal, application.

The importance of mechanical law in human society can be fully recognized without reducing that society to a mechanism. Instead of explaining all social phenomena in this way, the explanation often seems to be hindered. The mind is immediately conscious of a vast number of human objects, of ideas and emotions and purposes, which are not explained by introducing from the external world matter, force, and motion, but which, by this method, actually seem to lose much of their content and quality.

Our very conception of force may have its source in the will, so that it is an inner and mental phenomenon which we transfer to the external world and to matter.

The law of equality, A=A, is discussed in the author's "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy," 215–218.

"On the Difference between Physical and Moral Law" see a work with that title by William Arthur.

Wundt, "Logik," II., 566–612, gives an elaborate discussion of the method of the social sciences. Dilthey, "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften." Menger, "Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften." A good review of the last in Schmoller's "Zur Litteraturgeschichte der Staats- und Socialwissenschaften."

Schäffle, in "Zeitschrift für Staatswissenschaft," beginning in 1876, gives a series of valuable articles on the relation of Darwinism to social science; Gustav Cohn, "Grundlegung der Nationalökonomie," first chapter, gives an account of method in the social sciences.

Professor Giddings discusses "The Methods of Sociology" in the third chapter of Book I.

In a Supplementary Number of "The American Journal of Sociology," May, 1897, Dr. J. H. Hyslop has a paper on "The Science of Sociology." It is a keen criticism of Professor Giddings' method and a valuable contribution to the general subject of method in Sociology.

On the importance of method see the author's "Tendencies in German Thought," Lecture 9, on "The Purpose and the Method of the Scholar and the Thinker." Also Chapter X. in his "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy."

Where there is a teacher of Sociology it can be left to him to direct students in the continuance of their sociological studies and in making independent researches. For such as have not the advantage of a teacher to guide them, a method for further study is here proposed.

Method for Independent Sociological Research.

The preceding pages can have left no doubt that in sociological inquiry the student is largely thrown upon his own resources. In his motives for associating with

his fellow-men he will find the key to many of the associative forces of humanity in all ages. Society in general is beheld in his social action, and in his relations in the family, the community, the church, the state, and voluntary organizations. In differentiating his private from his social affairs, distinguishing between himself as social and extra-social, he learns to discern the individual or private from the social personality.

With this study of himself in society, in which he likewise studies the social relations of others, he naturally connects personal investigations into the associations of his environment. For this purpose the plan of the study of a community, at the close of the volume, gives directions. When this inquiry is made scientific, it will become the basis of all further investigations. This personal scientific research is especially lacking in various sociological works, for which no compensation can be found in the statistics and researches of others.

We place this kind of investigation first, but it is not to be isolated. The student should also learn from other investigators, especially from sociologists. Among the best services which can be rendered him is to give directions in the use of sociological literature.

References to works in the preceding pages may be a general guide. Every good sociological book refers to literature on the subject, and in this way the student can learn what to read. The different standpoints of sociologists and the confusion reigning in their specialty make it difficult to say definitely what books are best. Scores can be recommended as valuable; but every one should be read critically. They furnish important materials, give excellent suggestions, and are very ser-

viceable to independent thinkers. They will be found far more valuable as aids than as authorities.

The student is likely to find that, after a general idea of Sociology has been attained, his best work can be done by specialization; that is, by taking special sociological themes and mastering them. For this study by limited subjects all the most important sociological works can be used, taking from each what bears on the particular subject in hand. In this way clearness and thoroughness may be gained; and if the totality aimed at in Sociology is kept in view, the specialization will also promote comprehensiveness.

If there is any doubt in his mind respecting the meaning, the scope, and the subject-matter of Sociology, he should first of all concentrate his energies on their interpretation. He must understand them in order to insure his further progress; they are an introduction to the whole discipline. We recommend the following books, confining ourselves to works in English, though for the best results French and German are also necessary. Many of these are, however, translated into English. The first here named belongs to this class, Comte's "Positive Philosophy," translated by H. Martineau, the last book, which treats of "Social Physics." Spencer's "The Study of Sociology" is important on account of general suggestions on Sociology and its study, but its chief value probably consists in the discussion of the various kinds of bias which interfere with the discovery of truth. He discusses the subject-matter and scope of Sociology in the first volume of his "Principles of Sociology," pp. 3–43 and 454–618. Ward's "Social Dynamics," Introduction, Fairbanks' "Introduction to Sociology," pp. 1–44, Giddings' "Principles of Sociology," pp. 3–51. Other

parts of the last three works named are important for Sociology in general, as well as for specific departments.

From a definite conception of Sociology and society the student can proceed to investigate the social actuality. For this various methods have already been given. Ethnologists have been mentioned who give an account of early society. For an introduction into this subject the following are recommended: E. B. Tylor, "Primitive Culture," and "Early History of Mankind;" Sir John Lubbock, "The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man;" L. H. Morgan, "Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery, through Barbarism to Civilization;" D. Wilson, "Prehistoric Man, Researches into the Origin of Civilization in the Old and the New World." On the "Religions of Primitive People," a new work, by D. G. Brinton, has just appeared. In the first volume of Ratzel's "History of Mankind" an excellent summary of the results of the researches into primitive peoples is given. The works of Max Müller on language and religion are so well known that the mention of them is hardly necessary.

The student cannot be at a loss respecting excellent works on social institutions. Most of the material in Mr. Spencer's three volumes on "Principles of Sociology" pertains to them. In Bascom's "Social Theory" Customs, Economics, Civics, Ethics, and Religion are discussed. Fairbanks' "Introduction" has chapters on The Industrial Organization of Society, The Family as the Social Unit, and The State. The special sciences abound in works on the same subjects, such as economics and political science. For the historic view of the family the work of E. Westermarck on "The History of Human Marriage" is important. The two

volumes of E. J. Simcox on "Primitive Civilizations" treat more especially of industrial institutions. The various works of H. S. Maine are valuable, especially "Lectures on the Early History of Institutions;" "Ancient Law, its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas;" and "Village Communities in the East and West."

We have already intimated that the exclusive study of institutions or a one-sided emphasis on them interferes with that organic view of society as a totality which is so essential to Sociology. Where is the connecting bond, the underlying unity, if each institution is to be considered by itself? In that case Sociology loses its mission because the special social sciences can do its work.

The common use of "social" (like the German *gesellig*) does not apply to institutional society, but to the more free, spontaneous intercourse of the people. Aside from the family, the church, the state, and voluntary organizations, there are countless motives and reasons for men to associate with one another, such as affection and friendship, mutual sympathy and interest, desire for companionship and amusement. Not only are the motives for such unrestrained associations precious, but they also lead to numerous gatherings and are the occasion of much social activity. In some respects this kind of social life is more important than that of institutions. In it humanity manifests itself, while in the institutional life there is more formality and more legality.

This vast and multiform unorganized social life presents greater difficulties to the student than the definite institutions. Its importance, however, is manifest. Sometimes governments suppress formal organizations;

then the people have only their social gatherings to give expression to themselves. Here we find the folk lore, cherished beliefs, traditions, manners and customs, proverbs and songs. What other parliament have the people of Russia to-day for the expression of their views? French society has had its celebrities, and its influence has been great. The same is true of England and Germany and other countries. This society no one takes as an institution. No theme, no interest was foreign to it; seditions were fomented and revolutions incited. To this universal forum of the people we must add, as also extra-institutional, court circles with their intrigues, and what is called polite, fashionable, aristocratic society.

How can the student investigate this department of Sociology? Histories of civilization, like that of Guizot, will aid him; the histories of different peoples also contain numerous references to the subject. Interesting glimpses are given in works on French history from the time of Louis XIV. till the Revolution and later. For English society "Social England," edited by H. D. Trail, is good. Frequently, however, we have to resort to letters, biographies, and magazines, for the desired information. To the written social history the unorganized society of humanity is similar to what the individual's sub-conscious activity is to his conscious life. Fortunately, this kind of society can be personally investigated by the student, and he may render excellent service by formulating its principles and laws.

Another important and much neglected sphere, for understanding which the student will also depend mainly on his own researches, is the social study of the age. The last chapter in the volume aims to lead him into the subject.

Numerous ethical works of recent date are valuable for the sociological student. Some of them devote much space to social ethics. Spencer's two volumes, "Data of Ethics," are well known. In connection with them and the ethics of evolutionists generally the work of C. M. Williams can be read, "A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution." The following are recommended: J. L. Mackenzie, "Introduction to Social Philosophy;" Leslie Stephen, "The Science of Ethics;" H. Sidgwick, "The Method of Ethics;" James Seth, "A Study of Ethical Principles;" W. Wundt, "The Facts of the Moral Life;" B. P. Bowne, "The Principles of Ethics;" J. H. Muirhead, "The Elements of Ethics."

There is, however, as yet no sociological ethics, its right to existence even being disputed.

The plan here outlined will lead the student into all departments of Sociology. The books named here and in other parts of the volume contain numerous references to works in different languages, of which no mention is made in this volume. Indeed, such a wealth of material and literature will be at his command that he will find difficulty in using it all.

Much literature exists outside of works regarded as direct sociological aids. History, as we have seen, teems with the most important revelations respecting society. It is the repository of social forces and social forms. Coming to its study from the sociological point of view, the student will find in history numerous social agencies, activities, and trends, which were overlooked in former times. Historic social study is actually obscured by thrusting into the foreground the myriads of individuals with which we know not what to do. But by putting individuals in their proper place, by

attributing to historic personages the influence they actually exerted, and by giving to social forces the emphasis due to them, a correct conception of historic society is formed. There are countless ages in which there is no record of a single individual; not to this, however, is due the obscurity of prehistoric times, but to the fact that our knowledge of the social forces at work is so imperfect. Yet we have some idea of early society, proving that our social knowledge does not depend on a knowledge of individuals. Even in the thousands of years properly called historic, comparatively few individuals are mentioned. History is an account of the interaction of social forces, and as such it is to be studied.

Historic literature is therefore one of the richest mines for sociological inquiry. From it great human and social characteristics can be learned: forces, associations, and tendencies common to society in general. The same motives are beheld in their activity amid an endless variety of circumstances. While all human history is important for the sociologist, certain parts are specially valuable, such as crises and transition eras like our own, epochs, the introduction of new social types or forces, periods when great interests clash and momentous decisions are made, when intense feeling, vigorous thinking, and resolute action reveal society in the utmost tension. In the more ordinary periods of historic quiet the conditions of social stagnation, retrogression, and progress can likewise be studied. We are getting histories of the people, and they promise to be of special importance.

It is taken for granted that the student will not be a mere accumulator of facts or lose himself in distractions. Only by means of classification and system can

he make his studies successful. Enough has been said to warn him against hasty generalizations and the establishment of laws where only rules are warranted.

REFLECTIONS.

Meaning of Method. Value. Scientific Method. Genetic Method. Speculative Method. Psychological Method. Sociological Method. Natural and Social Laws. Facts and their Interpretation. Facts and Laws. The Problem in Facts. The Influence of the Environment and of the Struggle for Existence in different Stages of Culture. The Principle of Identity and of Equality. Psychology and Philosophy deposited in History. Nature furnishes what is, the Actuality; whence then the Ideals or the Distinction between what is and what ought to be? Working in the Present for the Future. Forecasting. Mechanical Processes and Ethics. The Intellectual Factor in Progress. Induction and Deduction in Sociology. Union of the Scientific and the Philosophical Methods. Different Methods for different Kinds of Material in Sociology. Statistics; Value and Limitation. Review of the Discussion of Method. Analyze the Plan for Independent Sociological Research.

CHAPTER IX.

IS SOCIOLOGY A SCIENCE?

The Problem. *The term "science" is used so vaguely and loosely that it must be defined in order to determine its sense. Methods and disciplines are sometimes termed scientific because that designation is supposed to confer on them absoluteness and finality. Then we are told that even in the natural sciences, as chemistry, botany, geology, physiology, we cannot have science in the same sense as in algebra and geometry. We determine to make everything scientific because that means exactness; then we are staggered by the information that there are "inexact" sciences. Would it not be better to eliminate the inexact from the scientific?*

How is the question of the scientific character of Sociology to be determined? One need but look at much that vaunts itself as science in our day to learn what unscientific methods are resorted to in the name of science. Besides the sense in which the term science is used, it is also necessary to investigate the conditions for settling the scientific character of a discipline. The problem is essentially this: Shall the scientific character be made a postulate to which a subject must submit, or shall the nature of the material determine the scientific character of the treatment?

Perhaps the great variety in the sociological materials makes science applicable to some in one sense and to

others only in a different sense. Here we may use mathematics; there natural law; while in other departments we resort to psychology, to history, to hypotheses and theories, for interpretation.

We want to make scientific in the strictest sense whatever admits of it; we want to discern the exact nature of the material considered, in order to learn in what sense it can be made scientific; and we want to evolve from every subject the science which it involves.

ALL sociologists are agreed that no sociological system thus far developed can claim to be thoroughly scientific. Dr. Ward says: "I do not hesitate to pronounce as mere patchwork the greater part of all that now goes by the sounding name of social science."[1] Numerous other writers have been no more respectful in their utterances. The purport of the question, however, is, whether the conditions exist for ultimately constructing the science of society.

It seems presumptuous to determine before the investigation what shall be made of a subject. How is that possible so long as the materials have not been mastered? In our aim to interpret society by all legitimate means we have refused to let the question of the possibility of absolute science in social affairs interfere with our investigations. With the most scientific method possible we aim at the science of society; how far the aim is realizable the result must show; it cannot be determined dogmatically beforehand. It is on this basis that our discussion has thus far proceeded, in order not to embarrass the beginner with problems for whose solution he has not the data. Society as a fact is given

[1] Dynamic Sociology, i., 700.

and can be investigated by all; we aim to discover its essence, its evolution, and its laws, so as to form a complete social system, without prejudicing the ulterior results. This rational procedure leaves the mind perfectly free in its researches, requiring only knowledge in the best possible form. This process has, however, been forestalled by another method. From the beginning Sociology has been designated and treated as a positive science. This decides the matter if traditionalism is to be the arbiter. The very history of Sociology obliges us to consider the question at the head of the chapter.

We have seen that when Comte introduced the term "Sociology" he defined it as the science of society, and aimed to make it a physical science. The mania to reduce all knowledge to a species of natural science culminated about the middle of this century. Of the many signal failures in this respect, Comte's "Positive Philosophy" is a striking example. He agreed with Kant in emphasizing empirical investigation instead of metaphysics as the basis of knowledge of the real world. The sensationalism of France had taught him the same lesson. But he failed utterly in seizing the critical spirit of Kant and in applying the critical method to his own constructions. The results he attained are a significant commentary on his claims. The inchoate state of Sociology might have suggested reserve respecting the determination of the positive character of its material, unless the question was to be settled dogmatically. But the general trend favored the making of all knowledge scientific. As a consequence, when it was found that all knowledge could not be made scientific in the sense of natural science, the term "science" itself was so stretched as to apply to mate-

rials subject to various degrees of definiteness and certainty.

When science includes not only mathematics, physics, and biology, but also anthropology, history, theology, and various kinds of speculation, it loses its specific character. Science in that case is not limited to what is objective and can be proved as such, but it is left to men themselves to determine the use of the term and to make it the repository of their subjective notions of truth. Science now suffers from that vagueness with which the term "philosophy" has long been afflicted. There is a temptation to claim that investigations are scientific because science is thought to be absolute; and then the loose sense in which science is used enables one to label "scientific" all kinds of real and supposed knowledge. The consequence is that science itself is thrust from its throne of exactness and finality. Even Mr. Spencer embarrasses us when he expects us to pass through his "Synthetic Philosophy" as the way to science. He uses science in the popular rather than the technical sense. He speaks of "inexact" science, and thus finds room for much "scientific" material which others might prefer to call by another name.

There is a marked difference in what are recognized as sciences in a technical sense, some admitting of a much greater degree of definiteness and exactness than others. At the head of all we place mathematics, an *a priori* science, all its constructions depending on exact and absolute numbers and axioms. Comte's hierarchy of the sciences can be studied profitably in respect to their exactness. Biology cannot be as definite as the sciences which deal with inorganic matter. The definiteness in every instance depends on the nature of the objects. In chemistry the objects are themselves defi-

nite, but less in organic than in inorganic. The inorganic objects can be examined by many investigators under the same or similar conditions, and exact results secured. As we enter life and investigate psychological phenomena and social intricacies, we deal with objects of the most difficult character and least of all subject to investigation by means of the scientific method. Numerous illustrations are afforded by medical practice when it treats physical ailments, to say nothing of mental diseases. The body can be dissected, but only when dead; yet it is life we want to understand. Can we not also speak of a body and soul of society? This at least is clear, that science becomes difficult in proportion as the objects are complicated and variable.

In all these respects Sociology is peculiarly difficult. Society is composed of the forces of individuals; the individual is himself exceedingly complicated, being the highest of organisms. Can we claim to have a science of him as physiological, psychical, and psycho-physical? We are not dealing with an abstract, unreal individual, but with the concrete, real man, who teems with elements wholly beyond the province of strict scientific analysis. This individual in his natural environment is subject to perpetual changes; were the scientific data of one moment possible, the changes of the next, chiefly internal and invisible, might be wholly beyond our reach. The body changes, the mind changes, the environment changes; as the changes themselves, so must their results be unforeseen. It should be remembered that we cannot experiment with the individuals as with other objects, and least of all with society.

Take now two individuals of neither of whom we have, strictly speaking, a science; can we speak of a science of their association? If the action of one can be fore-

told, can its effect on the other be? Strict scientific knowledge is evidently out of the question. How much less possible is it to foretell the action and interaction and reaction of the social forces of a thousand individuals, or of a whole nation, or of humanity, with factors all variable and amid variable surroundings; and can we get a science of the actions, the relations, the results? We cannot start with a science of the individual; much less can we end with a science of multitudes of individuals or of their social energies.

Natural science has become so dominant that it has determined the strict sense in which the term "science" is to be used. It is evident that in point of accuracy, definiteness, and exactness, Sociology cannot rank with the natural sciences. Nor can any one of the human disciplines in which psychical as well as physical elements are involved. Sociology deals with numbers and with physical elements, and thus, in a certain sense, a strict science is possible; but this does not imply that the entire subject will yield to scientific treatment. So far as the data are now at hand, we must conclude that in the strict technical sense (in the sense of natural or physical science), a science of society is impossible. This does not in the least interfere with the effort to attain the utmost scientific accuracy, but it prevents scientific postulates where they are manifestly out of place. Should future investigation prove a strict sociological science possible, every honest inquirer will hail the result with joy.

If not as in the case of mathematics and chemistry, in what sense, then, can we speak of a science of society? History shows that the term "science" is used with a remarkable degree of latitude. Formerly philosophy included science, frequently the terms have been and are

used synonymously, so that a "philosophical" magazine may be devoted to chemistry or other natural sciences.[1] Writers are apt to mean the same thing whether they speak of a science or a philosophy of law, of language, and of history. Before the term "science" was applied to a special kind of objects which were investigated according to a particular method, it was used to designate deeper knowledge, especially such as inquired into the causes of things, or knowledge developed in a systematic way. Hence it came to mean system, and some speculative philosophers have claimed that metaphysic is the most absolute science. We speak of theology and history as sciences. Yet only in part is the scientific method applicable, and the system called science may be one of faith rather than of scientific data. Thus the source and character of what was termed knowledge were not always taken into account. Less than a cen-

[1] In the introduction to his "Logic" Hegel calls attention to the fact that in England philosophy, in his estimation the very essence and climax of exact thinking, was not yet differentiated from natural science. He says that the eminent scientist Newton is constantly spoken of as the greatest philosopher. Thermometers, barometers, and similar apparatus are called "philosophical instruments;" but wood, iron, and other materials should not be regarded as the instruments of philosophy, whose only instrument is thought. He found that "Annals of Philosophy" was "a magazine of chemistry, mineralogy, mechanics, natural history, agriculture, and arts." Most astonishing, however, was the title of an English book: "The Art of Preserving the Hair, on Philosophical Principles, neatly printed in post 8, price 7 sh." What would he have said to the philosophic and scientific monstrosities in the literature of our day, not to mention our scientific education, our scientific politics, our scientific garments, our scientific cooking utensils, our scientific nostrums? What would he have said if he could have stepped out of his own metaphysics into the crude metaphysics of modern Sociology, crudely dubbed Science? He might have said: "I have demonstrated that being equals non-being or nothing. These scientists illustrate my position. They prove metaphysics nothing, and then fill their books with metaphysics. According to their own showing, they abound in something which is nothing."

tury ago philosophical speculation was deemed pre-eminently scientific in Germany, while knowledge based on observation, experience, and experiment, was rather contemptuously called empiricism. Now the reverse is the case. *A priori* speculation is disparaged, and science in the technical sense means objective knowledge, accessible to all who have the scientific method, and verifiable by means of this method. When used technically, a sharp distinction is made between philosophy and science, the former dealing with abstractions, principles, and the ultimate problems of the human mind, while the latter adheres more closely to reality, using observation and experiment as its means, and aiming to discover the causes and laws of phenomena, and to construct a system of them. For their best work scientists, however, require the highest philosophical powers; but we must discriminate between their science and their philosophy. Monism, materialism, spiritualism, pantheism, are not science, but philosophy, speculation which no experiment or demonstration can verify. When men start with materialism, which is a mere hypothesis, they make it a law for the reduction of all phenomena to its materialistic monism, test all knowledge by it, and reject as unworthy of inquiry what cannot be subjected to physical force. They may call this science, but it is speculation without scientific warrant.

While not subject to the same exactness as the natural sciences, we are justified in speaking of Sociology as a science in the sense of *systematized Knowledge*. We say knowledge, not opinion or faith; and if this knowledge cannot be made as strictly scientific as mathematics, that no more interferes with its trustworthiness and value than the genuineness and preciousness of music are destroyed for the man who sees no science in it.

The unscientific data usually increase in proportion as a subject is exalted and appeals to the highest human interests. We thus put Sociology in the same category as the other human disciplines called sciences, such as psychology, economics, jurisprudence, ethics, politics, all of which admit of principles, laws, and system; but it is immeasurably more complicated and difficult than these, involves all of them and much more, and for scientific treatment in any sense presents the greatest perplexities.

With an evidently realizable sense of science before us, we can pursue the study of Sociology with the determination to make our investigations as scientific as possible, and to put the knowledge gained in the best form. We shall be thankful if this knowledge can be made strictly positive, but prefer not to call it positive and capable of prevision before it has been proved such. So much at least has the era of criticism and of scientific progress taught us, — that we must learn what the mind *can* do with a subject before we settle dogmatically what it *must* do with it. In other words, in order to make the most of Sociology, we must expel that arrogant *a priori* dogmatism which obstructs real knowledge by putting in its place empty speculation and undemonstrable hypothesis.

Our aim is thus unmistakable. We go to the mind to study its character, before we class psychology with the natural sciences or with philosophy; we go to history for our knowledge of human events, without settling beforehand that in history we must find only the working of physical forces, and that definite and final laws of progress must be the result; we study human ethics, before resolving to find only an evolution of the ethics of brutes; we try to master political economy, without determining that the struggle for existence and the

survival of the fittest furnish the sole law for human industries: and just so we go to society for our knowledge of society, banishing all unscientific bias in favor of science, in order to be perfectly free in using to best advantage all means to make our interpretation definite, exact, comprehensive, and final. It is admitted that the man who starts with the purpose of writing history to prove materialism or spiritualism, or to establish some political dogma or ethical theory, is liable to vitiate the whole process of his inquiry, none the less really though it be done unconsciously; but the genuine historian is intent solely on the truth, takes it where and as he finds it, and lets it be its own invincible advocate. Does the sociologist become unscientific when he pursues the same course?

Sociology, according to its etymology, is the reason of society, the intellectual interpretation and logical system of human association. This sociological system is yet an ideal, but we keep it in view while dealing with the confused actuality of Sociology. For the realization of this system much preparatory study and long processes of development will yet be required; but if we must adopt Comte's Positive Philosophy, or Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy, as the way to Sociology, we are afraid of being lost on the way and of taking theories for facts. Is it not significant that philosophy is by these writers made the road to science? Why not resort to the scientific method of induction, construct a science so far as possible, and make that the basis of the philosophy? The exploded speculation of the metaphysical era drew its science from its philosophy; modern thought prefers to start with science and build on it, as a basis, the philosophy of the universe.

With the term "science" so carefully guarded as above,

we do not hesitate to employ it for the system of society. Sociology as the *philosophy* of society may be less liable to misunderstanding; but we must insist on making the study of the social realism and the scientific data within reach the foundation of our philosophy. All disciplines, so far as involved in society, are to be used in our research, whether they be natural or humanistic. Some laws we may term natural, others psychical, some personal as involving the entire psycho-physical personality, others sociological. If we can find laws expressive of the forces at work, we shall accept them; if they are merely empirical, we shall designate them as such; if a law stands only for a series of events or for a rule, and indicates what is customary rather than universal and necessary, in every case just what is found should be given, remembering that our idea of society is true in proportion as it is the intellectual counterpart of society as an actuality. We cannot foretell just what the results will be, but we are justified in believing that they will be of the utmost value.

There are various methods for determining the scientific character of Sociology. The traditional method follows Comte in regarding all knowledge as positive and scientific. When this theory is adopted as final, it is a dogmatism which dispenses with the painful necessity of inquiring into the exact sense in which "science" is to be used. By ignoring the fact that natural science has determined the technical sense of "scientific," the term "science" can be used loosely and variably. A scientific "habit" can be put for scientific thinking. With this loose use of the term all the *a priori* possibilities of the use of "science" have not yet been exhausted. Hypotheses respecting primitive peoples, ideas, and things of which we have no scientific data; beliefs with reference to the origin and evolution of social forms and institutions, of which no knowledge is within reach; and preconceived notions about secret processes in evolution, — all can be designated as scientific. Meta-

physic can be ridiculed as utterly unscientific, and then, in the name of monism or physicism or transmutationism or some other ism, can be lugged in and given the scientific stamp.

The scientific character of Sociology can also be assumed by making natural science the model to which it must, *nolens volens*, be conformed. This test has been applied to history, psychology, ethics, politics, philosophy, and social affairs generally. Its emphasis on facts as the tangible reality gave a marked impulse to historical investigation; but it was soon discovered that facts in humanity and facts in nature are very different, and that the laws of investigation in one sphere may help those in another, but cannot be authoritative and final. But in order to make humanity subject to natural law, why not reduce it to mechanical and physical necessity? Hence the materialistic dogmatism respecting man and society. Emphasis was placed on what was thought explicable in terms of natural science; what could not even be thought explicable now was postulated as undoubtedly explicable in this way at some future time. The materialistic hypothesis is considered more fully later. We have reason to believe that this species of postulated naturalism has had its day, except in the case of metaphysical survivals.

An entirely different method is the truly scientific one. Rejecting all *a priori* constructions falsely called science, it goes to the subject-matter of Sociology, and from the nature of the material learns what methods, what laws, what system are possible. Thus we evolve from society the science it involves, instead of forcing on society a science from a foreign department or from our preconceived notion of science. No argument is needed to commend to the scientific thinker this scientific method of determining the scientific character of Sociology.

We can understand how, when the progress in natural science threatened to make nature the sole object of valid knowledge, all subjects were to be made scientific in the sense of the physical sciences. The results of this attempt have been commented on by scientists themselves. The most emphatic protests against the effort to reduce all knowledge to natural science, and to make this science the test of the value of all thinking, came from the ranks of science. See, for instance, Du Bois-Reymond's addresses: "*Über die Grenzen der Naturerkenntniss*," and "*Die sieben Welträthsel*." The works of Lotze and Wundt also show that science in its techni-

cal sense is severely limited. The testimony of these two thinkers is the more significant because they passed through physiology and medical science to philosophy, and rank both as scientists and philosophers. The most eminent scientists, like Helmholtz, have been far more modest in their claims than those of the second or third rank, who expected to catch in their scientific net all that was worth knowing, and were able, with a single postulate called scientific, to evolve the universe.

Too much rigor cannot be exercised in the method and criticism of knowledge, but the mere form of knowledge does not determine its substantial value. We refuse to depreciate the vast realm of the personality because we cannot make it as strictly scientific as physics. The term "science" has been sufficiently abused by making it give absoluteness and finality to mere vagaries which were dubbed scientific, and every thinker in Sociology will strive to keep these abuses from his specialty. Shall we ignore history and literature and politics and ethics and religion because we cannot reduce them to natural science? Is a fact less a fact because its scientific place has not been determined?

Many a mistake consists chiefly in putting the ideal of science for the attained actuality. There is as yet but little science, though every subject is striving to become scientific. Even in the sense of a logical system, Sociology is scientific only tentatively. We may believe that a science lies at the basis of all we call intellectual and spiritual; but whether we shall ever be able to discover this science is a different matter. Now to apply the scientific test of mathematics or physics to objects which do not yet admit of such a test is simply a piece of arrogance.

We of course recognize social phenomena as connected, not arbitrary, not creations out of nothing, but as caused and causative. There must be some kind of regularity in human society, some kind of law; otherwise society could not be an object of rational thought or of a logical system. Chance and accident are purely subjective; they mean that we do not apprehend the causes actually at work. But how far we can discover the causes and laws must be left to future development. So exclusively has Sociology been treated as historic that some sociologists have made the regularity found in human history the essence, just as if the sole aim of the study were to find sociological laws in human progress and to make social prevision possible. That there are

laws of human association aside from the historic progress of humanity has been overlooked. Even if the laws of history are beyond our reach, we can have a Sociology, namely, a science or system of human association, giving the principles on which all society rests. If Sociology in this sense is not possible, how can social statics be a department of Sociology? Sociology as the science of human development reduces the whole to social dynamics.

Although an exact, mathematical determination of human events is out of the question, this does not imply that human affairs are involved in impenetrable mystery. In social reform and in our outlook into the future we can never treat persons as inorganic or material factors and mechanical forces. Our limitations leave beyond our knowledge and control many powers and their operations. Nevertheless, certain conditions are within our reach. We cannot foretell what progress will occur, or when and how; there may even be retrogressions or spiral movements which we cannot foresee. The past, however, inspires the confidence that there will be evolution, and that this will promote the progress of humanity. Certain powers inherent in human nature and in the external world must continue their work; the discovery of these is our especial aim, since they give us, whatever unknown forms they may take, the permanent factors in history. But aside from these there are other objects which we understand, and they are of great importance in Sociology. Education, ethics, religion, the state, language, literature, laws, institutions, we can interpret, their influence we know, their character we can affect. These have a kind of independent existence as social products, abiding while individuals and whole generations pass away. However variable and transitory personalities may be, here we have a large class of objects respecting which thorough knowledge is within reach. So far as these permanent factors are known we can form an estimate of their reformatory character and of their influence in shaping the future course of society. It need hardly be stated that for this no claim to scientific knowledge can be made.

Sociology is largely a philosophy of these social products. They are the treasures of culture, and their existence is the chief measure of culture. It is from these treasures that the individual draws his wealth. Culture consists in using, developing, and conserving such treasures. We can understand why the conditions

for civilization are most favorable in zones where men are obliged to exert themselves to secure a livelihood and yet find time for other exertions than the struggle for existence. What is wrought out, accumulated, and handed down by a people becomes a permanent element of culture. Perhaps in a lower stage of civilization people were stronger than now; but the treasures of culture were inferior. Our hope of human progress is based chiefly on those permanent social products which shall prove a blessing to coming generations. The study of society is thus largely a study of social institutions and inheritances.

That the study of these according to their nature is different from the study of material objects is evident. As in the latter we adopt the method of natural science, so in the former we adopt the sociological method. When writers like Gumplowicz insist that Sociology must be scientific in a naturalistic sense, they ignore the difference in the subject-matter of society and of nature. Such an insistence is an assumption which is neither scientific nor rational, and does not in the least enhance the scientific character or value of Sociology.

In a previous chapter we have attempted to limit sociological inquiries strictly to the sphere of Sociology. How difficult it is to do this becomes especially evident when the attempts to make of Sociology a science in the technical sense are considered. In order to accomplish that, there has been a marked tendency to reduce sociological to physical laws, which has given a strong flavor of materialism to the subject. This fact, not the investigation of the ultimate problems, is the reason for referring to the discussion of materialism here.

What matter is in itself we do not know; only its manifestations are within reach of our faculties. The same is true of mind. This careful investigators recognize, and for that reason they do not now as confidently as some decades since transmute matter into mind. Under the head of psycho-physics a new department of inquiry has been originated; but psychology has not been reduced to physiology. Even if investigators believe that natural force will eventually be able to explain consciousness, reason, and ethics, they have no right to promulgate their faith as a scientific axiom. Wherever Kant's philosophy has penetrated, confidence in solving the ultimate problems of being is shaken; where noumena are believed to be beyond our reach, phenomena absorb the

attention. Especially was this natural for English philosophers under the influence of Locke's empiricism and Hume's scepticism. We are not surprised, therefore, to find Mr. Spencer very modest in his claims respecting the ultimate problems. In his "First Principles" (54) he pronounces Matter, in its ultimate nature, "absolutely incomprehensible;" Force passes all understanding (66); Motion is likewise a mystery (56–7). In other words, matter, force, motion belong to the unknowable. The charge of materialism does not apply to him; for, since the ultimate questions are unanswerable, there is just as much ground for spiritualism as for materialism (502–3).[1] Yet he attempts "the interpretation of all phenomena in terms of matter, motion, and force," which are pronounced inscrutable and nothing but symbols. It is not apparent what is to be gained by a resort to the mysterious and unknowable for the interpretation of phenomena which lie open before us. If Mr. Spencer's symbols are themselves uninterpretable, of what use can they be for the interpretation of society? We have not yet learned the art of extracting intelligence from ignorance, the knowable from the unknowable. But the very fact that symbols to interpret social phenomena are drawn from the natural and physical realm tends to give a materialistic stamp to Sociology. However guarded Mr. Spencer may be in explaining the use of his terms, others may be tempted to employ matter, force, and motion for the promotion of materialism.

There are evidences that we are passing out of the era when scientific phraseology and philosophical theories were taken for science, into a more critical era which seeks to conserve science itself while consuming the dross attached to it. The mind is

[1] The passage is as follows: "The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force is nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols; and when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms the symbols remain symbols still. Hence the reasonings contained in the foregoing pages afford no support to either of the antagonist hypotheses respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic; and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic. . . . He who rightly interprets the doctrine contained in this work will see that neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both."

coming to itself and asserting its claims; that is, it recognizes matter, and itself as different from matter.

A superficial view is inclined to regard material phenomena as more clear than the mental, and to make the former the means of interpreting the latter. A deeper view, however, reverses this. The entire external world is known to us only as a reflection of our own minds, only as it becomes a subjective element. We know the material only in terms of our intellects, and never can get out of our minds into things as the interpreters of our mental processes. Since we never can deal with anything but mental percepts and concepts of objects, it seems strange, as Lotze remarks, that mind, which alone can discern or interpret matter, should ever be lost in matter. Some terms become so familiar by frequent use that we take it for granted we have their meaning, when they are the very ones that most of all need explanation. If men would think through the terms they use, they would be less inclined to resort to natural law, material force, and mechanical processes, all frequently used without any definite sense, for an interpretation of the universe, particularly of social phenomena.

Men who proclaim their total ignorance of matter need only become fully conscious of what they do in order to make them hesitate to absorb mind in matter and reduce the social to material phenomena. Carpenter says in his "Mental Physiology," "There seems valid ground for the assertion that our notion of *Matter* is a conception of intellect, Force being that externality of which we have the *most* direct — perhaps even the *only* direct — cognizance." To us, mind is always first; through it alone, and only in mental terms, can we know matter.

Brande says: "Of the ultimate nature of matter the human faculties cannot take cognizance; nor can data be furnished by observation or experiment on which to found an investigation of it. All we know of it is its sensible properties."

Lord Rayleigh, professor of experimental physics, Cambridge, England, said in his presidential address to the British Science Association: "Many excellent people are afraid of science as tending towards materialism. That such apprehension should exist is not surprising, for unfortunately there are writers, speaking in the name of science, who have set themselves to foster it. It is true that among scientific men, as in other classes, crude views are to be met with as to the deeper things of Nature; but that the

life-long beliefs of Newton, of Faraday, and of Maxwell are inconsistent with the scientific habit of mind, is surely a proposition which I need not pause to refute."

Huxley: "Matter and force, so far as we know, are mere names for certain forms of consciousness." He also says: "When Materialists stray beyond the borders of their path and begin to talk of there being nothing but matter and force and necessary laws, I decline to follow them."

Numerous equally significant utterances of other scientists, we are obliged to omit. We cannot, however, refrain from quoting a recent statement of a scientific, economic, and social thinker of the highest rank, Professor Schmoller, now Rector of the University of Berlin. In vol. vi., "Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften" (549) he says: "Whatever one may think in our day about the connection of physical and psychical life; no matter how one may emphasize that our intellectual life is conditioned by our nervous system; however one may properly conceive our feelings as attached to physiological processes; so much is certain, that we cannot explain the coexistence and sequence of intellectual conditions by means of nervous conditions, that the last recognizable condition of material elements and the first actions (or responses, *Accorde*) of the soul's life now, and probably for all time to come, must stand opposite each other as independent phenomena. Therefore those attempts at explanation which claim to deduce the conduct of man from mere physical or biological elements must all be pronounced failures or insufficient. . . . Whatever action there may be of natural and intellectual causes on each other, it must be maintained that we deal with two independent systems of causes, each following its own laws, and each requiring, and capable of, independent investigation of the connections they sustain."

It is significant that the scientist Ernst Haeckel felt it necessary to oppose that shallow sensationalism which disparages reason, and to defend emphatically and repeatedly the union of philosophy and science, of reflection and empiricism, of the idea and experience. His influence in favor of that species of monism which has become so powerful in Sociology is great, and for that reason we here refer to him. He identifies the monistic and mechanical philosophy. "The mechanical or monistic philosophy asserts that everywhere the phenomena of human life, as well as those

of external nature, are under the control of fixed and unalterable laws, that there is everywhere a necessary causal connection between phenomena, and that, accordingly, the whole knowable universe forms one undivided whole, a *monon*." There are no purposive, teleological causes. What is called free-will is declared to be as much subject to fixed laws "as any other natural phenomenon." He rejects the popular distinction between nature and spirit. "Man is not above nature, but in nature." ("The Evolution of Man," English translation, vol. ii., 455). This monism, he claims, might be called spiritualism as well as materialism; but as it is mechanical monism, it has a materialistic rather than spiritualistic quality.

Not a few scientists have been astonished at the facility with which Haeckel evolved man from the monera and amœbæ, and philosophers must be equally astonished at his monism. He declares that the monistic philosophy "can as little believe in force without matter, as in matter without force. . . . The 'spirit' and 'mind' of men are but forces which are inseparably connected with the material substance of our bodies. Just as the motive force of our flesh is involved in the muscular form-element, so is the thinking force of our spirit involved in the form-element of the brain. Our spiritual forces are as much functions of this part of the body as every force is a function of a material body. We know of no matter which does not possess force, and, conversely, of no forces that are not connected with matter" (456–7).

And this *dualism* of matter and force we are seriously asked to take as *monism!* The one cannot be resolved into the other, the one does not precede the other, but both are inseparable. This inseparableness is, consequently, the monistic element. For the sake of intellectual honesty let us call this system *dualistic monism* or *monistic dualism.*

He is consistent with his theory that anthropology is a part of zoölogy. He claims that he sees that "in the entire history of the evolution of man, in the history of the germ, as well as in that of the tribe, no other active forces have been at work than in the rest of organic and inorganic forces." Man under "the fixed and unalterable laws" of nature, entirely controlled by mechanical causes, absolutely without free-will, cannot, therefore, be any more responsible for his actions than the brute.

Now turn to the preface of this book. Of its subject he says: "No other branch has been so wilfully obscured and mystified, by priestly influence." The conclusions reached by the study produce "an incredulous smile" and even "disgust." But are not the priestly influence, the smile, and the disgust the inevitable product of the unalterable mechanical laws? He denounces scientists who dissent from his conclusions, as severely as he does "the infallible Vatican" and "the black international;" yet, according to his own theory, those scientists, and that Vatican, and all the gods of Olympus, and all the ghosts that haunt men, are nothing but the product of those fixed and unalterable laws! His wrath is kindled against men and gods, the very product of his monism. If an absolute mechanical law does away with all freedom, why blame the product of absolute necessity? The Greeks already knew that it is folly to fight against Fate. But as an apology for his wrath, we must remember that it too is the product of fixed and unalterable mechanical laws, just as the mischievous views he so heroically combats, if the mechanical laws admit of heroism. We have no language to express our convictions respecting a monism that produces all in the universe according to an absolute and blind necessity, and then turns on men and gods, on superstition and wickedness, which are solely and helplessly its own product, and berates them as if they were not its legitimate offspring, as if they could help what the mechanical laws made them. A system that ends in absurdity needs no further criticism. When, however, it is to be made the law of Sociology, we have a right to protest. Here a healthy agnosticism is more rational. This scientific agnosticism may have room for faith where science and philosophy cannot rule. Haeckel himself gives a striking passage respecting the limits of scientific inquiry: "The history of the evolution of organism, equally with the history of human civilization, can never be the subject of 'exact' investigation."

Sociology has too long suffered from philosophical speculations and metaphysical hypotheses, which were confidently proclaimed scientific. Schäffle ("Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers," i., 128) thinks that the work now most of all required is of a preparatory character. "The work of description is far from being completed." To him it seems doubtful whether we are prepared to establish any social laws. "At the present stage of the investi-

gation we do not presume to decide whether social laws of general application will be the result of the comparative description."

To the student can be commended the reserve found (vol. i., 3) in Tylor's "Primitive Culture:" "None will deny that, as each man knows by the evidence of his own consciousness, definite and natural cause does, to a great extent, determine human action. Then, keeping aside from considerations of extra-natural interference and causeless spontaneity, let us take this admitted existence of natural cause and effect as our standing-ground, and travel on it as far as it will bear us. It is on this same basis that physical nature pursues, with ever-increasing success, its quest of laws of nature. Nor need this restriction hamper the scientific study of human life, in which the real difficulties are the practical ones of enormous complexity of evidence, and imperfection of methods of observation."

Darwin's definitions of nature and law show that he was anxious to avoid the metaphysical problems. "I mean by nature only the aggregation and product of many natural laws, — and by laws only the ascertained sequence of events."

In Draper's "Intellectual Development of Europe," the first chapter contains a discussion of law in human affairs.

Quatrefages, in "The Human Species," Book I., chapter i., recognizes the relation of man to the lower animals, but at the same time lays stress on his peculiarities. "Is man distinguished from animals by important and characteristic phenomena, absolutely unknown in the latter? For more than forty years I have answered this question in the affirmative, and my convictions, tested by many controversies, are now stronger than ever." He puts the human phenomena in a special kingdom, declaring them to be "the attributes of a kingdom which we call the *Human Kingdom.*" Anthropology has "its own special field of study, and on that account alone its special questions, which often could not be solved by processes borrowed from cognate sciences." This does not interfere with the organic unity of man as an animal with the rest of the world. "In anthropology, every solution, to be sound, that is to say, true, should refer man, in everything which is not exclusively human, to the generally recognized laws for other organized and living beings."

Schäffle, in the volume quoted above, discusses the limits of sociological knowledge, and makes frequent mention of the mate-

rialistic hypothesis, which he rejects as untenable. In his "Gesammelte Aufsätze," the first article discusses the relation of Darwinism to social science. He shows that in reference to society the application of natural selection is limited.

The following, from F. M. Sprague's book on "The Laws of Social Evolution," is one of numerous evidences that the reduction of Sociology to a natural science is deemed a failure. "The unsuccessful but chronic attempt to explain the social in terms of a physical organism must be abandoned. It was born of arrogant physicism. It is an analogical monstrosity and a grotesque caricature of the scientific method. The social organism is based on mind, the physical organism on matter. The properties of matter cannot be compared with those of mind."

Our position is thus clear. In the interest of true science we demand the rejection of all false scientific assumptions. Not the least objection is urged against making Sociology as positive or scientific as possible; we in fact insist on this, but we distinguish between this and the adoption of a system of speculative and metaphysical philosophy as the basis of Sociology, then making this philosophy a species of dogmatism, adherence to which is made the condition of science! In order to avoid this, a former chapter has urged the separation of Sociology from all adulterating admixtures and confusing entanglements.

Let natural law be applied to society so far as possible. But after it has explained all within its reach, let the peculiarity of psychological, personal, and sociological factors be acknowledged. If these factors are mysterious, let us say so, without professing to explain them by simply hiding them under still greater mysteries. Thus we shall gain as much as by dogmatic assumptions, while our method will be scientific, which the other is not.

In order to test the correctness of the views here given, the student is requested to examine the sociological works from Comte till the present. They have scientific elements and aim at positive knowledge, and this knowledge they seek to reduce to system. But so far as scientific knowledge is concerned, knowledge gained by means of the scientific method, knowledge as exact as natural science, absolute and final, it forms a small fraction of the works. They abound in description and historic references, in presuppositions and theories and surmises, and sometimes a whole system of speculative philosophy is suddenly thrust as science on the unsus-

pecting student. Those who come to the study with different presuppositions and a different psychology, also give different interpretations of the same social phenomena. Hence, instead of strict science, which is indisputable and has objective validity for all, we have tentative scientific efforts, and, in many instances, a conglomerate mass whose chaotic state is its most striking characteristic.

Is Sociology a science? Yes and no. It is not a science yet in any sense; it has not the conditions for a mathematical or physical science. Some of its material can be made more strictly scientific than the rest. Taking all its material into account, we are warranted in saying that it can be made scientific in the sense of valid and systematized knowledge. Even in this sense we are now obliged to regard Sociology as but tentatively the science of society.

A fuller discussion of various points in this chapter are found in the following books of the author: "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy," chapter iii., Philosophy and Science; "The Life of Immanuel Kant," chapters viii. and ix; and "Tendencies in German Thought," second and third lectures on "Tendencies in German Philosophy."

In "Essays in Philosophical Criticism," edited by Seth and Haldane, the second essay, by R. D. Haldane, is on "The Relation of Philosophy to Science."

REFLECTIONS.

Different Meanings of the Term "Science." Technical and Popular Use. Difference between Science and Philosophy. Scientific Method as determining the Scientific Character of Disciplines. Exactness and Certainty in Natural and Human Affairs. In what Sense is Sociology a Science? The Factors in Sociology which yield the most Scientific Data. Is Materialism Scientific? Tentative Character of Sociology as a Science. Review of the Chapter.

CHAPTER X.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE AGE.

The Problem. *Special interest attaches to our own age. It is the culmination of the entire process of evolution; the past is known to us only as its results have come down to our time; we have direct contact with the age, are part of it, and can by means of personal observation study its sociological character; and then it is the only age whose society immediately affects us and whose social affairs we can directly help to mould.*

What is the sociological character of the age? What societies exist and how are they related to one another? Amid the varied factors of our social life, none of the forces of the past are wanting: but our problem pertains to the degree of development attained by them, how they are correlated and what their interaction is, and which forces are dominant, which subordinate. We aim at the sociological characteristics of the times.

Especially for ethics is a knowledge of the social forces and needs important. We must learn the social needs and demands in order to supply them; we must know the social forces in order to use them; and we must understand the social aspirations in order to direct them. Particularly worthy of study are certain great economic movements, such as communism, socialism, and individualism. The importance of viewing these subjects sociologically consists in the fact that in this way

the pernicious partial and partisan tendencies can be overcome.

In his own country the American student will find some of the most fruitful as well as most momentous sociological questions of the day.

The social humanity of the age, what it is, how it became what it is, and whither it tends, — that is the problem.

WEIGHTY reasons have led to the discussion of this subject. The sociological study of the age will give the student an opportunity of applying the principles enunciated in the preceding pages to his own environment and times. Besides thus fixing the principles more definitely and more firmly in his mind, he will be led into the social realism of the day. From the sociological interpretation of the age he can turn back to the past and trace the genesis of society as it now is, and to the future to consider what conditions are required for social progress. Even though we are obliged to limit our investigation to general outlines, they may be guides for the study of a lifetime.

Just what is aimed at is the first question. If we consider the whole of humanity as it exists at this particular time, we are at once impressed how small a portion of it we know or can know with any degree of thoroughness. There are vast regions, including many millions of inhabitants, of which our knowledge is very imperfect. Even Americans and Europeans, with rare exceptions, do not understand each other. To scholars themselves much in America, in Russia and the Balkan States, in China, India, and other parts of Asia, in Japan and Africa, has to be classed as *terra incognita*. So soon as we consider the question of details, we find

that at best our knowledge is vague in proportion as it is comprehensive. Only among the advanced nations do we find trustworthy statistics; so that so simple a fact as the number of people on the globe, on continents, and in nations has to be estimated or guessed.[1]

In a limited sphere our knowledge may be tolerably definite, as in our immediate environment, state, or nation. Other countries may be visited, or detailed accounts of them are accessible. But taking the society of our age as a whole, we find ourselves limited to general features. Some particular parts can be taken for special study because they most nearly concern us, or are of most importance for understanding the age. Thus a study of the enlightened nations reveals the progress attained throughout the process of evolution.

For the sake of his own discipline as well as for the knowledge to be gained, the student ought to make a thorough personal investigation of some society or societies. In general, however, the aim should be to

[1] The population of the globe is supposed to be between fourteen and fifteen hundred millions, more than twenty times as many as there are inhabitants in the United States. The births are from forty to fifty millions annually, the deaths somewhat less than the births. Not only are these numbers too large for definite conception, but there is no possibility of making them exact, on account of the lack of statistics outside of Europe and America. How limited our knowledge of the world's social condition is becomes evident so soon as we reflect on our ignorance respecting our own people and other enlightened nations, which constitute but a fraction of humanity; of the rest our ignorance is still more dense. Unless a specialty is made of the subject, it is safe to say that of more than nine-tenths of the world's inhabitants even scholars have not an intelligent general conception. In confirmation of this we need but look at the distribution of these inhabitants: America, 120,000,000; Europe, 369,000,000; Asia, 800,000,000; Africa, 200,000,000. Most students know even North America and Western Europe very imperfectly; South America and Eastern Europe are obscure, while extremely vague notions prevail respecting Asia, Africa, and the islands of the sea, containing over two-thirds of the population of the globe.

get the dominant characteristics of the age in which the character of society is embodied. The study of the age is largely a study of its purposes, of the objects which attract men, of the needs which they feel most deeply, of the motives of action. In these we behold the *Zeitgeist*, to which other things are subordinate. A society may express its heart in a single trend. At the same time other motives come in and modify the dominant ones. Nations are often unjust to one another because the whole nation and all the affairs of the nation are judged by some general characteristic, as when Germany is apprehended as merely a military power, England as a nation of shop-keepers, and the United States as a moral (or immoral) wilderness in which the golden calf is worshipped.

The study of the advanced nations is most important. The lower peoples represent types which have been found, with some variations, in other ages. For the characteristics of the times we look chiefly to the civilized states. Not that the lower stages of culture are to be neglected. A panorama of existing peoples, passing in regular gradation from the lowest to the highest culture, would present many of the most essential characteristics of the world's history. For the enlightened of the age this study of the lower existing forms of society has a direct significance: they behold the various stages through which their ancestors passed and through which the ages have pushed their way to our age. In the Indo-Germanic languages, literatures, and history, many deposits of the various stages of development are distinctly seen. In many higher forms of culture we have survivals or products of the lower, and in their genesis we have conditions for their interpretation. For another reason also this study is im-

portant. The inferior races are engaging the attention and enlisting the energies of the advanced nations. They are affected by the civilization with which they come in contact; but they, in turn, influence civilized lands, and this influence is likely to grow with their culture.

The times are peculiarly favorable for the sociological study of our age. Science, fame and adventure have led men to explore the habitable parts of the globe and to penetrate regions heretofore deemed inaccessible; the darkest realms have attracted missionaries, because in greatest contrast with the light they brought; the industrial nations make the world their market, and their commerce, freighted with blessings and curses, seeks the peoples by the seas, and traverses valleys and mountains to find those that are inland. The world's postal and telegraph arrangements, the ease of communication, the frequency of travel, have done their part to make the world know the world. Colonization aids in this spread of knowledge. The great interests and movements of our times bring the leading states into close relations. The stronger care for the weaker, as the large fish of the sea do for the small. A few nations rule the world, not because requested, but because they find it to their interest and have the power. This makes diplomacy active and puts a premium on such knowledge as will give one nation an advantage over another. The peoples watch and study one another, in order to obtain the requisite knowledge for their economic and political affairs.

The growing intimacy of nations has promoted similarity. In Russia, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and other lands, the development of the consciousness of nationality during

the century has been marked. But parallel with this has also been the development of cosmopolitanism. Internationalism has grown as well as nationalism, and men can go abroad and feel at home. A monotonous sameness is even complained of as characteristic of the great cities of different countries.

The same trend is seen in scholarship, in literature, in inventions. Genius now thinks, writes, and invents for the world. Thanks to the post and telegraph offices and the press, important discoveries, inventions, and movements are at once communicated to all nations. The people generally take a deeper interest in the world's affairs as education spreads and they themselves receive a share in the government.

These facts show what advantages are offered to the sociological student for the study of the age. A knowledge of the nations whose characteristics are of most value to him is within his reach. By studying the European and American nations which are in the van, he will learn the most striking features of the age, the peculiarities which distinguish our times from the past, and also the most potent influences to which the other nations and peoples are subject.

With so large a field before him, and with details of such bewildering variety and multiplicity, a systematic plan of study is indispensable. How can he master the subject?

Every sociologist must be gratified by the popular interest in his specialty; but he ought to insist on maintaining its scientific character. For this reason we emphasize Sociology as a system, and treat as sociological only such social material as forms part of the system. Isolated social data are not sociological, but they may become so through systematic correlation. Keeping in

view the distinction between social and sociological, the student will perceive that by the sociological study of the age we mean such an investigation as will give a knowledge of the existing society, of the social systems which prevail, of the associative energies of the times, and of the organism they form. A social fact is to the sociologist what a stone is to the geologist. Not as isolated phenomena does he view the murder of Alexander II., of Carnot, and of Canovas, but so far as the nihilism or anarchism in the deeds have their cause in society.

What was said under Sociation leaves no doubt that the social forces are the special objects of investigation. We must consider the individuals of the times in order to understand the association of the age; but we consider them as the possessors of the social energies.

Thus it is claimed by a specialist on the characteristics of the age that more stress should be placed on feeling than is usually done by students. He holds that feeling, as the basis of taste, inclination, and disposition, determines the course of the intellect and the will. This places peculiar stress on feeling as a social energy. Is it true that now society is dominated by emotional impulse rather than by rational considerations, dogmas, and theories? If so, then the kind of feeling which is dominant becomes one of the most important problems.

On the principle that the dominant interest determines the focus of thought, the social element in the literature of the past has become an object of inquiry. In the literature of our age the social factor is a constantly increasing quantity. Much in it, however, will strike as strange the sociologist who has apprehended the social energies as the essence. For the sociological study of a nation, the nativity of its inhabitants, on which many lay great stress, may be to little purpose. The more homo-

geneous a people, the more valuable their nativity in sociological study; but if the differentiations are great, the nativity cannot be regarded as a mark of character. There is some value in the statistics in America of Chinese, Italians, and Irish in this respect, because significant traits are general among these peoples. Less importance is to be attached to immigrants from Russia, with its 120,000,000 inhabitants. Are they Stundists, Lutherans, Baptists, or of the orthodox faith? Perhaps they are expelled Jews, or nihilists, or followers of Tolstoi. Still less valuable for social study are the statistics of Germans and their descendants. There are nearly a score of factions in the German Parliament, representing numerous phases of economics, of revolutionary, republican, and monarchical views; and yet many throughout the empire may claim that their views are not represented. The religious sentiments vary from avowed atheism, based on bald materialism, to ultramontanism. When accordingly it is said that a certain percentage of American citizens are of German origin, it does not reveal their character. Bismarck once lamented that his countrymen so readily adopted the characteristics of the people among whom they settled. But aside from their Americanization which wipes out past peculiarities, the difference in the immigrants themselves must be considered. The Pennsylvania Germans are a type by themselves. Later immigration has brought numerous other varieties. In the early part of the century came the Missouri Lutherans of hyper-orthodoxy; 1848 brought freethinkers; then followed a strong tide of immigrants from Catholic districts; since then social democrats have come in large numbers. With this variety, representing diverging religious, political, and industrial types, what definite notion is given

when the statistics of Germans in the United States is given? It means little even to say that a man is a native American. Is he a Yankee? There are Yankees and Yankees, an endless diversity. Is he from the South? From the West? It has even been questioned whether a distinct American type has been developed. Even to state his religion, politics, and industrial pursuit, may give but a vague notion of the man.

This vagueness is overcome when, instead of numbering persons, we seize what actually constitutes society, the social forces. In this way we master what actually determines association, and drop all foreign elements. Whatever nationality may mean or not mean, the social forces mean everything. Classified according to their social energies, large bodies of Germans will be placed with certain other foreigners and with certain native Americans, rather than with the rest of their countrymen.

In the sociological study of the existing social forces we investigate them not as isolated, but as organically connected, as co-operative. This must be remembered in order not to lose ourselves in *a* social science, instead of confining ourselves to *the* social science.

With the whole of humanity before us various classifications of society are possible. The study according to races is vague. The racial bounds are not sharply drawn; even the number of races is in dispute. Besides, marked differences are found in the same race. There are advantages in the division according to religion; but even when we consider the highest religions, what a confusing variety in different nations! The adherents of Christianity would have to be put into various classes in order to get a definite idea of them. A more satisfactory division is possible according to the degree of cul-

ture attained. As a general classification we have the barbarous, the semi-civilized, the civilized, and then we might add the most enlightened. But each of these divisions requires numerous sub-divisions. In each stage of progress, however, certain social forces are dominant and determine characteristics of the peoples belonging to that stage.

If we confine our sociological inquiries to the most advanced nations as of supreme importance, we concentrate our attention on Europe and America, particularly the western part of the former and the northern of the latter. Their religion, their education, their politics, their industrial pursuits, their intimate relations and influence on one another, and their general trend give certain common characteristics which enable us to study them together.

Taking these nations as a whole, the most dominant trend is toward *Objective Realism*.[1]

By this we mean that they seek something objective; no longer satisfied with subjective notions, they demand reality in the ordinary sense. Objective reality being made the supreme aim, it becomes the test of faith, hope, and all religious conceptions and mental products. Hence historical and biblical criticism; the emphasis was formerly placed on *what* men believed, but now it is on the *grounds* of belief. So many opinions have been found to rest on imagination that the age has become suspicious not only in religious matters. General scepticism and agnosticism respecting the foundations of

[1] For a fuller discussion of the subject the author refers to his volume on "The Age and the Church." The Appendix contains "The Study of the Age," giving the method and means of the study. The Principles involved in the study are found in the first chapter of the book. The second and third chapters discuss "The Characteristics of the Age."

knowledge make ours a transition era in intellect. While objective realism is sought as the bottom rock, the trend appears with different force and in various forms among the advanced nations, and the counteracting influences also vary greatly; but that trend is the most distinctive fundamental feature of our times.

The creation and promotion of this trend are largely due to the intellectual place and popular influence of natural science.[1] This has also had a large share in determining the most striking characteristic in this general trend. What kind of objective reality do men seek? Not that of the next world and in the future, but here and now. This-worldliness, this-sidedness are the new terms which characterize the tendency. Hence theoretical materialism; hence practical materialism even where the theoretical is rejected; hence realism in art and literature; hence the prevalence of industrialism, economics, capitalism; hence material welfare as the great concern of politics and the daily press; hence

[1] The nineteenth century has frequently been called the century of natural science. This has been justified by the remarkable achievements in this department, and by the inventions and practical results which followed. The effects produced arrested the popular attention, affected the method of research, gave new conceptions of the universe, and deeply influenced all departments of thought. But an exclusive predominance of natural science cannot be claimed. Historians affirm that the advance in their specialty is no less marked. For proof they point to the archives which have been opened during the century, to the extensive excavations of buried remains in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, to the deciphering of inscriptions unread for thousands of years, to the numerous historical works of great excellence in various languages and in all departments of research, and to the progress in historiography. In no department of learning is the claim to exclusive predominance justified. Progress can be claimed in economics and political science, as well as in natural science and history. A mighty impulse has been given to empirical investigations, particularly to such as have a direct bearing on industrial and social life.

revolutionary socialism, so far as it makes political economy the social science on which life and society depend. Here, then, we have the fruit of the factory, of steam and electricity, of inventions, and of that marvellous industrial development which has transformed the world.

Intimately connected with this materialistic and realistic trend is the decline of philosophy where once the dominant intellectual pursuit; the prevalence of history as dealing with facts; the preference of sensationalism and empiricism over intellectual rationalism and speculation; the attempt to reduce Sociology, ethics, and all human affairs to natural law; the absorbing pursuit of earthly pleasure or happiness as the aim of life.

The new studies, interests, and developments have stimulated life in general. The age is characterized by marvellous activity. New subjects have been developed, religion has been energized by the very opposition it has encountered. The conflicts of thought, of education, of faith, of life, have prevented stagnation and promoted energy. Hence the variety of activities in modern society.

A reaction against the naturalistic trend has set in. It is felt in France, where realism celebrated its greatest triumphs in art and literature. Philosophy has received fresh impulses in Germany, and in that land of ideals one hears less now than quite recently the complaint that the ideals have vanished.

We thus find a dominance of economic forces in society; the political forces largely subject to the economic; with a strong trend towards hedonism in ethics; with education, art, literature, and the church deeply affected by the mammonistic spirit. The subordination of higher interests, the crushing out of faith by the

weight of crass materialism, the satiety wrought by pleasure, the contrast of realizations with the ideals and aspirations of modern life, and the sensitiveness of our culture, produce that pessimism which has become so common in certain circles, so that men wonder, particularly in emergencies, whether life is worth living.

In Germany and France, in England and the United States, the social forces here indicated are found in different degrees of intensity, with peculiar manifestations in each, and with a variety of forces trying to counteract or modify the dominant ones. The rise of Germany to a leading economic nation is a sign of the times. In spite of its militarism and educational interests, it is now attempting with remarkable success to rival the first industrial nations in production and commerce.

Those who rely on the continued supremacy of a particular force may build on a sandy foundation. Soon, or in the course of time, the dominance may be transferred to other energies. Our age of fermentation teems with transformations. Past impulses continue traditional courses, but these are met by strong counter-movements. It is one of the firmest convictions of the age that momentous changes are inevitable. The demand is imperative that things be dethroned that man may be enthroned; the emphasis is being shifted from objective realism to the claims of the heart and the conscience, of reason, faith, and hope; and abnormal and partisan tendencies will be doomed in exact proportion as Sociology, with its stress on all the social energies and on society as a unity, is promoted. The consciousness of existing evils is the condition for overcoming them; and this consciousness is being deeply developed. That peoples can be lifted to a higher plane of thought and life is evident

when some great interest is to be conserved, when slavery is to be abolished, when national unity and safety are to be achieved, or when a faith dearer than life is to be maintained.

This struggle for existence, for earthly being and well-being, with its fierce competition, with means often so brutal as to trample on persons for the sake of getting things, could be traced, with its attendant forces, through various phases of social life. That there are many social groups and organizations in which higher aims, intellectual, ethical, religious, are dominant, is fully admitted; we are only speaking of what is of most general prominence.

We cannot investigate, but only indicate, other plans of study. Different forms of organization and association can be taken up for special inquiry. The aristocracy can be examined, whether of birth, of wealth, or of intellect; the middle class, and laborers. Particularly in the rising, the solidarity, the internationalism, and the trend, of laborers is much of the age reflected. This pressing upward from the lowest social stratum suggests the uprising of the people at the time of the French Revolution. But what was a local volcano a century ago has now become an earthquake shaking all the enlightened nations. The materialistic element is prominent in the social agitations of the masses, but there are also ideal factors in the aspiration to rise to a better condition.

Besides the general characteristics of the age which permeate all its social forms, we can specialize on particular associations and institutions. Too much stress can hardly be laid on the family, the social nucleus. The sacredness of the family relation, the theories of marriage and divorce, and the laws on these subjects,

the actual family life, all are important. Worthy of special study also are the school, the church, politics, the ethical, literary, scientific, philosophical, and æsthetic societies. Their power as a concentration of specific energies is the object of the investigation. For thorough knowledge the organizations and institutions must of course be studied in their genesis and correlations.

Astonishing results will likely be discovered by the student who distinguishes between what the society of the day has inherited and what it adds to this inheritance through its own achievements. Owing to another of those pernicious and undiscriminating generalizations, we credit existing society with excellences which are not its own creation. We glory in the advance of society over the past, when its very superiority may consist in the contributions made by the past. This becomes evident when we distinguish between the treasures transmitted to society, and the mechanism in which it moves, on the one hand, and the actual social forces exerted by the members of society, on the other. It is like the etiquette of a court: it has a polite and refined mechanism in which each is obliged to move, a mechanism so dominant that it is calculated to hide the weakness, the inanity, the vice, and even brutality, of such as are admitted into the first society of the land. Why emphasize the substance when the form is everything?

Are the social forces of the age really an advance over the past, better in quality, of greater degree, of more vigorous interaction than in former times, or is the advance in the inheritances from the past? When so generally ours is designated as an era of decadence, it surely cannot mean that there is a decrease in what has been transmitted to us.

It may be a question whether there is not danger of

over-organization or of over-socialization. There can be no doubt that certain communistic and socialistic tendencies do not sufficiently respect individual rights and peculiarities. A decay of individuality is complained of; in free countries public opinion is the new despot which enslaves the personality. As in some places the government has heretofore left to individuals what should have been settled by law, now the reaction may tend to a paternalism which seeks to do everything for the people and leave nothing for them to do for themselves. Legal enactments have their limits; they are no substitute for character and will.

The tendency to organize the social forces is very marked. An idea, a dogma, a purpose, a conscious need, becomes the nucleus of an organization. In this century of organizations — religious, industrial, political, literary, scientific — is there not danger of consigning to associations, committees, clubs, what can only be done by individuals? We are liable to forget that the social forces, even in organizations, are individual forces in interaction and depend on individual character and energy for their efficiency. The individual is enervated if he dwindles into insignificance compared with the power of organization. Yet we must look to strong personalities for creative forces and initiative efforts. The association represents the average; it is composed of what enters into the interaction of forces. What is highest and best may be individual, not social; then it can be made social only if it is transmitted by the individual to society. There ought to be a growth of the personality and individuality in proportion to the growth of socialism and organization.

As the century culminates and closes, the effects of its marvellous activity and development become appar-

ent. Distraction is one of the characteristics of the times. Men are bewildered by the multiplicity of objects and interests which demand their attention. A fair sample of this is seen in the daily paper. The power of forgetting is a blessed gift; what could a man do with himself if all the stuff he reads had to be lugged along? So many things appeal to the mind and heart that men lose themselves. They are under constant strain. Hence they are excited, nervous. Sensations develop the taste for sensation; therefore the spectacular and sensational must grow in order to continue to interest.

These characteristics are marks of modern society. Men belong to so many societies that they do not belong to themselves.[1] As new interests are presented they become the cause of organizations. These are often in conflict with one another, and increase the conflicts and distractions. Especially are these evident in the industries, politics, and religion. The antagonism between organizations (capitalists and laborers, individualists and socialists, conservatives and radicals in politics, Catholics and Protestants) is such that for the sake of internal peace the determination of the relation of voluntary associations to one another and to the government has become one of the most important functions of the state.

The prominence given to society was the condition for the origin and rapid development of Sociology. It is destined to revolutionize social theory; and momentous practical results must follow. The study of the

[1] I know of a lady in private life who belongs to thirty-seven societies, not including the church, the state, the family, and unorganized social circles. There are no doubt men and women who belong to a still larger number.

social forces will more and more lead to the mastery of their use. An apprehension of the organism of these forces will overcome their false isolation and one-sided development, and promote their proper correlation and harmonious development. Already we are passing from a perverted individualism into a new social era, — some prefer to say socialistic. We are beginning to realize what the individual owes to society, what social responsibility means, and the need of socializing of the individual what belongs to society.

Society as a totality is coming to the front, instead of societies. We are learning that what is called social because in the interest of a fractional or partisan organization, may be anti-social, because opposed to the interest of society at large. A community of interests is recognized as pertaining to all members of society. The welfare of one part at the expense of another is known to be detrimental to society itself. One reason why the functions of the state are increased is that the conviction prevails that society must do more for the general welfare. That what belongs to the public should be done by the public is a growing sentiment. The socializing trend is seen in the tendency toward mutualism, partnership, co-operation, conciliation, arbitration, in the industries, instead of wild competition in which might makes right, and instead of an antagonism which threatens society, and of an anarchy which endangers the authority of the law and the existence of the state. The trend toward solidarity is also seen in international affairs, as in the movement toward arbitration, in forming alliances among nations, and in the Concert of Powers.[1]

[1] Is there not in nations a trend toward combination, just as in the industries? The Triple Alliance and the Concert of the European

Eternal peace between nations may for a long time be a dream, and an alliance which shall include all peoples may be the hope of only a few now; but these few may stand on summits where fall the morning's first rays which usher in the new day. Truth and right and goodness and the beauty of harmony point in that direction. It is the prophecy which lies concealed in Sociology. The fact that there is a strong trend toward an equalization which places the elements of our common humanity above the fiction of rank attained simply by birth, is significant.

The filling up of this meagre outline must be left to the student. He can trace more fully the development and interaction of the social energies which have been mentioned. Ages are not so much distinguished by the absence or presence of social forces as by the relations the forces sustain to one another. Two ages may contain the same forces, yet one be controlled by religious interests, the other by industries, and therefore show marked differences; or in both the industries may be dominant, yet in different degrees. No investigator questions that relatively religion now absorbs

Powers seem indicative of that trend. The solidarity of interests among nations is likely to lead to international co-operation. No one familiar with national action questions that such action, no less than that of individuals and voluntary associations, is largely controlled by selfish interests. But nations are more guarded; diplomacy may be the art of so using words as to hide the real meaning. By the interaction of nations the interests held in common will receive more attention. The conditions and movements of the times now more than ever promote internationalism. There are indications that we are on the eve of great national conflicts; but they are likely to be but means for greater unity among nations. The organic relation of nations is becoming more evident, just as the social organism of humanity. Certainly at no former period did the conditions for general progress seem so favorable as at present. But there are also powerful deteriorating and destructive tendencies which must be studied in forming an estimate of the age.

less attention than during the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and later periods. Yet it may be that this does not indicate an actual loss of religious power. Perhaps religion has not lost, but the industries have gained, and that makes the change in relative prominence. Trinity Church, New York, need not lose a particle, and yet the attention may be so concentrated on Wall Street and on the tide of humanity sweeping along Broadway that nothing but the clock of the church is looked at; and the business blocks may so overtower the steeple that the church, once a most conspicuous landmark, is hardly visible. The church is the same, the surroundings are changed.

The account of the social forces of the age here given is the result of decades of special study in America and Europe. Different views on so extensive a subject will naturally prevail. The most conflicting opinions are found even among scholars. Few try to get a philosophy of the age, being content with the facts given by the papers rather than intent on passing from them to principles. A local study of the social forces in one's environment or state may yield results different from those obtained when the study is extended both to Europe and America.

In the preceding pages the emphasis has been placed on prominent and dominant tendencies. Many a heart and many a region may promote other tendencies without interfering with the correctness of the statements given.

The social forces of the day must be judged according to the influences under which they act. Forces active in humanity from the first have been unusually developed because stimulated and exercised under peculiar circumstances. The factory, the use of steam and electricity, machinery, have exerted a dominant influence. The faculties have grown in the line in which they were cultivated; the taste, the purpose, have grown in the same direction. The ease of production has absorbed attention in production. Add to this the increased appreciation and study of nature, and the trend indicated by realism, industrialism, capitalism, economics, materi-

alism, commercialism, competition, is easily understood. What is intended as the means of life is made the end.

As the study of the age is largely that of the relative dominance of social forces, so the changes to be made will be in respect to this dominance. We must have bread; but that does not mean that it is life's essence. In future progress not an iota of any real value gained in the past is to be dropped. The sociological student by his study of the social totality, and of the harmonious relation of its various forces, is saved from the popular movement of a reaction against an extreme toward another extreme. The problem of progress for him is the right proportion of the social forces. The higher interests must be made supreme; and the value of the industries consists in making them the foundation on which life builds.

Much of the efficiency of the social forces depends on the nature of their organization. Education and the intellectual forces generally are best organized in Germany. The schools are state institutions under the control of a cabinet minister (*Cultus-Minister*); education in the common schools is compulsory; for the learned professions, a regular course in the gymnasia and universities is required by the state; scholars form a distinct rank or class (*Gelehrtenstand*). The unity of organization in the schools and among scholars gives scholarship a prominence and power there as found nowhere else. Each university is a great learned corporation; all universities are intimately connected with one another, with the gymnasia of the land, with the learned professions, and with intellectual movements generally. This solidarity promotes scholarly independence, freedom of thought, and concentrated power respecting the other forces and tendencies of the country.

The same country has a powerful social democracy with an organization of great compactness. Not only is its influence felt among laborers, but also by capitalists and the church. It is a political as well as industrial organization, and takes a prominent part in national affairs.

In religion the influence of organization is seen in the difference between state and free churches, also in the unity of Catholicism and the divisions in Protestantism.

The different ages in a community are important factors. It has been claimed, for instance, that it takes three generations, as

a rule, to gain the ascendency for a new view. Those who are in mature life or aged when the view is announced, are too much controlled by conservatism and traditionalism to be won by it. The young, however, are more easily influenced; they accept it, or some of them do, teach it to their children, and the children develop it and impart it, and thus it gains the victory.

While the future is so much in the hands of the young, for the dominant influence of the age itself we must look chiefly to those between the ages of 25 and 70. In infancy children are totally dependent on others and occupy the time of older persons. From infancy till twelve or fourteen they are still dependent in part. Whether they enter business or a profession, few gain an independent place or maturity of judgment before 25 which enables them to make themselves felt in the community; many have to wait longer. Perhaps it is safe to say that the strongest influence is exerted from 30 to 60, though the influence of some begins earlier and that of some lasts longer. The strength of a nation certainly lies in those above 20 and under 70.

The United States Census for 1890 gives the ages of the population of 28 cities with 100,000 inhabitants and upward. Their total population was 9,697,960, of whom 4,850,653 were males, 4,847,307 females; 227,391 were under one year; 1,059,637 under five years; 2,904,118 under fifteen; 5,199,410 from fifteen to forty-five; 1,280,547 from forty-five to sixty-five; 285,368 sixty-five and over; and 28,517 unknown. This shows that about two-thirds of the population are between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five.

Statistics and estimates made in Europe place over one-half of the total population of the advanced nations between the ages of twenty and sixty, and over 40 per cent between twenty and fifty.[1]

In our study of the age certain factors must be reckoned with which are either new or modifications of older ones. Their influence should be considered in estimating the probable progress in the future.

Sociology as a new element has already been mentioned. Sociological studies are permeating all departments of literature and affecting all the relations of life. No prediction of the probable changes can be made, but they can hardly be short of a revolution. Individuals and associations will be viewed as in vital connection with the great social organism, thus doing away with that false isolation which is now so common.

[1] Schäffle, "Bau und Leben," iii., 59.

Running parallel with this development of sociological thought we find a growing discontent of the masses, the uprising of labor, socialism and communism, anarchism and nihilism, all evidences of a deep social ferment intent on radical changes. The theoretical and practical movements unite in making ours an age of social crises and revolutions.

As a phase in the marvellous development of modern industries with their division of labor we note the remarkable growth of cities. The improvement in agriculture has made manual labor on farms less indispensable, and the development of manufacture and commerce has more and more concentrated population in the cities. This process is seen throughout Europe and America. In the United States 3.35 per cent of the inhabitants were in cities of 4,000 inhabitants and upward in 1790; but in 1890 there were 29.20. The significance of this fact will be appreciated when we consider the effect of massing men in large bodies, the increase of association by this process, and the powerful influence always exerted by large cities in social movements.[1]

The male and female population in the different nations and the world is nearly equal; but in many places woman's influence is confined chiefly to the family. Throughout the civilized world, however, woman is coming to the front, and exercises new and greater social power. This is evident in education, in the professions, in business, in politics, and in all the social relations.

Other new or more emphasized factors can only be mentioned. The one-sided dominance of natural science seems to be at an end; on the passion for nature rises the passion for humanity. But the absorbing study of nature and the wonderful achievements of natural science have produced effects which are likely to be permanent. Whatever ideals may enchant the human heart, for this earthly life success will depend largely on subduing and using the objects and forces of nature. As humanity realizes its distinct-

[1] Mulhall ("Industries and Wealth of Nations," 16–17) says that in Europe, the United States, and the British Colonies, "cities (over 50,000 souls) show an increase of 470 per cent in 60 years, while the population outside them has risen only 70 per cent, the former growing 6½ times faster than the latter. . . . Rural population constitutes in the United Kingdom 45, on the European Continent 82, and in the United States 72, per cent of the total." "One-half of the world is engaged in agricultural pursuits, one-fourth in manufactures, one-tenth in trade and transport, and the remainder (15 per cent) in professions, public service, and other useful occupations" (19).

ness, it will, however, protest against so naturalizing man as to make him subject to nature; it will insist on humanizing nature in order to meet the demands of the human head and heart. The value of the environment will not be lost sight of again; but it will be adapted to man, not man enslaved by its conditions. The close relation of mind to body will not be forgotten, though physiology will not be substituted for psychology. In general, the trend will be from abstractions to concrete reality, without forgetting the function of reason, the value of principles, and the importance of laws and systems. This simply means that the lessons learned from the marvellous progress of the nineteenth century will henceforth be integral parts of the social forces. One-sided movements will be overcome in the course of progress, such as the extremes of conservatism and of radicalism, and the false views of individualism and socialism in economics and politics; the consciousness of self, being recovered, will determine man's place in nature; and the irrepressible needs of the human heart and life must promote a more harmonious co-operation of intellect, susceptibility, and will, in place of the cold intellectualism which tries to rationalize what requires to be experienced and practised.

Among the newer and most potent social forces of the times we put the United States. European as well as American scholars are tempted to indulge in predictions as they contemplate this rising nation. What new type of Anglo-Saxon civilization will the New World develop? Will it be Anglo-Saxon, or will foreign admixture make it an unclassifiable conglomeration? These and numerous questions of nationality and literature and life we cannot discuss. To one important point, often overlooked, attention is here directed: the effect of the position of the United States on the social power of the nation.

Their very location determines the intimate relation of European powers. Even Russia is afraid of being overwhelmed by the thought and life of the civilization of Western Europe, and the isolation of the Turk is due to his religion and the fact that he is Asiatic rather than European. When any power gains an economic advantage, others at once seek to rival the same. The powers watch one another with respect to education, politics, and military affairs, and each country carefully studies and weighs the diplomacy, the press, and the general trend of the others. Thus each nation in its action considers the rest. There is therefore a certain

European internationalism. As for many ages the world's culture and progress have been so largely concentrated in Europe, the same concentration is taken for granted respecting the future. America is studied with interest, but chiefly in its industrial movements, in the development of its vast resources, and the relation of the government to economic affairs. European scholars in particular have other interests in America; but in general its importance is supposed to consist in the fact that it affords a market for buying or selling agricultural products, manufactures, and stocks. The outside of the new university of Vienna is ornamented with the portraits of eminent scholars from all countries and ages. There is but one portrait of an American, and he belongs to the beginning of our national history: Benjamin Franklin. Thousands of Americans go abroad to absorb European culture; but what is America doing for the social progress of the world?

The question does not affect the culture at home, but only its influence abroad and on the whole of humanity. A young nation may have to concentrate its energies on the development of its resources in order to get a firm basis for the future; but the time will also come when it must consider its place in the total social organism and its influence on other nations. Our very isolation and independence may interfere with the exertion of power over other people. How far have we developed a characteristic American literature which has become a world power? In what departments of scholarship are we the leaders among the nations? To which of our schools do Europeans flock as the deepest fountains of wisdom? Have the unrivalled agricultural and industrial resources culminated in advancing to the pinnacle of modern culture all the highest interests of humanity? Do even Canada, Mexico, and South America sit at our feet to learn science and philosophy, literature and art, morals and religion, or do they look rather to distant Europe for the best models and most eminent teachers in these departments?

We cannot discuss these questions of such moment to sociological students, but present them for consideration. The answers are by no means always easy. But they are problems which naturally arise in the sociological study of the age, and come with special force to the American sociologist.[1]

[1] America affords remarkable advantages for sociological research. Good suggestions on this subject are given in the preface of "Ancient Society," by

The European complications are bewildering. Will England be able to maintain its industrial and commercial supremacy, and to hold its foreign possessions? There is no evidence of a decrease of the military armaments of the Continental nations, in spite of the crushing debts under which the people groan. Russia, with its marvellous growth in power and influence, is a problem for Europe and perhaps still more for Asia. Neither in Europe nor in Asia has that country an outlet to the south, but it seeks one to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The Turk, who has long been thought sick enough to die, could easily be disposed of if it were decided what to do with the country. Russia, ever since the testament of Peter the Great, has been eager to get Constantinople; but the enormous advantage thus given would meet with the opposition of the other European powers, France perhaps excepted. It is an interesting question for Europe and Asia and, in fact, the world, what civilization will be developed in that vast empire, which includes one-seventh of the territorial surface of the globe, — namely, one-half of Europe and one-third of Asia.

In the importance of Europe and America for a knowledge of the age, the other peoples must not be overlooked. European influence is rapidly extending in Africa, as the following, from "The Library Atlas of Modern Geography," shows. The possessions in Africa are: —

	Square Miles.	Inhabitants.
Great Britain	341,859	4,963,060
Portugal	916,100	11,781,970
France	250,000	5,275,770
Spain	13	5,086
Germany	833,000	5,110,000
Italy	316,100	5,658,000

Lewis H. Morgan. American specialists on Indian antiquities complain of the difficulty of exciting an interest in the United States in their accumulation and preservation. European ethnologists manifest a deep interest in the subject, and some of the best researches are made by them. The antiquities of Egypt have enriched European museums; and with an apathy like that of modern Egypt, Americans let many of the treasures of America's rich past wander to Europe, leaving it to others to appreciate what should be most prized at home. Not even the hand of vandalism is stayed in destroying the relics of buried tribes and old civilizations!

It is to be hoped that some day sociologists will learn to appreciate Washington as a centre for sociological investigation, on account of its Smithsonian and other collections, its government institutions, and its representatives from different nations.

Whatever influence these nations may exert in the way of political organization, industrial development, education, and religion, the climate and general sanitary conditions of a large part of the continent are not favorable to extensive and permanent settlement by the white race. Africa, while developed largely under European influence, will no doubt continue to belong to the Africans. As civilization increases they may become more independent of foreign influence. Before the supremacy of European influence is secure, many conflicts with the different peoples and with Mohammedan fanaticism may be necessary.

It is idle to speculate on the changes likely to take place in Asia with more than one-half of the population of the world. Other factors in the near future may become more important than the struggle between England and Russia for the supremacy. Germany, France, and other European nations may become factors in the struggle. More significant, however, may be the development of the Asiatics themselves. The rapid advances of Japan with its forty million inhabitants must be reckoned with. The Chinese Empire contains a population of four hundred millions. The exclusivism which prevails limits foreign influence. The people are industrious, their standard of living enables them to underbid the European in the labor market, and their effect on the industries is keenly felt in the numerous countries to which they emigrate. China will probably continue to belong to the Chinese; and if the military spirit of the people is aroused, all the calculations of European supremacy in Asia may be at an end.

What will become of India, with some three hundred million inhabitants? Can a foreign ruler maintain himself after the people grow in consciousness of power and become better able to govern themselves?

The very civilization introduced by Europe will tend to promote the independence of the Asiatic nations. The Europeans would not be apt to exterminate the natives if they could, nor can they hope to gain the perpetual dominance over them by means of colonization. Whatever outside influence, therefore, may be exerted, there seems to be no doubt that Asia will remain Asiatic, as Africa will continue to be African.[1]

This changes materially the aspect from that which considers

[1] Statistics of population make doubtful even the continued supremacy of the white race in South America.

only the most advanced nations and takes their world-supremacy as a matter of course. Interesting discussions of the subject are found in "National Life and Character," by C. H. Pearson. Many of the forecasts are far from encouraging. "The day will come, and perhaps is not far distant, when the European observer will look round to see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and yellow races, no longer too weak for aggression or under tutelage, but independent, or practically so, in government, monopolizing the trade of their own regions, and circumscribing the industry of the European; when Chinamen and the nations of Hindostan, the States of Central and South America, by that time predominantly Indian, and, it may be, African nations of the Congo and the Zambesi, under a dominant caste of foreign rulers, are represented by fleets in the European seas, invited to international conferences, and welcomed as allies in the quarrels of the civilized world. The citizens of these countries will then be taken up into the social relations of the white races, will throng the English turf, or the salons of Paris, and will be admitted to marriage" (84–85).

So far as the enlightenment of the advanced nations is concerned it is almost universally overestimated. To them is falsely attributed the science, the learning, and the culture of the very few who are on the summit. Those who study the actual condition of the most civilized nations are appalled at the fearful reign of barbarism and heathenism. Amid great industrial and intellectual development, it has been claimed that there is an actual loss of moral power. As the savage is intent on eating and drinking and pleasure, so amid material interests we see the survival of the savage in the life absorbed by gratification, but regardless of the higher purposes of life. We have no complete statistics of the oft-repeated decadence of the most advanced nations. In many instances there is decay at the top. Some of the aristocratic families are dying out, in many others there are but few descendants. The laborers usually have larger families, and in the lower races the increase of population is often rapid. There can be no doubt that in Europe and America great deterioration results from luxury, from vice, from alcoholism, and from the hardships and the low standard of life among the poorer classes.[1] But in con-

[1] "The Decline of the Family" and "The Decay of Character" are the closing chapters in Mr. Pearson's work.

nection with these destructive factors the remedial agencies, never before so general and constantly increasing, must be considered.

In connection with the study of the age a practical plan for studying a community is added. This plan will afford an opportunity for the application of many principles given in the preceding chapters. For a beginning it may be advisable to take a community smaller than a state or large city. However circumscribed the sphere, the study ought to be made a model for an investigation of all communities, whether large or small. Such a scheme as that presented is specially valuable as a guide for original investigations and is adapted to Seminar work. Each member of the class can investigate a particular department of the community and present the results to the whole class for discussion. The plan ought to be a discipline in the method of original research, and each student should give a full account of his method of procedure.

Numerous other subjects can be chosen for similar class exercises. A sociological work can be selected for discussion; the social forces of a particular time or a particular people can be investigated; a study of institutions is very important; in the present age the general social character, the social trend, the relative dominance of particular social forces, the social movements in different nations, the uprising of the masses, the social problem, socialism, and many other subjects are admirably adapted for special inquiry. Of such importance to the student is a knowledge of the age in which he lives that it may be best to take subjects from the times, considering them in connection with their genesis and also in the light of future progress.

Plan for the Study of a Community.

First make the community to be studied as definite as possible. Whether it be a village or city, a township or county, let the boundary be so exact that there can be no mistake respecting the limits of the investigation.

After determining the sphere of the investigation, fix the aim of the inquiry. What is to be the result of the

study? The aim is so important because on it depends the nature of the inquiry and of the results.

The objective reality is to be mastered. The scientific method should be adopted so far as possible. Statistics should be gathered whenever attainable. A definite method should be adopted for every department of the inquiry.

After settling the preliminaries investigate —

1. *The Natural Environment of the Community.*

This includes all the natural conditions, such as the longitude and latitude, the face of the country whether a valley or hilly, the character of the soil, the minerals, the flora and fauna, the climate, the hydrographic conditions. After describing the natural environment, its effect on the community should be indicated, on the health, on the industries, on recreation, on the life and views of the people in general.

2. *The History of the Community.*

Origin of the Community. The process of development. Epochs. Dominant factors at different periods, influential persons, significant events. Emphasis should be placed on what is characteristic and typical. What permanent forces have prevailed throughout the history? Growth of Institutions. Show the effect of the history on the present condition of the community, — on traditions, manners, customs, and the general character. Folk lore.

We now pass to the study of the community itself.

3. *Racial and National Distinctions.*

Indians, Caucasians, Africans, Mongolians. Natives, their ancestry. Were their parents natives or of foreign birth? Foreigners, their nationalities and social forces. The influence of race and nationality on the population, on the industrial, political, social, moral, and religious

situation. Advantages and disadvantages of the mixture of different races and nationalities. Processes of assimilation. Should immigration be restricted?

4. *The Family Life.*

Views respecting the family. Divorce. Number of families. Size of families. Family life. Number of married and single men and women. Causes of the surplus of men or of women in a place. The relation of the sexes. The position of woman, social, industrial, legal, intellectual. Description of the homes.

5. *Ages in the Population.*

Rate of birth and death. Other causes affecting age — emigration and immigration. Number of children under five; between five and fifteen; number of persons between fifteen and twenty; between twenty and sixty; over sixty. Deaths by accident; suicide; diseases among children; consumption and other diseases. General sanitary condition. The differences in age as affecting the character of the community.

6. *Social Groups, Unorganized.*

These include the natural, spontaneous social distinctions of a community which divide it into different classes. These groups require no specific organization to make them distinct. The lines are usually drawn definitely between the higher, the middle, and lower classes. Each of these classes may again be subdivided, so that numerous separate groups are found in every general class. The social ranks of the community are to be studied. Is there a nobility of birth? Is there military rank? Who constitute the aristocracy? The reason for social groupings is especially important. Usually the bond of union consists in what men prize most; hence the appreciation of a community can be studied in its social groups. There are groupings

according to family (consanguinity), or according to the position of ancestors (aristocracy of birth), or according to wealth, or according to pursuits, whether intellectual, artistic, or economic. It should be studied what determines the friendship of men, their associations, their social gatherings. The character and conduct of the various groups should be investigated, their sentiments, the customs and fashions which prevail, the traditions and tendencies. What is the influence of these groups on the members, on one another, and on the community? Analyze the groups in order to determine what forces prevail in them. The aim is a definite view of the social life outside of the regular organizations.

7. *The Economic Condition.*

Wealth of the community. Its source. Employments, agricultural, industrial, commercial, professional. Capitalists, laborers, servants, drones. Production, distribution, exchange, consumption. Means of communication. Different kinds of manufacture, kinds of merchandise sold. Effect of the economic condition on the character of the community. Are material interests dominant? Contrasts in the economic situation. Relation of the classes to one another. Condition of manual laborers. Does the sweating system prevail? Do women and children work in factories? Hours of labor. Treatment of laborers. Describe the manufacturing and business establishments.

8. *The Moral Condition.*

Business integrity — the ethics of Trade. The social evil. Intemperance. Gambling. Number of saloons. The criminal classes. Causes of crime. Statistics of arrests and convictions. Character and efficiency of the police. Justice in the courts. The relation of lawyers to crime. Treatment of prisoners. Is anything done for released prisoners? Various efforts at reform.

9. *The Religious Condition.*

The denominations. Their relation to one another. Churches. Character of the religious services. Statistics of attendance at the services. Church members, proportion of the entire population. Infidelity and religious indifference. The churches and the masses. The effect of the churches on the moral, social, industrial, and political character of the community. Other religious societies than churches.

10. *The Intellectual Condition.*

The Schools. Character of the education. Is education compulsory? The position of the teachers. Is there co-operation between the home and the school? Do many students attend schools away from home? Statistics of illiteracy among natives, foreigners, and the different classes. Libraries; character of the literature read. Lectures. Journals. Literary and scientific societies. Intellectual character of the professions. Intellectual influence of the professions. Literary men and authors. Is there a history of the community? Are there archives for valuable documents?

11. *Artistic or Æsthetic Interests.*

Development of taste. Appreciation and cultivation of the beautiful in nature and art. The study of music. Sculpture in homes and in public. Painting, drawing, photography. Architecture. Landscape gardening. Parks. Museums. Concerts, operas, theatres. Artists. Musicians. Poets. Societies for the promotion of art. What does the community do to promote æsthetic culture?

12. *The Political Condition.*

Exact nature of the government of the community. The constitution and the laws. Officials and their functions. The relation of the community to the state and

nation. What is left to the individual, and what is controlled by the public? Who controls the gas and water works and the street railway? Taxes. Efficiency and honesty of the government. The saloon in politics. Political parties. Questions at issue. Character of the elections.

13. *Public Institutions.*

Penal and charitable institutions. Prisons, reformatories, asylums. Theory respecting the aim of punishment. Character of the penal institutions. Provision for paupers and the defective classes. The almshouse. The insane asylum. A study of the physically and mentally defective, such as the blind, the deaf and dumb, the lame and diseased, epileptics, idiots, etc., and the provision made for them. The relation of public to private charity. Efficiency of the charities.

14. *Voluntary Organizations.*

For industrial, political, intellectual, æsthetic, recreative, moral, and religious purposes. The motives which lead to organization. What social forces are involved in the organizations? Classify the organizations. Masons. Odd Fellows. Labor organizations. Temperance and other reformatory societies. Combinations of capitalists. Religious associations. Indicate the character and efficiency of the various organizations. The relation of the organizations to one another and to the community. The good and the evil in the organizations.

15. *The Community as an Organism.*

What unity prevails? What is held in common? The public interests. Disintegrating factors. Antagonisms. Conflicts. Individualistic and communistic tendencies. Is there a public opinion? If so, how is it formed, how expressed, and what is its influence? The exact character of the community as an organism.

16. *The External Relations of the Community.*

What bonds unite it to contiguous communities? The influences it exerts on, and receives from, them. Dependence and independence. Show the exact nature of the relation to the environment, whether predominantly agricultural, industrial, political, intellectual, moral, or religious. The place of the community as an organism in organisms is to be determined. From its immediate social environment we consider the relation of the community to the state, the nation, and to humanity. Not being isolated, it can be understood only in its organic connection with the totality to which it belongs. Has the community a representative in the legislature or in congress? How is it affected by the laws of the state and the nation? Has it direct or only indirect connection with foreign countries?

To this scheme for the study of the natural environment, the character, the history, and the relations of a community can be added an inquiry into its ethical needs, in order to promote its future progress.

REFLECTIONS.

The Age, define it. Exact Aim of the Study. Difference between Social and Sociological Study. Classification of Nations for the Study of Humanity. What Nations are worthy of Special Inquiry? Dominant Forces. Genesis of their Dominance. Reactions. Importance of the Relative Prominence of Social Forces in Different Ages. Power of Organization of Forces. Effect of the Differences of Age in a Community. Forces which are New or have been Changed. The Social Influence of the United States as affected by Location. Give the General Outlines of the Plan for the Study of a Community.

INDEX.

Adaptation, basis of association, 157–159.
Age, The, its characteristics, 304–308, 311, 312; its study, 179, 180; limited knowledge of, 296, 297.
Ages in a community, 315, 316.
Animal organization, 59, 142.
Aristotle, how used in Middle Ages, 39; obscured for ages, 229; philosophy of, 89; politics, 13, 78, 86.
Association and aggregation, 46, 117, 137.
Association, classification of, 187; conscious and unconscious, 8, 9, 46, 47; distinct from sociation, 130; kinds and degrees, 137, 138; not as its individuals, but as its social forces, 125, 126; primitive, 9; reasons for, 157–160; what it involves, 154–159.
Associative forces, 246, 247.
Associative impulses, 169–172.
Augustine, 86.

Bacon, Lord, formulated law for science, 20, 31, 257; movement of states, 183.
Bacon, Roger, 220.
Bascom, John, definition of Sociology, 110; subjects discussed by, 266.
Bastian, P. W. A., on environment, 227.
Bentham, 22.
Bernheim, E , history, 93, 99.
Biology and Sociology, 48, 59.
Bossuet, 21.
Bowne, B. P., 269.
Brande, W. T., on matter, 288.
Brinton, D. G., 266.
Buckle, mistake of, 227; the thinker and the observer, 261.

Caird, E., on the Positive Philosophy, 41.
Carlyle on ideals, 210.
Carpenter, W. B., on matter, 288.
Causes, real and imaginary, 189, 190.
Characteristics, American, 303; German, 302, 303; Russian, 302.
Christianity, 15, 16.
Christian thought and the science of society, 18–20.
Civilization and the lower races, 321, 322.
Civilization, improvement of, 232; wherein distinguished from savagery, 11, 12.
Clearness and distinctness, 73.
Clement, Epistles, 39.
Cohn, G., ethics, 225; method, 263.
Communism, 134.
Community, analysis of, 323–329.
Comte, 28–37; on ethical factor in Sociology, 205; hierarchy of sciences, 32, 33, 147, 275; Positive Philosophy, 67; theological, metaphysical, and positive stages, 29–31.
Conscience, individual and social, 231.
Consciousness of kind, 159, 160.
Conservatism and Radicalism, 192, 193.

Constructive social forces, 209, 210.
Co-operation, individual and social, 152, 153.
Copernicus, 181.
Cosmopolitanism, 300.
Crabbe on society, 52.
Critical method, Kant and Comte, 34, 35, 274.
Culture, history of, 28, 90; literature on history of, 92.

Darwin and heredity, 227, 228.
Darwin, on evolution, 60–62; on nature and law, 292; on practical application of science, 203.
Decadence, 322.
Deduction, 243.
Descriptive Sociology, 107.
Design, 61.
Differentiation, process of, 194–198.
Dilthey, W., 263.
Division, a mental convenience, 105; benefit of, 106; completeness of sociological, 233–237; how found, 108; into Static and Dynamic Sociology, objections to, 106, 107; mental abstraction, 103, 104; rules for, 105.
Dogmatism, 262, 280, 282, 283, 293.
Draper, J. W., on law, 292.
Du Bois-Reymond, 283.
Duns Scotus, on natural and supernatural, 20.

Education, individual and social, 132.
Emerson on society, 133.
Encyclopedists, 35.
Engels, Friedrich, emphasis on economics, 85.
Environment, limit of its influence, 226, 227.
Equality, law of, 248, 249, 263.
Ethical Actuality, The, 220, 221.
Ethical factors in Comte, 204, 205.
Ethical Ideal, The, 216–220.
Ethics, sociological, aim of, 207, 208, 210–212, 216–219, 226; importance, 209; justified, 202–207, 225, 226; distinguished from social, 208; science and art, 230, 231.
European complications, 320.
European influence in Africa, 320, 321.
Evolution of homogeneity into heterogeneity, 193–198.
Evolution, sociological, what it includes, 166, 167.

Fairbanks, Arthur, 43, 265, 266.
Family, The, 9–11, 50–52.
Flint, R., 39, 40.
Franklin, B., 319.
Freedom of will and law, 18, 19, 65.
Fulton, Robert, 229.

Germain, Sophie, 31.
Giddings, F. H., 43, 263; consciousness of kind, 159, 160; sociological ethics, 206, 207.
Goethe, 181.
Grotius on international and natural law, 22, 40.
Gumplowicz, 69, 286.

Haeckel, Ernst, on Darwin, 62, 227.
Haeckel's monism, 289, 290.
Haldane, R. D., 198.
Hamilton, Sir William, on method, 257.
Hartmann, E. von, 170.
Hebraism, its social thought, 14, 234.
Hegel, 89; history, 174, 186; philosophy, 278.
Helmholtz, 203.
Herbart on psychology, 63, 186.
Herder, the history of humanity, 23–28, 41.
Heredity, 164, 227, 228.
Historical and rational inquiry, 90, 91.
History and biography, 121, 135.

History, its aim, 88–89, 92; its early records, 13; origin of, 12, 13; reason in, 174; social thought in, 269, 270.
Hobbes, 22.
Homer, 189.
Humanism of Greece, 14.
Humanity as a society, 47–53, 121.
Humboldt, A. von, 67.
Hume, 287.
Huxley on materialism, 289.
Hyslop, J. H,, on method, 263.

Ideal of Progress, means for realization, 221–225.
Imagination in science, 34.
Imitation, 169, 170.
Independent sociological research, 263–271.
Individual and society, 7, 8, 37, 53, 54, 116–126.
Individualism and socialism, 130–132.
Individuality and socialization, 133–134.
Individuals, distinction between isolated and associated, 121–123; not viewed as abstractions, 145, 146, 150.
Induction, 242, 243, 259.
Institutions, 177–179, 184, 185.
Internationalism, 300, 312, 313, 318, 319.

Kant on human development, 28, 41; on ultimate problems, 286.
Kepler, 34.
Kierkegaard, representative of individualism, 153.

Language, 95, 141.
Lassalle, F., iron law of wages, 256.
Law, its meaning, 257, 258; origin of, 12, 257–259.
Laws in humanity, 66, 284, 285.
Lazarus, Moritz, psychology of nations, 10, 93, 94.
Leibnitz, influence of, 22; monads of, 152; on mental energy, 64.
Lewes, G. H., on Comte, 31, 35, 36.
Literature on Sociology, 39-43, 265-269.
Littré, 41.
Locke, imitation, 170; innate ideas, 227.
Lotze, "Microcosm," 24, 186; energy of thought, 227; materialism, 288; value, 168.
Lubbock, Sir John, 266.

Mackenzie, J. L., 269.
Maine, H. S., 267.
Malthus, indebtedness of Darwin to, 62.
Martensen, socialism and individualism, 153.
Martineau, Harriet, translation of "Positive Philosophy," 41, 265.
Marx, Karl, economics, 85, 86.
Materialism, 288, 289.
Matter unknowable, 286–289.
Menger, A., 263.
Metaphysics, views of Comte and Kant, 33, 34.
Method, *a priori*, 239, 240; dependent upon the material, 244, 255; in Sociology, literature on, 263; of social evolution, 249, 250; of sociological ethics, 250–254; of Sociology, 239; of Sociology, difficulties, 258–260; sociological, 241, 255, 256, 257; statistical, 260, 261.
Middle Ages, their social thought, 16, 18–20, 39.
Mill, J. S., on happiness as life's aim, 216.
Milton, 34.
Mohl, R. von, on the state, 51.
Monism, 289–291.
Montesquieu, "Spirit of Laws," 21, 40, 96.
Morgan, L. H., 266, 320.
Muirland, J. H., 317.

Mulford, E., a nation an organism, 153.
Mulhall, M. G., on statistics, 317.
Müller, F., on classification of language, 113.
Müller, Max, language, 113, 266.

Nationality, development of, 299, 300.
Need, basis of Association, 157–159, 168, 169.
New social era, 312.
New social factors, 316–318.
Newton, 34, 252.

Objective realism, 304–307.
Organizations, when effete, 222, 223.
Orient, its social thought, 14, 15.
Original research, 261, 263–271.
Öttingen, A. von, 261.
Over-organization, 309, 310.

Pearson, Chas. H., higher and lower races, 322; motive for action, 230.
People, their growth in prominence, 17, 18.
Philosophy, Greek, 13–15.
Plato, the state, 13; philosophy of, 39, 89.
Political economy, changes in, 86, 87; its place, 85–87; its prominence, 84, 85; literature on, 87, 88.
Population of the globe, 297.
Prevision in Sociology, 180–184, 198, 199.
Primitive social state, 165.
Principles, how obtained, 244–249.
Principles of society, 143–160; and social evolution, 149; defined, 143–146, 150; their contents, 147–149.
Processes involved in social evolution, 163–165.
Progress, 172, 173, 199, 212–214, 228–233; individual and social, 153, 223–225.
Psychology and environment, 63–65.
Psychology of Nations, 93, 94.

Quatrefages on Human Kingdom, 292.
Quesnay, 21.
Quételet, 31, 260.

Ranke, L. von, on use of historical documents, 259.
Ratzel, F., 266.
Ratzenhofer, G., on Sociology, 110.
Rayleigh, Lord, on materialism, 288.
Reform, 251, 252.
Riehl, A., freedom of the will, 19; natural selection, 61.
Riehl, W. H., 83.
Rome, Ancient, influence on social thought, 15, 39.
Rousseau, 9, 21.
Russia, its growing influence, 320.

Saint-Simon, relation to Comte, 31, 204.
Savigny, 205.
Schäffle, A. E. F., 183, 187, 263; limit of sociological knowledge, 292; study of the social condition, 231.
Schiller on History, 22, 23, 24, 41.
Schleicher, 113.
Schliemann, 156.
Schmoller, G., on physical and psychical processes, 289.
Schönberg, G., 87.
Schulze-Gaevernitz, G. von, organic development, 148.
Science and association, 276, 277.
Science and philosophy, 277–279.
Science, its limitations, 275–277; technical sense, 277.
Seminar, subjects for, 323–329.
Seth, James, 198, 269.
Sidgwick, H., 269.
Simcox, E. J., 267.

Simmel, G., social phenomena, 198.
Social achievement and inheritance, 308, 309; action, its effects, 156, 157; and private action, 123–126; and private personality, 127–130; and sociological, distinction between, 113, 114, 300, 301; characteristics, 249, 250, 310, 311; causation, 256, 257; classification, 303, 304; energies in evolution, 175–177; energies the social substance, 257; evolution, 162–164; evolution, factors in, 187–189; evolution, how studied, 177–180; evolution, richness of content, 186; experiments, 262; forces and nationality, 301–303; forces, condition of organization, 142; forces, relative dominance, 190–192, 307; groups, 54, 55, 70; growth, effect on social thought, 18; its meaning, 153, 154; laws, 174; mind, the, 151, 152; perfection, the aim of social progress, 217–219; physics, 107, 129; principles and social evolution, 166, 167; products, 55; science and the social sciences, 75–77, 97–101; study in history, 269, 270; thought in modern times, 16–18, 21, 22; unity and social differentiation, 163.
Socialism, 130, 312, 317.
Sociation, 127–142; its definition, 127–129; its process, 140–142.
Society, idea of among the Greeks, 13, 14, 39; and manhood, 4; and personal freedom, 132, 133; and selfhood, 2, 3; and social phenomena, 110; and societies, 5–6, 37, 38; and the educated, 4, 5; and youth, 3; an organism, 70, 136, 150–152, 212, 213; as a system of forces, 136; composed of social forces, 54, 55–56, 128, 129, 137, 138, 144, 145; defined, 46; difficulty of the conception, 2, 6, 39, 40; genesis of the idea of, 1–43; how its conception arises in the individual, 2–8; its idea how found, 111; not dependent on individuals, 134, 135; *per se*, 244–246, 248, 249; science of, 45.
Sociological and economic view, 112, 185; inquiry, its limits, 56–66, 68, 69; literature, 40–43; specialization, 68.
Sociology and biology, 59; and evolution, 59–62; and institutions, 111; and metaphysics, 58; and philology, 101, 112, 113; and political economy, 84–88; and political science, 78–83; and psychology, 62–65; and science, 273, 274; and theology, 65.
Sociology, definition, 44–53; division, 109–114; division of labor in, 67, 68; not a grouping of social disciplines, 97–101; origin of, 36, 37; reason for its separate treatment, 73–75; relation to history, 88–93; a science in what sense, 279–281; its scientific character, how determined, 282–285; its scope, 53–71; static and dynamic, 106, 107; its subject-matter, 52, 56; what it includes, 51–53, 55.
Socrates, 227; humanism of, 14; influence on method, 257; view of the state, 13.
Spencer, Herbert, Descriptive Sociology, 107, 108; ethical discussion in Sociology, 206; on social evolution, 193–198; on matter, force, and motion, 287; on social statics, 106; on study of Sociology, 265; on the use of the term "science," 275, 281; his view of society, 52, 110, 148, 184.
Spinoza, 152.
Sprague, F. W., on social evolution, 293.
State, The, 78–83; its ethical mission, 223; literature on, 83; its origin, 10–12; its prominence in Greek thought, 13; a society, 52.
Stein, Lorenz von, on Sociology, 69.
Steinthal, H., psychology of nations, 93, 269.
Stephen, Leslie, 269; prevision, 198; social organism, 52, 120; society, 160.

Stoics, social thought of the, 15.
Struggle for existence, 175.
Supernational bonds, 187.
Süssmilch, 260.

Tarde, G., on imitation, 170.
Tauler on society, 133.
Teleological action, 155, 214, 215, 226, 227; and natural law, 255, 256.
Tertullian, 20.
Tolstoi, 302.
Tönnies, F., 47.
Trail, H. D., 268.
Treitschke, H. von, on Sociology, 83.
Turgot, forerunner of Comte, 21, 30, 31.
Tylor, E. B., history, 92, 183, 266; natural causation, 292.

Ultimate problems, 241, 242, 286, 287.
Unconscious action, 170, 171.
United States, social influence of, 318, 319.
Unorganized society, 69, 70; importance of, 267, 268.
Unit of force, 176, 177.
Unity and differentiation, 163.

Vico on the science of history, 20, 40.
Vinet, representative of individualism, 153.
Voltaire, 21.

Wagner, A., economic function of the state, 87.
Wäntig, H., on Comte, 31, 41, 42.
Ward, L. F., ethics, 233; social forces, 200; Sociology, 65, 66, 273.
Westermarck, E., on marriage, 266.
Whitney, W. D., on linguistics, 112.
Will in ethics, 251.
Williams, C. M., 269.
Wilson, D., on prehistoric man, 266.
Wundt, W., ethics and method, 263, 269.

Date Due

[redacted]

[redacted]

FACULTY

JUN 15 1971

PRINTED IN U. S. A.

HM51 .S93
Introduction to the study of sociology,
Princeton Theological Seminary–Speer Library
1 1012 00025 2009